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Abstract 
Using the extensive military justice records held at the National Archives, in 
Kew, this thesis offers a survey of soldier offending and identifies and 
delineates a soldier-specific experience of crime in the British Army, both 
as perpetrator and victim, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 
Through a detailed statistical analysis of records from three levels of 
military court martial, and drawing on a wide range of supporting materials, 
this thesis will demonstrate the ways in which the soldier experience of 
crime both overlapped with and differed from that of his civilian 
counterpart, how it was shaped and contextualised by military service and 
regimental life, as well as how that soldier-specific experience was itself 
differentiated and transformed by rank, for those soldiers who achieved non-
commissioned officer status. In considering this experience, this thesis will 
explore what crime can tell us about soldiers’ sense of identity as soldiers, 
and their relationships with authority, their service, each other and the wider 
civilian world. It will also show that at the meeting point between military 
and civilian worlds, as well as within regimental communities, there 
operated a thriving black market in stolen and military goods. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1813, the Duke of Wellington wrote of his army: ‘We have in the 
service the scum of the earth as common soldiers.’1 Though this complaint 
was due to the excesses of the British troops campaigning on the continent, 
it mirrored rather neatly the general view of the soldiery held by the British 
nation during the long eighteenth century.  Poorly paid and subject  to a 
military legal system which itself was seen as antithetical to liberty, the 
British soldier was a figure of derision and disdain right up until the fatal 
moment in which he was transformed by battle into a hero.
2
  Such was the 
low standing of the regular army within Britain, that he retained his image 
as brutalised and disorderly well into the nineteenth century. Recent years 
have seen an attempt by historians to rehabilitate the eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century British soldier, to set him within a wider context and to 
understand the nature of his service beyond the picture painted by army 
regulations and the prosecution of large-scale wars.  
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s,  with grand scale works such as 
Corelli Barnett’s, Britain and her Army: A Military, Political and Social 
History of the British Army  and H.C.B Rogers’ comprehensive institutional 
analysis of The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, with its ‘socio-
military’ approach to army life, and continuing into the 1980s with works 
such as John Brewer’s Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 
1688-1783, this attempt to integrate the history of the British army into a 
wider political and social context was for a time labelled a ‘New Military 
History’; a moniker which, according to Will Tatum’s 2006 survey of the 
field, brought with it unhelpful academic divisions and methodological 
inconsistencies between ‘old’ and ‘new’.3 In particular, Tatum considers 
                                                     
1
 Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington, The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke 
of Wellington, K.G.: During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, 
Spain, the Low Countries, and France. From 1799 to 1818,ed. by, John Gurwood,  
Volume 10 (London: Murray, 1834), p. 496.  
2
 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-
1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002), p. 55; E. E. Steiner, 
‘Separating the Soldier from the Citizen: Ideology and Criticism of Corporal 
Punishment in the British Armies, 1790-1815,’ Social History, 8 (Jan, 1983), 19-35 
(p. 29). 
3
 William Tatum III, ‘Challenging the New Military History: The Case of 
Eighteenth-Century British Army Studies’, History Compass, 5 (2006), 72-84 
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that the opening up of military subjects, by other historical schools, to 
methodologies unsuited to the analysis of military documents in some cases 
led to a less nuanced understanding of some aspects of military life. Tatum 
suggests key examples of this can be found in some of the 1980s through to 
the early 2000s scholarship on the role of women in the eighteenth-century 
British army, in which the methodologies of gender history applied to 
women in a military setting at times robbed their historical subjects of 
agency, even as they cast a brighter light on their roles and importance to 
the history of the British army. Similarly, he suggests that some of the 
attempts to analyse soldiers through the methodologies and models of 
cultural, and in particular, labour histories have further ingrained the image 
of the eighteenth-century British soldier as a particularly unfortunate and 
downtrodden example of his social class, even as they stripped away some 
of the old stereotypes of criminality and brutishness, moving away from 
assumptions of forced enlistment through the justice system and towards 
enlistment forced through economic or social distress.
4
   
Tatum’s call to abandon the divisions between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ 
military histories, in favour of a new division between the ‘History of War’, 
incorporating both the ‘old’ military campaign and battlefield histories and 
the impact of war on wider society and the political state, and the ‘History 
of the Army’ as an institution, incorporating both the traditional regimental 
and institutional histories, and the experiences of those who lived and 
served within, seems compelling.  According to his analysis, whilst the 
                                                                                                                                       
(pp.74-76); also, Corelli Barnett,  Britain and her Army: A Military, Political and 
Social History of the British Army (London: Cassel,1970);  H.C.B. Rogers, The 
British Army of the Eighteenth Century, (London : Allen and Unwin, 1977); John 
Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
4
 Tatum gives as an example of these problematic readings of military materials: 
the use of ‘analytical approaches [...] not designed around military source 
materials’, in Kathleen Wilson’s work, and an over emphasis on ‘the seeming 
helplessness of the enlisted man’s experience’ in Sylvia Frey’s work. He does, 
however, note several examples of successful application of social history models, 
most notably, the work of Stephen Brumwell with ‘the best synthetic volume to 
date on the army during the French and Indian War’, and in contrast to Wilson, the 
much more successful application of gender history models in Fraser Easton’s 
work: Tatum, pp.76-79;   Kathleen Wilson,’Britannia into Battle: Women,War and 
Identities in England and America,’ in The Island Race: Englishness, Empire, and 
Gender in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Routledge,2003), 92–128 ; F. 
Easton,“Gender’s Two Bodies: Women Warriors, Female Husbands and Plebeian 
Life,” Past & Present, 180 (2003), 131–74; Brumwell, Redcoats. 
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‘New Military History’ of the 1960s carried with it a clear academic 
mission, the field beyond traditional military history later became 
fragmented and fractured. In particular, he suggests the lack of a unifying 
academic mission or understanding and the concomitant lack of academic 
debate around an identifiable core led to an even greater division between 
traditional, or ‘old’ military history and the successors to the ‘New Military 
History’, which became absorbed into non-military historical schools.  
In the years since Tatum’s article, the field has changed again. In 
particular, the paucity, he noted, of ‘academic’ as opposed to popular work 
specifically on the eighteenth-century British army and the lack of discourse 
between the different approaches is much less apparent. Rather than a 
dangerous fragmentation, it would seem that this new scene offers instead a 
multi-faceted view of military lives and cultures. Far from denying agency, 
the work of social historians like Jennine Hurl-Eamon, with her focus on the 
economic survival strategies of soldiers’ and sailors’ wives, has offered new 
and dynamic interpretations of the roles and experiences of military  and 
naval families.
5
  
Approaching civilian evidence bases, such as the trial records of the 
Old Bailey, has allowed a greater understanding of lives lived at the border 
of military and civilian worlds and shown that, just as there may have been 
potential difficulties in utilising ‘foreign’ methodologies to analyse military 
records, there are also distinct dangers in allowing military records to stand 
alone as evidence for military lives. Indeed, Tatum’s suggestion that 
military records require a specialist approach seems something of an 
overstatement, as the same claim could easily be made for any evidence 
base, civilian or military. Carole Divall’s use of the 30th Regiment as a case 
study for an in-depth exploration of the professional lives of soldiers and 
officers, has reinvigorated the genre of regimental histories, with her 
approach to military sources through broader methodologies. Edward Coss’s 
All for the King’s Shilling, meanwhile, with a much a more traditional 
military history methodology, directly tackles the stereotypes of innate 
                                                     
5
Jennine Hurl-Eamon, ‘The Fiction of Female Dependence and the Makeshift 
Economy of Soldiers, Sailors and Their Wives in Eighteenth-Century London’, 
Labor History, 49 (2008), 481-501; ‘Insights into Plebeian Marriage: Soldiers, 
Sailors, and their Wives in the Old Bailey Proceedings’, London Journal, 30 (May 
2005), 22-38. 
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criminality attached to the British soldier of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.
6
 
The shift in focus towards the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
soldier as more than either an embodiment and expression of martiality, or a 
simple manifestation of social displacement, and towards the army as more 
than a simply military machine, or expression of the national political will, 
has opened up new avenues of research and begun to offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the men, and women, who served during this period, as 
well as of the military institutions in which they served and lived.  The work 
of Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, in particular, highlights the 
complications inherent in defining ‘soldiers’ and ‘soldiering’ in the context 
of a military system which incorporated very different forms of service, 
from the traditional regimental private enlisted for ‘unlimited service’ to the 
citizen-soldiers of the militia, chosen by ballot, and the part-time volunteers, 
with their local gentry officers and distinct regional loyalties.
7
  
Their work raises important questions of identity and loyalism, and 
make evident a need for a third strand to military history: the history of the 
soldier, straddling the line between the divisions Tatum identified.
8
 In the 
introduction to Britain’s Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society, 1715 – 
1815, Linch and McCormack state the aims of the collection of essays to be 
an exploration of Britain’s military during a century of near constant 
warfare, ‘by focusing in detail upon its combatants’. They suggest that, 
whilst ‘war and society’ studies have been valuable, they have generally 
concentrated on the impact of war on civil society, and argue instead for a 
refocusing on war, ‘using the techniques from social and cultural history in 
                                                     
6
 Carole Divall, Inside the Regiment: The Officers and Men of the 30th Regiment 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 
2011); Edward Coss, All for the King's shilling: the British Soldier under 
Wellington, 1808-1814, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010).   
7
 K. Linch, and M. McCormack, ‘Defining Soldiers: Britain’s Military, c.1740–
1815’, War in History,  20 (2013),  144-159; also see Stephen Conway, The British 
Isles and the War of American Independence (Oxford: OUP, 2000; repr. 2002), pp. 
102-103. 
8
 Linch and McCormack, ‘Introduction’, Britain's Soldiers: Rethinking War and 
Society, 1715-1815, ed. by, Linch and McCormack, (Liverpool: LUP, 2014), pp. 1-
14 (p. 3). 
14 
 
 
 
order to study the lives of its combatants, and to think about their place 
within society and culture’.9 
Most importantly, perhaps, the academic dialogue has begun in 
earnest, bringing together historians from a variety of fields and 
perspectives within a more or less unified mission, fuelled largely by 
growing interest in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, their 
impact on society and the experiences of those involved.  Conferences such 
as War, Society and Culture in Britain, 1750-1850, held at the University of 
Leeds in the summer of 2013 and its predecessor, Britain’s Soldiers, 1750-
1815, in 2011, both part of the AHRC funded project, Soldiers and 
Soldiering in Britain, c.1750-1815, saw the coming together of scholars 
from a wide variety of historical schools, and indeed academic disciplines, 
with a common but broad purpose in mind.
10
 Far from a dangerous 
fragmentation, it would seem that this new scene offers instead a multi-
faceted view of military lives and cultures. 
And yet, as Coss points out in the introduction to his 2010 study of 
soldiers’ combat motivations, the image of the ‘redcoat’ as essentially an 
outcast from civil society, either on the grounds of criminality and 
brutishness or stark poverty and social distress, still carries weight in 
popular history.  In his analysis of the British soldier’s campaign behaviours 
and motivations to fight, Coss explores what amounts to a two centuries 
long slander against the rank and file of Wellington’s army.11  This 
idiosyncratic acceptance amongst past historians across the field, of a 
characterisation that falls apart at the slightest scrutiny, is both intriguing 
and odd, and Coss makes a strong case for a thorough re-examination both 
of the eighteenth-century British soldier himself, and his place within the 
field as a historical subject.  Coss’s reappraisal of soldier motivations allows 
him to apply the same model of ‘small group dynamics’ to the eighteenth-
century British army, company and regiment, which has been applied to 
other soldiers in other theatres of war.
12
  Drawing from modern 
                                                     
9
 Linch and McCormack, ‘Introduction’, Britain's Soldiers, ed. by, Linch and 
McCormack, p. 3. 
10
 For details of the project and conferences: http://redcoats.ning.com. 
11
 Coss, pp. 29-49.  
12
In defining and delineating groups, Coss draws on the work of Charles Cooley, 
whose writings in the early twentieth century set the foundation for modern 
15 
 
 
 
understandings of the psychology of warfare and small-group dynamics, 
Coss addresses the inherent flaw in the historical picture of the eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth-century British soldier: anti-social thugs do not make 
good soldiers.
13
 
In exploring the disconnect between popular perception and 
historical reality, the field of military history has begun to incorporate a 
much wider range of approaches, shedding light on the cultural and social 
history of the soldier, even as they clarify his legal and political identity. 
The internal world of the regiments has become a particular focus for 
historians in this field, as has the often fraught relationship between the 
British nation and its armed forces.  Studies of recruitment practices and 
desertion patterns have told us much about the social origins of the British 
soldiery, but have yet to fully answer the question of criminality; though 
Coss’s study tackles the perception of the British soldiery as brutish, anti-
social and violent, both in terms of forced enlistment through the justice 
system, and behaviour on campaign.   
Arthur Gilbert, Glenn Steppler and Peter Burroughs, writing in the 
1970s and 1980s, did much to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of 
military justice, with their respective studies into the structures and practices 
of the courts martial system, its relationship to civil justice, sentencing 
practices and, in Gilbert’s case, what those courts martial records can tell us 
about why some men chose to desert the army in which they had enlisted.
14
  
Hurl-Eamon’s recent and current work, meanwhile, has contextualised 
crime as a survival strategy amongst soldiers’ and sailors’ wives in London, 
within the broader experience of their social class.  
                                                                                                                                       
understandings of the organisational features of social groups; though there may be 
potential dangers in assuming a universality to soldiering across different historical 
contexts: Coss, pp. 6-9. 
13
 Coss, p. 4 
14
Arthur N. Gilbert ‘Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army 
Officers’, Historical Journal, 19 (March, 1976), 75-87; ‘The Regimental Courts 
Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army’, Albion, 8 (Spring, 1976), 50-66; 
‘Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment’, 
Journal of British Studies, 17 (1978), 41-65; ‘Why Men Deserted the Eighteenth-
Century British Army,’ Armed Forces and Society, 6  (1980), 553-67; G. A 
Steppler., ‘British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of Regimental Courts 
Martial in the later Eighteenth Century’, EHR, 102, (Oct, 1987), 859-886; P. 
Burroughs, ‘Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815-1870’, EHR, 100 
(1985), 545-571. 
16 
 
 
 
This thesis is intended to contribute to the ongoing mission to 
understand the British soldier of the long eighteenth century and in 
particular the role of crime in his personal and professional life. If we take 
as a starting point an understanding of the British soldier as not necessarily 
more criminal than his civilian counterpart, we can begin to ask questions 
about his experience of crime and the role it played in his life and service.  
Some work has been done in this area already, for example the 
aforementioned study by Coss, in which a strong case is made for soldiers 
engaging in acts of theft as a direct result of service conditions.
15
  
Such studies have primarily focused on the soldier’s campaign 
behaviour and experience of crime whilst on active service and it is 
considered that this has been amply demonstrated by Coss.  Few historians 
would argue that theft and plunder amongst the soldiers who marched under 
Wellington in the Peninsula, for example, was anything other than a 
response to a highly specific context.  Very little work has yet focused on 
the soldier’s experience of crime during those months or years in which he 
was militarily inactive, arguably a more defining feature of army life than 
active campaigning ever was.
16
 What work has been undertaken to 
understand crime in this context has tended to be tightly focused on 
individual regiments or locations, such as Hurl-Eamon’s work on military 
and naval wives in London, and Carol Divall’s study of life in the 30th.  
Wellington’s famously disparaging remark, which to a large extent 
set the standard for how those men have been viewed by historians for the 
past two centuries, underlines the image of the British redcoat as uniquely 
and particularly criminal in nature. Coss, Hurl-Eamon and others, have 
overturned many of the stereotypes surrounding the apparent criminality of 
eighteenth-century soldiers and military families.  In this ongoing re-
appraisal of the eighteenth-century British soldier, criminality appears less 
as a character trait common to those who enlisted, but rather a necessary 
component of military life, itself subject to a series of cultural regulations 
and ‘group norms’.17 Though as a counterpoint to that, Stephen Conway 
argues that, whilst in some respects the army may have been a ‘school for 
                                                     
15
Coss, pp. 17-18. 
16
 Linch and McCormack, ‘Defining Soldiers’, p. 145. 
17
 Coss, pp. 17-18 
17 
 
 
 
crime’, in other respects it may have acted to rehabilitate those soldiers who 
did enter as convicted criminals.
18
  In Hurl-Eamon’s analysis, soldiers and 
military families in eighteenth-century London can be seen to operate within 
a similar set of cultural norms to those of other plebeian groupings. Though 
subject to a particular and peculiar set of stressors, military families 
employed many of the survival strategies which can be seen to have been 
employed by other, non-military families, and in doing so displayed some of 
the same cultural understandings of and attitudes to crime. Coss’s study, 
meanwhile, demonstrates how the exigencies of campaign life turned the 
crimes of looting and plundering, particularly of food or alcohol, into vital 
and much valued campaign survival skills, conducted within a strict moral 
framework of behaviour and governed by the ‘group norms’ of the military 
communities in which soldiers lived.
19
   Between the two poles of domestic 
metropolitan living and life on the campaign trail in the Peninsular, there is 
a broad spectrum of military lives and experiences, and it could be argued 
that the ‘typical’ experience of the British soldier during this period lies 
somewhere between these two points.  It is how crime features in this 
military experience that is of most interest to this study. 
This thesis will provide a broad survey of soldier crime during this 
period, taking account not just of the desperate pilfering of half-starved 
marching soldiers, but the wider patterns of crime within British military 
communities.  Broadly covering the period c.1740-1830, allows temporal as 
well as specific contextual factors to be taken into account, incorporating 
both the peacetime and wartime experiences of the British soldier. This 
period saw the British Army begin to take a more recognisably modern 
shape, with a drive towards professionalization, even as the image of the 
redcoat began to take on the aspects mentioned above.
20
  At the same time 
the ‘Redcoat Era’ was largely one of continuity, with tactics and internal 
structures changing little between Cumberland’s reforms of the mid-
eighteenth century and the mass mobilisations of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars.
21
 Even with the rapid changes to recruitment and training 
                                                     
18
 Conway, The British Isles and the War of American Independence, p. 101. 
19
 Coss, pp. 17-18. 
20
Corelli, Barnett, Britain and her Army: A Military, Political and Social History of 
the British Army (London: Cassel and Co., 1970), pp. 168-70, 246-47. 
21
Barnett, p. 175. 
18 
 
 
 
practices during the Napoleonic Wars, continuity in key personnel and 
military philosophy ensured that the basic experience of the British soldier 
remained broadly similar to that of the previous generation, and would 
continue to do so until the reforms of the Victorian era.  Such a timeframe 
allows a broader experience to be drawn, whilst at the same time offering 
specific periods within that to be examined.  Whilst the earlier period will 
provide that sense of continuity, the years covering the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, with their increase in record keeping, more formal 
approach to military justice and increase in soldier literacy levels, offer a 
more detailed picture of the soldier experience.
22
 
An examination of crime and criminality is also an examination of a 
series of relationships. As Douglas Hay puts it, it is an examination of 'the 
structure of relationships that we call (in a moment of abstraction or 
generalization) "crime"’. Though Hay cautions the dangers of attempting to 
reconstruct complex relationships and circumstances through the ‘archaic 
language and fossilized categories of the criminal law, written on a few 
desiccated slips of parchment’, he also considers the value of the attempt.23 
By studying the soldier’s experience of crime we can shed light on his 
relationships with other soldiers, with his family, with civilians and with 
various levels of authority. This thesis examines the role crime played in 
military life, its impact on individuals and even on the service itself, and 
considers what crime meant to the soldier either as perpetrator or victim.  
Along with establishing the kinds of crime prevalent within military 
communities, it will consider the ways in which military service shaped, and 
provided the context for, the soldier’s experience of crime. It is important 
that whilst we recognise soldiers as belonging to discrete military 
communities, those communities often lived and worked alongside civilians, 
and as such the role of civilians in soldier crime is also an important 
consideration.  
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Relations between soldiers and civilians may not always have been 
comfortable, but they were nonetheless often close.  With few barracks, the 
majority of soldiers during the eighteenth century would have found 
themselves living primarily within a wider civilian setting, either billeted 
with civilians, or in camps near to civilian communities.
24
 When examining 
property crime in particular, it is useful to consider how that might have 
provided conduits between civilian and military worlds. This thesis 
considers the various forms of property crime to which soldiers were victim 
and which soldiers committed, their motivations for such crimes and 
common features which united those experiences, and also demonstrates the 
existence of a thriving black market, operating ‘across the borders’ of 
military and civilian worlds, and internally as a ubiquitous feature of army 
life. It considers crimes of violence within the regimental community, how 
that community responded to them and how they appear in the military 
justice records, and also demonstrates some of the distinctions between how 
violence was experienced by private soldiers and how it was experienced by 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Essentially it is the intention of this 
thesis to identify and characterise a common, soldier experience of crime, 
both as victim and perpetrator and to demonstrate how and in what ways 
military service and army life shaped and defined that experience of crime 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
Additionally, a secondary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the 
usefulness and value of a unique set of official documents, created by the 
determination of early nineteenth-century British military commanders to 
professionalise their institution and to document and record the judicial 
processes and service conditions of the men under their command. The 
majority of studies into military justice have tended to focus on one, or two 
levels of courts martial, examining either regimental, or general courts 
martial, or a combination of the two. In examining samples from all three 
levels of the courts martial system, this thesis will provide a much broader 
look at the way crime functioned in the lives and service of soldiers in the 
British army, across the whole service, as well as consider the experiences 
of individual soldiers and regiments. 
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Thesis structure 
Chapter One will introduce some of the main themes to be 
considered in this thesis, offer an explanation of terms and consider 
important questions of definition. It will also provide an introduction to the 
core sources used and a brief explanation of the military justice system. It 
will explain the methodology used in the statistical analysis of the three 
levels of courts martial records, as well as outline the headline findings of 
that analysis and introduce the three regiments used as case studies.  
The chapters that follow will offer detailed analyses of particular 
categories of offence, with statistical analysis of offences represented in the 
courts martial records, and an exploration of other sources to explore how 
those offences featured in the lives and service of soldiers, as well as 
considering both the distinctions and areas of overlap between the soldier 
and civilian experiences of those offence types.  
Chapters Two and Three will focus on military offences, with 
Chapter Two considering the crime of desertion and related offences such as 
suicide and self-harm and Chapter Three considering regulatory breaches 
and offences of disorder, such as mutiny, disobedience of orders, and 
irregular conduct. 
Chapters Four and Five will focus on criminal offences, or those 
offences which would be recognised as criminal in both military and civilian 
spheres, and for which both soldiers and civilians might be prosecuted. 
Chapter Four will consider offences against the person, primarily violent 
crime and Chapter Five will consider offences against property, such as 
theft, and offences of dishonesty, such as fraud and embezzlement. 
Two key areas of study arise from the statistical analysis of courts 
martial records and wider exploration of other official sources, soldier and 
officer memoirs and contemporary popular culture. The first is that, just as 
there was a soldier-specific experience of crime during this period, that 
experience was differentiated by rank, with NCOs experiencing crime in 
subtly different ways to the men under them. Chapter Six will consider this 
distinction and explore how NCOs experienced crime in different ways to 
privates, as victims of violent crime and as perpetrators of property crime 
21 
 
 
 
and dishonesty offences. The second key area is the apparent existence of a 
thriving black market operating within regimental communities and between 
military and civilian worlds. Chapter Seven will consider the informal 
regimental market place and black-market trading in stolen goods. In 
particular it will explore the black market in military goods and soldiers’ 
necessaries.  
Finally, a short concluding chapter will draw together the main 
themes and patterns of crime and criminality explored in this thesis. 
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Chapter One: Definitions and Sources 
Introduction 
In order to understand the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
soldier experience of crime, we must first consider what is meant by the 
terms ‘soldier’ and ‘crime’. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, 
the term ‘soldier’ was a far less simple category in this period than might at 
first be supposed, with a variety of service types and different degrees to 
which the ‘soldier’ identified, and was identified by others, as such.25  
Defining what is or was a crime is similarly deceptive in its superficial 
simplicity. Indeed, as John Rule suggests, ‘few forms of human behaviour 
are more complex than the criminal’, with definitions of crime varying 
across time, and different parts of society.
26
  If understanding what was or 
was not considered criminal in the civilian sphere is complex, this is further 
complicated in the case of soldier crime, by the existence of two parallel 
judicial systems.  
This chapter will consider some important questions of definition 
and historically specific contexts, and introduce the key sources and 
methodologies through which this study will examine the nature, prevalence 
and role of crime within the lives and service of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century British soldiers. It is also important to define what might 
be considered criminal in the context of the time and the historical actors 
involved, and to set those definitions within the methodological approaches 
used in this study. As well as introducing core concepts and definitions, this 
chapter will also offer a brief introduction to the organisation and practice of 
military justice during the period, and in particular the three-tiered courts-
martial system from which the majority of the evidence used in this study is 
drawn. Finally, the chapter will offer a broad analysis of those sources and 
the key questions they raise. 
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‘Defining Soldiers’ 
It is necessary at this point to consider what is meant by the term 
‘soldier’ within this study; a seemingly obvious identification to the modern 
mind, but one which for the period under study was rather less so. In their 
recent article, ‘Defining Soldiers: Britain's Military, c.1815 -1740’, Linch 
and McCormack explore some of the difficulties in defining who ‘soldiers’ 
were and indeed what constituted ‘military service’ in the context of the 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British military. Alongside the 
regular army establishment, a proliferation of other service types existed, 
with varying degrees of recognition, legitimacy and inclusion within formal 
military structures.  
Linch and McCormack make the point that, whilst during this period 
Britain’s armed forces went through a ‘massive and sustained expansion’, 
the majority of that expansion occurred ‘outside the British army’, so that of 
the more than half a million men under arms in 1805, only around twenty-
three percent of them were ‘regulars’.27 With the proliferation of non-
regular regiments and services ranging from part-time volunteers, to citizen 
soldiers in the militia, and geographically limited service in the fencibles, 
the identification of ‘soldier’ necessarily encompassed a broad range of 
experiences.
28
 For some, soldiering was an activity which ran alongside 
their main occupational identity, with weekend training exercises or parades 
and a readiness to take up arms in defence of their locales should the ever-
feared threat of French invasion come to pass. For some, soldiering was a 
distinctly home-bound experience, acting, particularly with regards to the 
militia, as an ad-hoc police force in various parts of the country, whilst 
waiting for an invasion which in the end did not come.
29
  For many, service 
was a voluntary addition to their day-to-day lives and occupations. But for 
some, soldiering was their central occupation and identity and, more 
importantly for this study, defined their legal status.
30
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One of the most fundamental ways in which the various kinds of 
service were differentiated was whether or not they placed the soldier under 
the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War. This provides a useful set of 
definitional parameters in which to work; however, even this distinction has 
its complications. In the political sphere and popular culture, the ‘citizen 
soldier’ was primarily differentiated from the regular soldier by virtue of his 
localism and his legal standing.
31
 Though their regiments mirrored the 
regiments of the line in shape and structure, and in many ways offered a 
very similar experience of service in terms of camp life and training, militia 
soldiers retained the legal status of civilians except when they were on 
active service, or when the nation was at war.
32
  This thesis is most 
concerned with those men for whom soldiering was their prime occupation, 
at least during the period of service, if not for life; in other words, those men 
who served under the aegis of the British Army as an institution, under the 
authority and command of the Horse Guards and whose lives were 
structured and bounded by army regulations and expectations. This would 
include men serving in militia regiments on active service, during the period 
of that activity.  It would also include men serving in regular regiments 
providing support to the troops of the East India Company.  
A further distinction is drawn in this study between ordinary-ranking 
soldiers and NCOs, the so-called ‘other ranks’, and the commissioned 
officers who commanded them. Although officers might be considered 
‘soldiers’, their experience of soldiering and army service was highly 
differentiated from that of the other ranks, particularly, and most relevant 
here, in their experience of military justice.  As Arthur Gilbert put it in his 
analysis of ‘Law and Honour Among Eighteenth-Century British Officers’: 
‘those who joined the officers corps in the eighteenth century became 
members of an exclusive club’.33 Primarily self-policed according to a strict 
‘honour code’, which held, among other transgressions, ‘consorting in a 
familiar way with the rank and file’ to be a serious offence, their careers and 
the expectations of their service ran along wholly different tracks to those of 
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the men they commanded. For an officer, after charges of cowardice, one of 
the most serious formal charges that could be levelled against him was that 
of ‘Conduct unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman’: a catch-all charge 
covering everything from public misbehaviour, or fraternising with the men, 
to serious regulatory offences and even felonies. Gilbert gives several 
examples of serious law breaking being treated as a breach of honour 
through the use of this charge.  For serving officers, the Court Martial was 
as much a ‘court of honour’ as it was a ‘court of justice’.34  
Indeed, as Gilbert argues in his later assessment of the respective 
characters of military and civilian justice, it is almost a misnomer to refer to 
a military justice system at all, with the areas of ‘overlap’ between officers 
and men, in terms of both the kinds of charges faced and the kinds of 
punishments inflicted, so narrow as to have effectively created two different 
systems.
35
 With such a different experience of justice and military culture, 
officers necessarily represent a distinct body, separate from the ordinary-
ranking soldiers and as such warrant separate study in their own right. It is 
not the intention of this thesis to consider in any detail the commissioned 
officer’s experience of crime, except where it intersects with, and can assist 
in understanding, that of the men under their command.  
By contrast, the NCOs who stood between officers and private 
soldiers, despite the separation of their rank in terms of messing and 
authority, remained a part of the cultural and social milieu of serving 
soldiers.
36
 Like their superior officers, sergeants and corporals were 
expected to maintain a degree of distance from their men, and ‘fraternising’ 
with them was considered a breach of discipline; however, their experience 
of military justice was that of the soldier, not of the officer.
37
 This study, 
therefore, includes NCOs along with the men in the ranks. That said, it is 
important to take account of some of the distinct elements of the NCOs’ 
service, and the ways in which that could shape and impact upon both the 
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crimes they were likely to fall victim to and those they were likely to 
commit.   
There is one further caveat to add, the rank-specific nature of 
military experience. Though it was largely the case that rank reflected 
civilian social class, with officers drawn from very different social 
backgrounds to those of private soldiers, this was not absolute, nor was it 
the case that all access to a commission was closed to men from the ranks.
38
 
By the same token, it was, whilst a rarity, quite possible for a disgraced, 
former serving officer to find himself enlisting as a private soldier. In 
Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle Brigade, William Surtees recalled having 
‘several individuals serving in the corps as soldiers, who had been officers 
in the army during the late war, but who, from different causes, had been 
reduced to the necessity of enlisting as private soldiers.’39  
 
Military justice in context and definitions of crime 
The military justice system differed in some ways to that of the 
civilian system; however, in other respects they were very much part of the 
same cultural milieu and therefore shared some important characteristics.
40
A 
key element of the civilian justice system was the role played by 
discretion.
41
 At first glance the military system seems less inclined towards 
discretionary elements, but this is deceptive. In terms of written rules and 
ordinances, the military justice system appears rigid and entirely 
prescriptive; however, further examination shows that this is not always 
how the system worked in practice. Officers and soldiers practiced and 
experienced discretionary justice as an essential part of an ongoing quest for 
order on the one hand, and independence on the other.
42
 Capital offences 
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and any charges serious enough to warrant transportation, lengthy prison 
sentences of above two years, or floggings of more than 150 lashes were 
supposed to be dealt with only at a General Court Martial. In practice such 
crimes were often dealt with at the lower levels of General Regimental, or 
Regimental Courts Martial, or at a sub-judicial level by officers on the 
ground.
43
 How a particular crime was treated differed according to the 
personalities of the commanding officers involved, and to the particular 
military concerns and exigencies of the day.
44
   
For soldier victims of crime, whether that crime was reported and to 
whom depended often on the soldiers’ own relationships with each other 
and with their officers. According to Coss’s study, the soldiers who served 
under Wellington in the Peninsula engaged in self-policing along company 
lines, with some crimes that transgressed their commonly held values 
incurring informal punishments, such as being shunned by the rest of the 
company. Coss illustrates this point with examples showing that soldiers 
saw little of concern with acts of simple theft against civilians, but found it 
difficult to accept violent robbery or rape.
45
   
As in the civilian sphere, discretion played an important role within 
military justice, with the main difference being where and with whom that 
discretion lay.  In the civilian system, the victim of a crime was, in most 
cases, personally responsible not just for the apprehension and arrest of the 
accused, but also the decision to prosecute and indeed the prosecution itself 
once any trial was undertaken. Speaking of property crime in particular, 
King explains that ‘the central role was played by the victim,’ who became, 
according to one contemporary observer, ‘the sole arbiter of the fate of the 
offender’.46 Within the military system, in crimes with a clear victim, the 
discretion of that victim remained in force only at informal, sub-judicial 
levels: the decision to report and thereby trigger formal action, or to deal 
with the offence at an unofficial level, in the manner Coss described. Once 
an offence had been reported, however, the location of discretion shifted 
away from the victim and passed into the hands of the officers of the 
regiment. At this point discretion became primarily a tool of pragmatism, 
                                                     
43
 Gilbert ‘Regimental Courts Martial’, p. 51; Burroughs, pp. 557-59.  
44
 Burroughs, p. 558. 
45
 Coss, p. 114. 
46
 King, p. 717. 
28 
 
 
 
with questions of morality and justice giving way almost entirely to 
concerns about discipline and good order, alongside personal considerations 
of jurisdiction on the part of officers: whether or not an offence was dealt 
with at a higher level of court martial often depended on the degree to which 
officers wished to keep matters within their battalion or regiment.
47
  
One of the clearest distinctions between military and civilian justice 
would seem to have rested with overall intent and purpose. The offences 
which most perturbed the military, and with which they were most 
concerned, were those which related directly to military order and 
operational health.
48
 Murder, robbery and rape were and would, when 
committed on home soil, usually be given over to the civilian courts, 
particularly when committed against a civilian victim.
49
 Courts martial 
records at all three levels are dominated by regulatory offences and acts of 
disorder, with desertion and sale of soldiers’ ‘necessaries’ featuring 
particularly heavily across the board.
50
 Though Gilbert suggests that the 
army practice of ‘drawing lots’ in some capital cases involving multiple 
defendants was indicative of the ‘capricious nature of military justice’, it 
can equally stand as evidence for a fundamental pragmatism.
51
 In such cases 
several defendants facing capital sentences could be offered the chance to 
draw lots in order to decide which of them might be spared, thereby 
allowing the army to retain soldiers who might otherwise have been 
executed, whilst at the same time providing a salutary lesson to others 
through the execution of one or more defendant.  
Even at the highest level of military justice, pragmatic concerns 
necessarily dominated. As Gilbert points out, ‘the army operated under a set 
of constraints - particularly during wartime - that were markedly different 
from those that existed in civilian courts.’52 Marching regiments in 
particular were often far from home, and when on the march, speed was of 
the essence when it came to military justice.   
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The presence of many offences, which in civilian terms would not 
necessarily have been categorised as ‘crimes’, brings us to the problem of 
classification and definition.  As with the civilian sphere, the people most 
likely to find themselves at the sharp end of the justice system were not the 
same people who decided what was, or was not criminal.
53
It is notable that 
one of the defining features of the different levels of courts martial was 
whether or not they had the right to try officers, with only the highest tier, 
that of General Court Martial, having that right. Both the level of court 
martial used and the kinds of punishments imposed reflected the ‘inequities 
of a society divided by class’.54 Class distinctions in categorising and 
defining crime must be taken into account if we are to understand how it 
was experienced by the ordinary soldier, either as victim or perpetrator.  
Interestingly, it is in these class-specific definitions that we can see 
some of the closest connections between civilian and military experiences of 
crime. In ‘Insights into Plebeian Marriage: Soldiers, Sailors, and their Wives 
in the Old Bailey Proceedings’ and again in ‘The Fiction of Female 
Dependence and the Makeshift Economy of Soldiers, Sailors and Their 
Wives in Eighteenth-Century London’, Hurl-Eamon outlines some of the 
economic survival strategies employed by military families in London, 
during the late eighteenth century.  Many have their echoes in other pauper 
cultures, and raise important questions of definition.  As Hurl-Eamon 
suggests, some of the wives who appear in the Old Bailey records were 
being tried for acts that they may not themselves have considered immoral, 
founded as some of their ‘crimes’ were on a sense of occupational,  
‘plebeian entitlement’, no different in tone to that of the brick yard worker 
taking his share of ‘chips’.55  
       That we can see similar attitudes expressed by soldiers on trial 
for stealing from the king’s stores, or other corporate entities, serves as a 
useful reminder that, however distanced soldiers sometimes were from their 
domestic settings, they were still the products of civilian culture and 
retained some of the expectations of their civilian counterparts.
56
 It is 
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notable that one of the most commonly occurring offences was that of 
soldiers ‘making away with’, or selling their regimental ‘necessaries’. 
Though we will explore this crime in greater detail later in this thesis, it is 
useful to bear this in mind as we consider definitions of crime. ‘Necessaries’ 
were ostensibly provided by the army to each individual soldier for use in 
his service,  though part of the cost of such provision was borne by the 
soldier himself through his initial bounty. The cost of replacing such items 
in the event of loss was initially borne by the regiment, but recovered from 
the soldier through the system of ‘stoppages in his pay’. 
It is not difficult to see how a soldier might feel a sense of ownership 
of the shirt and coat he wore and which he had at least in part paid for. 
Referring to militia soldiers, but also relevant to the regular army, Matthew 
McCormack, suggests that the soldier’s uniform formed part of his ‘moral 
economy’.57 However much a soldier may have recognised that such actions 
transgressed the rules by which he was governed, the extent to which he 
considered them criminal was often questionable.  
For the purposes of this study, we will consider primarily those 
offences which, either to the offender or to the victim, even in cases where 
the ‘victim’ was the regiment or army as an institution, would be considered 
‘criminal’: offences against the person, or against property. Offences against 
property, primarily refers in this thesis to acts of theft, fraud and 
embezzlement, or any offence in which the perpetrator acquired, attempted 
to acquire, or was party to an acquisition of goods or money through 
dishonest means. The definition of violent crime includes both violent 
actions and threats of violent action, as well as offences of sexualised 
violence.  These categories do not, however, include destruction of property, 
rioting, or generalised calls to violent rebellion. Similarly, amongst the 
records is a small number of cases involving the mistreatment or maiming 
of animals, primarily cavalry horses. To the modern mind such acts may sit 
more comfortably within an analysis of violence, but for most of the period 
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under study would most likely have been viewed more in terms of property 
damage.  Cruelty to animals did not become a crime in and of itself until 
1822.
58
 Such offences will therefore be grouped with other regulatory 
offences, such as the deliberate breaking of military equipment. 
 Offences of a purely military or regulatory nature, such as 
‘disobedience of orders’ or ‘being drunk whilst on sentry’, will be 
considered primarily where they add to our understanding of more obvious 
criminality.
59
 That said, we must bear in mind that whilst one party might 
consider an offence to be ‘criminal’, others involved in the case may not 
share that definition.  
Within that category of ‘criminal’ offence, there are some obvious 
sub-categories. Property crimes and violent crimes, for example, offer very 
different lessons and experiences for study. To carry out a comprehensive 
analysis of all criminal offences would be too large a task for a study of this 
size, and indeed some types of crime can tell us little of a common, soldier 
experience of crime and criminality. Cases of murder appear in the records 
but with such infrequency that they should be considered highly unusual. 
Though such cases will be touched upon, they necessarily represent a very 
small part of this study, with more typical cases of non-fatal violent assault 
being more prominent.  
In contrast, the particular prevalence of certain kinds of property 
crime and the high levels of contemporary concern over such offences, 
within both the civilian and military spheres, suggest they were central to 
contemporary experiences of crime.
60
 Property crime, unlike violent crime, 
often consists of multiple acts and stages. Items pass from individuals or 
groups, to other individuals or groups, and beyond, through a series of 
interactions and relationships. If property crime is key to understanding the 
eighteenth-century experience of crime overall, its prevalence within the 
military records suggest it is equally instructive of the soldier experience of 
crime.  
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One act which arguably straddles our two definitions of regulatory 
and criminal offence is that of desertion. On the one hand, desertion was 
defined in law as criminal and indeed as a capital offence. Morally too, 
many contemporaries viewed the act of desertion as a disturbing and 
socially dangerous crime. On the other hand, it can also be seen in terms of 
contract breaking or a withdrawal of labour and was viewed by many other 
contemporaries as wholly distinct from other forms of criminality.
61
 In his 
study of ‘Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815-1870’, 
Burroughs considers desertion, ‘unruly behaviour’ and drunkenness to have 
been the ‘negative, unconstructive forms [...of protest...] open to them 
against the harassments and monotony of army life and service.
62
 This 
seems to have applied particularly to those men who faced trial for 
desertion, rather than those who successfully deserted, many of whom were 
raw recruits who regretted enlisting once introduced to the rigours of army 
life.
63
 Many of those facing trial appear not to have gone to the trouble of 
attempting to evade capture, and the number of repeat desertions suggest 
that this may indeed have been, in some cases, an expression of reckless 
dissatisfaction, rather than a concerted effort to leave the service.
64
  
As an offence, desertion has been extensively studied and can most 
likely tell us a great deal more about labour relations within the army than 
can most other offences. By its nature the act of desertion, if not 
accompanied by reenlistment elsewhere in the armed forces, often 
represented an attempt to sever the soldier identity. Though considered a 
crime in both spheres, it nonetheless occupied a very different mental and 
moral space to that of other crime types. Simple desertions, with no other 
accompanying crimes, have therefore been treated in this study primarily as 
regulatory, or military offences. Similarly, rioting and other forms of 
rebellion or resistance, such as deliberately breaking regimental equipment, 
do not sit entirely comfortably in either regulatory or criminal categories.  
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The surviving military justice records of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries play a prominent role in the evidence base for this 
thesis. In order to get a sense of the shape of crime within the army, the 
patterns of criminality and the potential effects on both individuals and 
corporate function, few sources can offer quite so much detailed and 
extensive evidence. Alongside the corporate context, these records offer 
sometimes quite detailed glimpses of specific moments in individual lives. 
Though soldiers arguably differed from their civilian counterparts as to the 
level at which their lives were recorded as a matter of course, the same 
paradigm of only really becoming ‘visible’ to us when their lives intersected 
with officialdom holds true.
65
  
The level of detail offered in deserter notices and courts martial 
transcripts far outstrips that offered by enlistment documents of individual 
soldiers who served without incident. In much the same way that the Old 
Bailey trial transcripts offer a window onto far more than just the crime in 
question, detailing as they do many very ordinary aspects of the day to day 
lives of accused and accusers, so the courts martial transcripts offer a 
window onto camp life, barracks life, and billeted life for ordinary soldiers 
serving across many theatres of operation.
66
   
With the exception of the lowest tier of formal trial, the Regimental 
Court Martial, military justice had a much more centralised recording 
system than civilian justice, with all courts martial above regimental level 
recorded and submitted to the Judge Advocate General, for trials held in 
England, and his deputy for trials held abroad.
67
 Set alongside the very 
measurable army population at any given time, and the specific details of 
regimental recruitment and retention, it is clear that this evidence base 
allows for a very detailed analysis of the prevalence of certain crime types 
within the military community and the ways in which soldiers committed 
and were victim to crimes.  
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Introduction to key sources 
The bureaucracy of military justice, and its gift to the historian is 
exemplified by the collated returns of all General Regimental Courts Martial 
conducted by the British Army during the years 1812 to 1829.
68
 Collected in 
two ledgers, the records are in a tabular form, with each entry giving details 
of an individual soldier, tried by court martial for offences ranging from 
desertion and theft, to attempted murder and rape.  The full charge faced by 
each soldier has been recorded, along with judgement and sentence, and in 
some cases there are further details as to whether that sentence was carried 
out in full or amended as a later act of mercy.  In all, the trials of over 4000 
serving soldiers and militia men on active duty are collated here, drawn 
from every theatre of operation. Given the size and scope of the register, it 
is an invaluable and relatively untapped resource for military historians, and 
lends itself very well to quantitative as well as textual analysis.  
General Regimental Courts Martial (GRCM), introduced in 1812, 
represented the middle, or ‘intermediate’ tier of military justice in the early 
nineteenth century.
69
 Though defined in a note within an 1821 volume of 
Estimates and Accounts, as ‘General Courts Martial within each regiment 
for the trial of serious and aggravated cases’, they had a slightly more 
limited jurisdiction than a General Court Martial (GCM).
70
 Aside from 
being limited to trials of men within the designated regiment only, the 
GRCM was not supposed to try capital offences, nor any charges serious 
enough to warrant transportation, lengthy prison sentences of above two 
years, or floggings of more than 150 lashes.
71
  It is highly unlikely therefore, 
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that the 4000 cases included in the register will include more than an 
occasional and wholly anomalous trial for murder, rape or high-value theft.  
By the same token, many relatively minor offences would never have made 
it to a GRCM, being more commonly dealt with in the far less scrutinised 
setting of the Regimental Court Martial (RCM), or at a less formal, sub-
judicial level by regimental officers.
72
  What we see in the GRCM register, 
along with deserters, are primarily repeat regulatory offences, repeat minor 
offences and serious, but not capital offences.  It is also important to note 
that non-military crimes would often be dealt with by the civilian legal 
system, particularly for those soldiers stationed at home.
73
 This source 
cannot, therefore, offer a comprehensive picture of crime and criminality for 
the army.  What it can do is indicate some interesting patterns and offer 
insights into a fairly broad band of crime within the army.   
Given the size of the GRCM register, such a detailed transcription 
and categorising of all 4000 entries would be too large a task for an 
individual working within the timescale of a PhD, and would risk over-
emphasising this middle tier of court martial at the expense of the upper and 
lower tiers. Instead, a sampling scheme is considered to provide both the 
necessary scope and manageability. Six years have been sampled, 
comprising three pairs of years, located near the start, middle and end of the 
register, at five year intervals: 1813-1814, 1819-1820, 1825-1826. This will 
form the main statistical analysis of the register entries; however, where 
needed, entries from other years have also been utilised, and the year 1818 
has also been sampled for use with the GCM level sample. This will give 
some sense of offending patterns across different periods at this level, whilst 
also facilitating a number of case studies: a detailed examination of two 
years of serious offences for the whole service at GRCM and GCM level 
and a single year across all three levels of military justice for three different 
regiments. 
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Alongside the GRCM register are two registers of General Courts 
Martial, with one listing all GCM trials confirmed at home, and the other all 
GCM trials confirmed abroad.
74
 Two years of these registers have been 
sampled, covering the period 1st January 1818 to 31st December 1819. As 
the highest tier of military justice, the presence of ordinary-ranking soldiers 
and NCOs is much smaller in this sample, with far more soldiers tried at 
RCM or GRCM levels. The kinds of offences tried at this level tend to be 
more serious, or involve persistent offenders. In terms of format, the GCM 
registers are very similar to the GRCM registers, and therefore allow for a 
similar approach in terms of sampling and recording. The GCM sample has 
been used alongside the GRCM sample to form a more detailed picture of 
criminality for specific years, and to show how offences moved through the 
levels of courts martial.  
For some of the period covered by the GRCM register, there are also 
surviving RCM registers included within the twice-yearly regimental returns 
submitted by individual regiments.
75
 Regimental reports for three individual 
regiments, covering the twelve month period from September 1818 to 
October 1819, have been studied alongside the registers, allowing the three 
regiments to be used as case studies within the wider statistical analysis. As 
with the whole service GRCM and GCM registers, the trial details included 
in these individual regimental returns are frustratingly slight. When set 
alongside the registers, however, they can add depth to the picture of crime 
within individual regiments, as well as allowing an analysis of how crime 
appears across the three tiers of justice through which the military dealt with 
most soldier crime.   
Registers of General Regimental Courts Martial, 1812 to 1829 
A simple spreadsheet database programme allows for a very flexible 
and multi-levelled analysis of the registers. The registers record the name, 
rank, regiment and date of trial for each entry.  These have been transcribed, 
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along with the charge and sentence summaries.  Offences have been 
identified as one or more of the following: desertion; simple regulatory; 
theft; fraud or embezzlement; violent; sexual, and finally self-harm.  Further 
category fields assess, where possible, the types of victim involved, with 
victims classified as: civilian; fellow soldier; officer or employer; NCO; 
member of another service (such as the navy or the marines), and lastly the 
regiment or the army as an institution.  This allows a nuanced interrogation 
of the evidence, which takes account of important considerations, such as 
whether or not the perpetrator of a crime expected to remain within the 
military community at the time they committed the offence, and the extent 
to which crime was externally or internally focused.   
Testing the method 
Alongside the six complete years sampled from the GRCM Register, 
which provide the core of the quantitative analysis for this study, an initial 
test sample of the first six months of the register is also of interest. 
Beginning midway through the year 1812, this six month period offers some 
intriguing results and provided some early avenues of enquiry for this 
investigation.  Some of those initial findings are repeated in the larger 
sampling exercise, such as the prevalence of desertion and regulatory 
offences, the high numbers of property crime compared to violent crime, the 
apparent lack of violence between soldiers of equal rank and the 
disproportionate presence of NCOs as victims of violent crime. There are, 
however, a few differences, which serve well both to demonstrate the 
dangers of attempting to apply the results of a small sample to the greater 
whole, and to indicate areas of specificity.   
For the last six months of the year 1812, there were 193 soldiers 
recorded as having been tried by GRCM, nine of whom were acquitted.
76
 In 
16 cases the charges were entirely of a regulatory nature, such as 
‘disobedience of orders’, ‘Unsoldierlike Conduct’ and ‘being drunk and 
absent from the Evening Parade’, with no outright criminal behaviour 
indicated.   Included in this category are the sometimes tragic attempts made 
by a few soldiers to ‘procure a discharge’ or ‘retard a cure’, such as that of 
Gunner Edward Barker, of the Royal Artillery, who was charged with 
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‘Having suffered some escarotic substance to be applied to his back to 
retard his Cure, being a Patient in the Hospital’, or Private William Playfoot 
of the 26th, tried at Gibraltar for having ‘Wifully fired a loaded musket 
depriving himself thereby of his left-hand’.  Of the 184 soldiers convicted, 
146 faced charges of desertion, with or without other charges: 
 
Table 1.1: GRCM convictions for 1812, by offence type - with and 
without desertion
77
 
Offence Type Total With 
Desertion 
W/out Desertion 
Desertion 146 n/a n/a 
Regulatory 31 6 25 
Theft 46 34 12 
Fraud/Embezzlement 12 10 2 
Violent 9 0 9 
 
In only 68 cases are there criminal charges beyond simple desertion 
or regulatory offences. Breaking down these 68 cases, we begin to see some 
intriguing aspects of soldier crime. By far the most common criminal 
charges relate to financial or property crime. Forty-six soldiers were 
convicted of various forms of theft and 12 were convicted of acts of fraud or 
embezzlement, including those who deserted and re-enlisted for additional 
bounties. In only 12 cases were charges of theft preferred against a soldier 
who was not also charged with desertion, and in only two cases were 
soldiers charged with fraud or embezzlement without also being charged 
with desertion.  In very few cases do we see soldiers committing such acts 
without an intention to leave their regimental community.  Acts of theft or 
fraud against fellow soldiers likewise appear a rarity, with only five charges 
of theft and only two of fraud or embezzlement against other soldiers.    
Now this may simply reflect differences in opportunity, risk and 
reward.  Soldiers in the ordinary ranks, on the whole, had very little to steal 
and theft from a fellow soldier may have offered very little reward for very 
high risk.  In both fraud cases, the soldiers concerned had defrauded several 
other soldiers of their wages, and as such the potential reward was unusually 
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high.  But this disparity may also reflect some deeper attitudes towards 
authority, as well as class-distinct moral understandings of theft. 
 Similarly rare are cases featuring violence.  Only nine cases 
involved violence of any kind. Intriguingly, unlike the cases involving theft 
or fraud, all nine involved soldiers intending to stay in service.  Not one of 
the charges of violence accompanied desertion charges and seven involved 
violence against fellow soldiers.  If we take a closer look at these cases of 
violence, however, we can see that five of the seven charges of violence 
against a fellow soldier relate to the same incident:  five soldiers of the 
Clare Militia were tried at Woodbridge for being ‘out of quarters’ and 
‘breaking into the hut of Driver Johnson of the Royal Horse Artillery’. 
Three were found guilty of ‘assaulting [Johnson] and his Wife’, and two of 
‘ill-treating Driver Johnson’.  It is also debatable to what extent soldiers 
from the Clare Militia Regiment would have considered a driver from the 
Royal Horse Artillery Regiment to have been a ‘fellow’.  Given the 
unprecedented numbers of men in service at this time and given that most of 
these men would have been armed and trained in violence, such a small 
number of violent crimes seems surprising. 
 
Overview of GRCM sampling exercise 
Having tested the method with the first half year of the GRCM 
register, the main sampling exercise was undertaken and the results show 
some similar patterns to the test sample. In the following chapters a more 
detailed analysis will be offered for each of the categories of offence; 
however, it is useful first to give an overview of the main findings. In total 
the six sampled years of the register contain 1589 trial entries, with 42 
recording acquittals, leaving 1547 for analysis.  
 
 
Table 1.2: Total number of GRCM trials by sample set, with acquittals 
 
Sample Set No. of  Entries  
1813 - 1814 474 
1819 - 1820 324 
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removed
78
 
 
 
 
 
 
The trials cover a wide geographical spread, with every location in 
which a British soldier may have found himself serving represented, 
although there is a definite weighting towards home trials. During the years 
1813-1814, while much of the army was engaged in the Peninsular War, and 
the War of 1812, approximately 42% of trials listed were conducted either 
on the British mainland, Ireland, the Channel Islands or Gibraltar.
79
 During 
the years 1819-1820, with the occupation of France ended, the army faced 
substantial troop reductions, thereby changing the balance of forces 
overseas, yet a similar proportion of trials, approximately 37%, were 
conducted at home.
80
 For the years 1825-1826, however, after several years 
of relative inactivity in Europe and America, the number of trials the army 
conducted at home rose to almost 90%.
81
 
 In her study of life inside the 30th Regiment, Carole Divall makes a 
compelling case for a rise in crime amongst the battalion stationed in India 
compared with the crime rates in the battalion stationed at home, with the  
‘extreme boredom’ of service in India cited as a possible cause.82 If this was 
indeed the case, then one might expect to see trials from India 
disproportionately represented; however, when viewed across multiple years 
and regiments, this does not seem to hold true.  During the years 1813-1814 
approximately 16% of trials were conducted in India, rising to 20% during 
the years 1819-1820, and dropping to a mere 5% of  the 1825-1826 trials. 
During the years 1818-1819, when our samples show the highest proportion 
of trials held in India, the proportion of the army stationed in India had risen 
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to around 30%.
83
 According to the estimates and accounts of the British 
army, as presented to Parliament in 1826, when the proportion of trials held 
in India fell to 5%, approximately 23% of the rank and file of the British 
army were stationed in India.
84
 
In their analysis of The Regimental Punishment Book of the Boston 
Detachments of the Royal Irish Regiment and 65th Regiment, 1774-1775’, 
Stephen Baule and Don Hagist make the case that high levels of crime in 
that regiment may not have been typical, or representative of a wider 
experience, given that the book concerns a ‘composite battalion’ made up of 
three different companies from the Royal Irish Regiment and two battalion 
companies from the 65th.
85
  Along with Divall’s study this raises interesting 
possibilities and the potential impact of geographical location and specific 
regimental circumstances on levels and kinds of criminality must be taken 
into account. And it is certainly worth considering the extent to which 
boredom may have fed into rises in crime levels in locations where soldiers 
were more restricted in their social engagements and integration.   
In terms of the personnel involved in the trials covered by the 
register, the majority concerned defendants of the ‘private’, or an 
equivalent, rank. This would include drummers and other musicians, riders 
and gunners from the artillery regiments, and ‘recruits’ to any regiment.  As 
might be expected given their numbers within each regiment, NCOs 
accounted for a small minority of defendants overall.  Of the 1547 trials 
sampled, only 56, or a little over 3.5%, concerned a defendant of non-
commissioned officer rank. A detailed analysis of NCO defendants and the 
charges they faced will be covered in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 1.3: Defendant Rank by GRCM Sample Set
86
 
Defendant 
Rank 
1813 - 1814 1819 - 1820 1825 - 1826 Total 
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Private / Equiv.  442 315 734 1491 
NCO 32 9 15 56 
 
Victims of crime, as they appear in the register, were naturally drawn from a 
wider base, and individual army personnel represent around 20% of 
identifiable victims. Across the three sample sets, a total of 609 trial records 
show a clearly defined, or easily inferred victim, with by far the highest 
proportion of these being the regiment itself, or another part of the army as 
an institution. This would include theft of regimental equipment not stolen 
from an individual soldier, or officer, along with items stolen from places 
such as army supply depots, or the King’s yards, and soldier’s necessaries, 
which had been ‘made away’ with.  Soldiers of the private rank appear as 
identifiable victims in only 23 cases across the three sample sets, and well 
over half of those are in the 1813-1814 set. Similarly infrequent are 
appearances of civilians or commissioned officers as victims; although it 
should be noted that the variance across the three sample sets is high, 
particularly in the case of civilian victims, which will be taken account of 
during the more detailed statistical analysis. 
  Intriguingly, of the four categories of military personnel, the most 
frequent to appear as an identifiable victim across all three sets is that of the 
NCO: all three sample sets show more NCOs as victims than privates and 
officers combined. These initial figures would seem to bear out the 
assumption that NCOs had a different experience of crime than did the 
ordinary-ranking soldiers, at least in terms of frequency. That said, a note of 
caution should be sounded as to whether this indicates frequency of 
experience, or frequency of official response, something which will be 
considered in more detail later. 
   
 
 
 
Table 1.4: Victim Type by GRCM Sample Set
87 
Victim Type 1813 – 1814 1819 – 1820 1825 – 1826 Total 
Fellow 14 4 5 23 
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NCO 33 11 25 69 
Officer/Employer 18 6 4 28 
Regiment/Army 72 96 285 452 
Other service 3 0 3 6 
Civilian 23 1 7 31 
 
In all three sample sets desertion represents the largest offence category, 
though the extent to which it dominates is different in each set. Of the 474 
trials conducted during the years 1813-1814, and ending in conviction, 50% 
were for desertion, or included a charge of desertion along with other 
offences. For the period 1819-1820 this rose to almost 60%, and for the 
years 1825-1826, almost 75%.  Regulatory offences, meanwhile, were 
mentioned in nearly 40% of trials conducted during the 1813-1814 period, 
35% of the 1819-1820 trials, and 21% of trials in the 1825-1826 period.  Of 
the offence types identified as criminal, rather than military, the most well 
represented in all three sets is that of theft, a category which includes cases 
of handling stolen goods and the sale or loss by soldiers of their regimental 
necessaries. During the years 1813-1814, 26% of the listed trials included a 
charge of theft or handling stolen goods, for the period 1819-1820 this rose 
to 36%, and for the period 1825-1826 rose again to 43%. In comparison, 
violent crimes seem remarkably infrequent, with only 14% of the 1813-1814 
trials including such a charge, 8% of the 1819-1820 trials and 6% of trials in 
the 1825-1826 sample: 
 
Table 1.5: Offence Type by GRCM Sample Set
88
 
Offence Type 1813 - 1814 1819-1820 
1820 
1825 -1826 Total 
Desertion 242 189 560 991 
Regulatory offences 170 105 147 422 
Theft 118 116 323 557 
Fraud/embezzlement 17 11 4 32 
Violence 66 25 45 136 
Sexual offences 5 5 5 15 
Self-harm 7 1 5 13 
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Overview of GCM register sample: 1818-1819 
The main reason for including a sample of the GCM register, is to 
provide a single year of military justice records for the three regimental case 
studies, and as such the choice of dates has been dictated by the time period 
covered by the half-yearly regimental returns. These run from September 
1818 to October 1819, and so the years 1818 and 1819 of the GCM register 
have been transcribed. This also allows an analysis of two full years of 
GCM trials, which overlap with a single year of the GRCM samples. 
Following the same methodology as the GRCM sample sets, with trials of 
commissioned officers and trials ending in acquittal both removed, there are 
293 listings for the two years covered by the sample. As with the GRCM 
samples, privates outnumber NCOs, with NCO defendants appearing in a 
little over 8.5% of trials for 1818, and just over 2% of trials in 1819: 
 
       Table 1.6: Defendant ranks by year at  GCM Level 
89
 
Defendant 
Rank 
1818 1819 Total 
Private / 
Equiv. 
181 93 274 
NCO 17 2 19 
 
Very few of the GCM trial records give clear indication of the 
victims involved. Of those that do, a little over half show civilian victims. 
Many of these have been categorised as civilian victims because of the 
charge of burglary, which has been assumed to involve a civilian victim. It 
should also be noted that when adjusted for multiple defendants being tried 
for the same incident, the 29 cases from 1818 falls to 13. Nonetheless, this 
does suggest a flurry of incidents of criminality against civilians. Again 
though, this is a cautious assessment and it is important to note that of those 
13 incidents, all but one were in Europe and most of those in France, where, 
in the context of the allied forces’ occupation of France, the chances of 
crimes against civilians being tried within the military system were 
particularly high.  
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         Table 1.7: Victim types by year at GCM level 
90
 
Victim Type 1818 1819 Total 
Fellow 3 1 4 
NCO 4 3 7 
Officer/Employer 1 3 4 
Regiment/Army 5 2 7 
Other service 1 0 1 
Civilian 29 0 29 
 
In terms of the spread of offence types, we can see a similar picture 
to that in the GRCM samples. Desertion and regulatory offences dominate 
at this level, though not quite as much as they do at GRCM level, with 
desertion charges appearing in 40% of trials and regulatory charges in 27%.  
The percentage of trials for property crime at this level is very similar to the 
GRCM sample, with 29% of trials overall showing theft charges; however, 
looking at each of the two years we can see that much of that figure is due to 
a high level of theft charges in 1818: this includes the cases mentioned 
above, of multiple defendants charged with burglary, and the number of 
incidents falls to 35 when this is taken into account.  As with the GRCM 
sample, violence charges are much less present than property charges, with 
around 15% of trials showing charges of this nature. Again though, the high 
number of such trials in the 1818 sample includes trials of multiple 
defendants and the number of incidents of violence in 1818 falls to 20 with 
this taken into account:   
 
 
Table 1.8: Offence types by year at GCM level
91
 
Offence Type 1818 1819 Total 
Desertion 61 56 117 
Regulatory offences 61 18 79 
Theft 75 10 85 
Fraud/embezzlement 2 1 3 
Violence 35 10 45 
Sexual offences 1 6 7 
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Self-harm 1 3 4 
 
Taken together then, the two levels of court martial show a broadly 
similar spread of offence types, victim types, and defendants and offer a 
starting point for an analysis of soldier crime across the whole service. 
 
Case Study: Three Regiments 
The three regiments chosen as case studies are the 33rd, 34th and 
37th regiments of foot.
92
 All three were single battalion infantry regiments 
and as such can be expected to share many aspects of service; however, they 
were located in different places, with the 33rd stationed primarily at home, 
the 34th stationed in India and the 37th in Canada and therefore offer an 
interesting comparison between similar regiments in very distinct 
locations.
93
  According to the three October inspection reports, as of 25th 
September 1819, there were 671 men serving in the 33rd as privates, 
drummers, and NCOs, 910 men serving in the 34th, and  686 men serving in 
the 37th.
94
  
Twelve months of regimental returns for each of the three regiments, 
when taken alongside the GRCM and GCM register entries for the same 
year can tell us much about how crime featured in those regiments and help 
to contextualise the wider findings of the statistical analysis for the army as 
a whole. Regimental returns were made every six months; however, they 
were not all sent at the same time and the half yearly returns sometimes 
overlapped, and this must be taken into account when comparing them to 
the GCM and GRCM registers.  
The first return for the 33rd ran from 25th September 1818 to 24th 
March 1819 and the second return, dated 9th October 1819, ran from ‘the 
9th of March last’.95 The first return of RCM for the 34th, dated 9th April 
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1819, states simply ‘since the last inspection’.96 The official date of 
inspection, according to the returns of necessaries and accoutrements and 
effective strength is dated 25th September, as standard for regimental 
returns; however, the confidential report refers to the previous report ‘in 
October’ and the first listing in the RCM returns is dated 4th November 
1818.
97
 The second set of returns for the 34th nominally runs from the 25th 
March 1818 to the 24th September 1819; again though, the actual dates of 
inspection may have been different.
98
 The first set of returns for the 37th 
Regiment, dated 30th June 1819, ran from ‘last September’ and again the 
nominal date of inspection is given as 25th September 1818; however, the 
first trial listed in the returns is dated 3rd September 1818, and the return of 
effective strength gives the 4th September 1818 as the date the regiment was 
inspected.
99
 The second set of returns runs from 30th June 1818 to 7th 
October 1819.
100
   
Though there is great variance in the earliest dates of trials, with the 
33rd beginning 25th September 1818, the 34th beginning 4th November 
1818 and the 37th beginning 3rd September 1818, trials for all three sets of 
regimental returns end within a few days of each other at the end of 
September 1819. In order to give a more or less complete year, the matching 
analysis of the GRCM and GCM registers runs from 1st September 1818 to 
1st October 1819.   
Altogether, for the 33rd, there are 53 RCM trials ending in 
conviction, with one GRCM and one GCM, for the 34th there are 101 RCM, 
three GRCM and three GCM, and for the 37th there are 59 RCM, 10 GRCM 
and no GCM trials.
101
  Looking at the kinds of offence we can see again a 
very similar picture within these three regiments to the wider picture of 
crime across the service. Taken together, desertion and regulatory charges 
account for a large number of offences followed by theft charges as the most 
prominent criminal offence, with violence charges again a much smaller 
presence. The apparently low number of desertion charges and 
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correspondingly high number of regulatory charges in the 34th and 37th will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three; however, it is worth 
mentioning here that this appears to be down to differences in reporting 
practices rather than differences in behaviour compared to the 33rd.  
 
Table 1.9: RCM Offence Type by Regiment
102
 
Offence Type 33rd 34th 37th Total 
Desertion 29 6 8 43 
Regulatory offences 28 84 40 152 
Theft 19 40 14 73 
Fraud/embezzlement 2 0 1 3 
Violence 6 16 4 26 
Sexual offences - - - - 
Self-harm - - - - 
 
The proportions of victim types for the individual regiments are in some 
ways similar to those of the whole service register samples: the regiment or 
army as corporate employer is far more present than individual victims; 
however, the balance between civilian and military personnel as victims is 
quite different. The reasons for this will be discussed later, but it is worth 
noting here that location may well be a significant factor in this:  for 
example, the 33rd shows no civilian victims, but as they were stationed at 
home, it is very likely that any offences committed against civilians by 
soldiers of the 33rd would have been passed to the civilian authorities.
103
  
 
Table 1.10: RCM Victim Type by Regiment
104
 
Victim Type 33rd 34th 37th Total 
Fellow 2 7 2 11 
NCO 3 7 4 14 
Officer/Employer 1 0 2 3 
Regiment/Army 11 36 9 56 
Other service - - - - 
Civilian - 6 1 7 
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Examining all three levels of court martial allows a more complete 
sense of the shape of crime within individual regiments, but they also 
underline the need for caution. The regimental returns taken alongside the 
GCM and GRCM registers demonstrate the inconsistent application of the 
judicial boundaries between the three levels of courts martial. Looking at 
the kinds of charges that appear at each level for the three regiments, we can 
see very similar charges tried at different levels of court martial, sometimes 
within the same regiment. We also see the same behaviour characterised 
differently.  The 34th tried one private, by RCM, for ‘Absenting himself 
from his Regt. without leave on the 18th March & not returning 'till brought 
back by an Escort about 17th April 1819’. Two months earlier, the regiment 
had tried another private by GRCM, for ‘Deserting [...] on the 8th of March 
1819 and not returning until brought back in charge of a Sepoy on the 15th 
of the same Month’.105 During the same twelve month period, the 34th also 
tried three soldiers at separate GCM trials, for desertion, apparently with no 
aggravating factors.
106
  
In one instance, we can also see how charges might change as they 
moved through the different stages of reporting and recording. Along with 
RCM trials, the regimental returns also list some GRCM trials, and in the 
return for the 37th, the charges recorded for the GRCM trial of Private John 
Bland, were: ‘1st) Drunk on Parade on the 18th May and Striking Lance 
Serjeant McMuney in the execution of his Duty, 2nd) Making his escape 
from the Guard House at Isle Aux Noix on 16th May, and resisting Serj. 
Keogh in the execution of his Duty’.107 By the time this trial was entered 
into the GRCM register, those charges had been simplified to read: ‘Drunk 
on Parade & escaping from the Guard House’.108 Using the GRCM register 
alone this trial would be categorised purely as a trial for regulatory offences, 
but taking the regimental returns into account, the trial can be categorised as 
including both regulatory and violence charges.  For the majority of the 
trials included in the sampled years of the GRCM register, we have only the 
register through which to categorise charges. It is reasonable to assume that 
some of those charges have been similarly simplified.  
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Conclusion 
Any study of military justice records must be approached with a 
degree of caution. Even more than for the criminal courts in eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century Britain, recording in the British military justice 
system was highly variable. As William Tatum suggests, ‘criminal labels 
[...] cannot be taken at face value’.109 Nevertheless, a close study of the two 
registers and the three sets of regimental returns can provide an insight into 
some broad trends and common themes and features of soldier crime, and 
along with examples of GCM full trial transcripts can help us understand 
how crime featured in the lives and service of soldiers. Contextualised 
through administration records and memoranda from the War Office, along 
with soldiers’ journals, regimental order books, parliamentary records and 
civil justice records, the three tiers of military justice represent the key 
evidence base for this study, with the statistical analysis of the GRCM 
Register as its foundation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
109Tatum,”Military Justice and Negotiated Authority”, p. 97. 
51 
 
 
 
Chapter Two:  Military Offences Part 1 - Desertion and Related 
Offences 
Introduction 
Of all the possible offences, whether criminal or military, for which 
a soldier might be court-martialled in the eighteenth-century British army, 
desertion was the most common and is one of the most studied. As Gilbert 
contends, ‘[d]esertion was the pre-eminent crime of the rank and file’ and at 
times accounted for 90% of GCM trials.
110
 From contemporary concerns of 
military authorities, faced with the conundrum of how to prevent it, to the 
most recent studies of recruitment patterns in the British army, desertion 
looms large in the historiography of the soldier.  In his study, ‘Why Men 
deserted the Eighteenth-Century British Army’, Gilbert explored many of 
the key features of this offence, examining courts martial records to 
understand both the military context and individual soldiers’ experiences of 
deserting the army, delineating common features and systemic pressures at 
play in soldier desertion and comparing them with those of deserters during 
other periods in history.
 111
  
In his history of the Reform of the British Army, Hew Strachan 
considered the high levels of desertion amongst army recruits. This 
flashpoint of desertion has been further explored in studies of army 
recruitment, most recently by Linch, in his comprehensive study of 
recruitment practices in Britain between 1807 and 1815, a period of 
sustained military conflict which, Linch argues, had a ‘lasting impact on the 
British army and its relationship to the state and society.
112
 Such a 
relationship, it must be said, is as illuminated by the history of desertion as 
it is by the history of enlistment. Thomas Agostini, approaching from a 
slightly different direction, considered the evidence of deserter notices in the 
British-American press, during the Seven Years War, to explore the 
methods used by army and civil authorities both to apprehend deserters and 
to prevent desertion, and most importantly the ‘strategies and artifices’ 
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soldiers used to get away and, for those who were successful, to remain 
free.
113
  
Though well studied, there are still elements of soldier desertion 
which are less well understood, in particular the close relationship between 
this offence and offences of self-harm and how the act of desertion impacted 
upon the former comrades of those who deserted.
114
 In many respects these 
offence types illuminate a very soldier-specific experience. Yet there are 
also ways in which they show elements of cultural continuity between 
soldiers and the communities from which they were drawn. This chapter 
will examine desertion and related offences as they appear in the courts 
martial records and popular culture, the ways in which these offences 
separated the soldier from his civilian counterpart and the ways in which 
they demonstrate a cultural link between them. 
Defining desertion 
Desertion in some ways straddled the line between criminal and 
regulatory offence, and as can be seen by its close relationship to the charge 
of being absent without leave, desertion was primarily an offence of military 
disorder.
115
 Unlike the charge of absence without leave, however, desertion 
was a potentially capital offence and recognised as criminal in both civil and 
military spheres.  The soldier who deserted did not merely offend against his 
regiment, but against his king and country and in doing so breached the 
Articles of War in one of the most serious ways possible.  
That said, the charge of desertion covered a wide range of actions, 
from deliberate attempts to leave the service and sever the relationship 
between the soldier and the army, to accidentally falling behind on a march, 
or overstaying a furlough by a few days.
116
 We know from Gilbert’s work in 
this area that many of the soldiers charged with desertion more than likely 
had not intended deserting at all: according to Gilbert, only around a quarter 
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of the 455 desertion trials he examined could be shown to be for clearly 
intentional and deliberate acts of desertion, with the rest either offering no 
explanation at all or showing clear indications of accidental desertion.
117
 In 
some cases, desertion was simply an expression of discontent, part of a 
range of strategies employed by soldiers in their ongoing negotiation or 
navigation of service conditions. 
118
 In other cases desertion was a clear 
attempt by soldiers to sever their relationships with the army entirely.   
Desertion in context – military and civilian attitudes  
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries military 
authorities wrestled with the problem of high levels of desertion from the 
British army. This was consistent with a wider European military 
experience.  Indeed, as Linch suggests, it was ‘almost an accepted facet of 
European military life’. 119 In his analysis of army casualty returns for the 
period 1807 to 1815, Linch demonstrates that the British army lost over 
50,000 men to desertion, with an average of 5,574 men a year from the 
regulars alone.
120
  Attempts by the Horse Guards to understand and stem the 
rates of desertion helped to shape the structures of soldier service in 
important ways, and had a profound impact on the relationship between the 
army and civilian communities in Britain.
121
   
Under the Articles of War, desertion was a potentially capital 
offence throughout our period, but attitudes towards this offence were not 
static, nor were military authorities blind to the different ways in which it 
could occur. According to Charles Clode’s seminal history of military law, 
the status of desertion as an offence and the punishments recommended in 
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law changed considerably from the mid-eighteenth century through to the 
nineteenth: though for the early part of our period, desertion was the offence 
most likely to be met with a death sentence,
122
 ‘[d]eath for desertion [...] 
was gradually withdrawn from the code’, initially by giving courts martial 
discretion where they considered death too severe and by 1803, declaring it 
a ‘[f]elony, punishable with transportation’, though with the caveat that 
should the deserter then wrongfully return to Britain,  ‘the Capital 
punishment was then to be inflicted’.123 Linch argues that by the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, official responses to desertion had changed considerably, 
with the army developing ‘a reasonably sensible system for dealing with 
deserters’, which recognised ‘that in the majority of cases [...] desertion was 
underpinned by rational actions’.124 Even so, for much of the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, soldiers tried for desertion could face severe 
punishments including death, particularly if the offence was repeated, or 
where the authorities felt a need to make an example of the offender in the 
face of high desertion rates.  As Linch demonstrates, however, the majority 
of deserters did not face the full force of military justice, with only ‘a tiny 
fraction of desertions’ making it to a GCM trial and deserter trials 
‘infrequent’ even at regimental level, with most deserters dealt with at an 
informal level of discipline, or formally but through the charge of absence 
without leave.
125
 
Certain forms of desertion were viewed with almost uniform 
contempt, while other forms sometimes garnered more sympathy.  A soldier 
who deserted to the enemy was often treated with hostility by other soldiers, 
no mercy by courts martial and little sympathy by civilians, particularly if 
the soldier had actively fought for the enemy against his former 
comrades.
126
 Drawing from the memoirs of William Surtees, Coss gives the 
example of seven men whose execution for desertion Surtees had witnessed 
with some distress. As Coss puts it, though the men’s excuse of having 
deserted out of desperation and hunger was most likely the truth, ‘it did not 
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explain their active collaboration with the French; thus no mercy was 
shown’.127  Indeed, the military justice system differentiated between simple 
desertion and desertion to the enemy both in their treatment under the 
Mutiny Act and in the manner of execution used. According to Charles 
Oman, during the Peninsular campaigns, ‘[s]hooting was almost exclusively 
reserved for the military offence of desertion to the enemy ‘.128 Oman gives 
several examples, including the case of five soldiers taken prisoner during 
the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, all of whom had been taken ‘in the French 
ranks, fighting against their old comrades’.129 That a sense of betrayal and 
disdain may have attached to such an act is unsurprising, and seems to have 
applied at the highest and lowest ranks of the army.  In a General Order 
from October 1808, to be read to all troops in order to stem the tide of 
desertions, Wellington set out the manner in which deserters might expect to 
be treated by both the enemy to whom they deserted and the fellows whose 
trust they betrayed: 
It is well known that nobody can trust men guilty of so base a 
crime; and notwithstanding the enemy’s promises, those who 
have been guilty of it are employed only in services of the 
lowest and most laborious description, they are despised and 
shunned by all, even by those who profit by their crime, and that 
the soldiers who are prisoners of war will hold no 
communication with them.
130
 
 
Though there is a danger in taking an order designed to discourage desertion 
entirely at face value, the treatment of deserters found in Rodrigo after the 
battle suggests that this attitude carried through to the ordinary soldier.  In 
his memoir, Adventures in the Connaught Rangers, William Grattan 
described the scene, as ‘groups of deserters from our army who, having 
taken shelter in Rodrigo during the winter [...were...] dragged from their 
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hiding places by their merciless comrades’.131 Soldiers’ attitudes towards 
desertion and the men who deserted were complex, however, and even a 
few soldiers executed for desertion to the enemy garnered sympathy. 
Edward Costello, referring to the same incident in Rodrigo, expressed 
bafflement at the pardoning of the corporal he understood to have been the 
ring leader of the deserters, and who had been seen heavily involved in the 
defence of the town against his former comrades, but sympathy for some 
others in the group who were shot for their crime.
132
   
Understandably, desertion to the enemy, and desertion on campaign 
presented a much more worrying aspect to the serving soldiers who 
remained, and whose survival in part rested on their ability to trust and rely 
on their comrades.
133
 For many soldiers, however, any desertion was a 
shameful act, and whilst they may have viewed those soldiers who deserted 
from desperation, alcohol, or love with a degree of sympathy, there was 
nonetheless often a sense of betrayal and anger for those who remained in 
service. Of all possible offences, at its core, desertion was the one which 
most obviously broke both the unwritten code by which soldiers lived, and 
the written laws by which they were governed.   
Though they were written a few decades later than our period of 
study, two of Rudyard Kipling’s stories, On Greenhow Hill and The 
Madness of Private Ortheris, exemplify this attitude. In his analysis of both 
stories, William Dillingham discusses the attitudes of three soldiers towards 
a ‘native’ deserter in Greenhow Hill, and the attitude of an older soldier 
towards a comrade who is considering desertion, in Madness of Ortheris. 
Though the former was criticized at the time for the ‘bloodthirsty’ tenor of 
the story, and the soldiers’ ‘lust to kill’ the deserter, Dillingham argues that 
rather than Kipling attempting to show the soldiers as ‘brutal and 
bloodthirsty’, he was instead demonstrating that they were ‘true to a creed 
of trustworthiness and fidelity’. In the Madness of Ortheris, meanwhile, we 
see a potential deserter shamed from his intended action by his older 
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comrade and best friend, who claims such a desertion would be a ‘black 
shame’ on all of them.134 As Dillingham explains, ‘In the culture of Tommy 
Atkins, a deserter was beneath contempt because he was seen as failing to 
stand by his fellow soldiers’.135  
Even in Greenhow Hill, however, the eldest of the soldiers displays 
some sympathy for the possible causes of desertion, and in particular the 
role of love which he assumes a likely cause of the deserter’s actions. A 
degree of sympathy and understanding can also be found in many of the 
soldier and officer journals and memoirs of the nineteenth century. In his 
recollections of the Peninsular War, after describing the march to Cuidad 
Rodrigo, during which many men fell behind and were counted as deserters, 
Major Harry Ross-Lewin set out the problem in treating all desertions as 
equally reprehensible acts:  
It is very true that no circumstances can ever render desertion 
justifiable, and all who were guilty of a crime so discreditable to 
the character of a soldier merited the severest censure and 
punishment; but to blame the men who left their ranks only 
when their physical strength no longer enabled them to keep 
their places on the march was the height of injustice; and the 
chief reason why so many did break down was the absence of 
the necessary supplies that should have attended the troops.
136
 
 
Alongside sympathy for desertion as an act of desperation there was also for 
some soldiers an element of romance and heroism attached to the act. Linch 
draws attention to the experiences of Charles O’Neill, whose memoirs 
recount both his initial ‘burning desire’ to be a soldier, and his subsequent 
disappointment and dismay at the ‘rigid life of discipline’ which was the 
reality of a soldier’s life. As Linch explains, while O’Neill’s desire to be a 
soldier had originally been ‘fuelled by stories of adventure’, it was now the 
excitement of desertion which ‘enthralled’ him. 137 Though the immediate 
cause of his first desertion was an undeserved punishment, O’Neill had 
already formed a view of desertion as an exciting adventure primarily 
because of the stories told to him by older soldiers. O’Neill described ‘[t]he 
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very romance connected with the undertaking and the thrilling interest that 
existed in listening to these adventures’. 138 
Such sympathy, and romantic admiration aside, returning deserters 
clearly presented soldiers with a dilemma. With survival largely dependent 
upon the ability of soldiers to form cohesive groups, supporting each other 
through any given hardship or danger, and adhering to implicit codes of 
behaviour, the deserter who returned to his regiment potentially endangered 
that group cohesion, regardless of any personal sympathy his fellows may 
have felt. Consequently, whether they had been caught and forcibly 
returned, or successfully evaded capture and chosen to return, former 
deserters often faced an uphill struggle to reclaim their places in their 
groups, and many were subject to the informal discipline of those groups.  
As Coss puts it, desertion even ‘stigmatised those lucky enough to run away 
and return without arousing official notice’. 139 Returnees, forced or 
unforced, officially punished or unnoticed by authority, were often mocked 
and treated with disdain by the comrades whose comradeship they had 
deserted, and many faced ‘ostracism’, the very worst informal punishment 
available to soldier groups.
140
 This informal response itself became, at 
times, a further spur to desertion, as can be seen in some of the soldier 
defence statements in desertion trial transcripts.  Robert Shaw,  a repeat 
deserter tried at Edinburgh Castle in  1757, claimed in his defence that he 
had deserted in order to enlist in another regiment that was due to go 
overseas, preferring to serve there, ‘than in [his previous] regiment where he 
thought he would never be respected’.141 Another soldier who deserted his 
regiment in India, claimed that as a new recruit to the regiment he had been 
caught ‘lying out of the garrison all night’ for which he was punished by 
order of a regimental court martial and that ever since, ‘his fellow soldiers 
used to upbraid him for being a runaway and used him ill’.142 
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In the wider culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, 
desertion was one of the most complex offences to delineate, bringing with 
it a range of assumptions and attitudes which speak both to the soldier’s 
experience of service and his perceived relationship to his former civilian 
culture. That many soldiers retained cultural links to their former 
communities may partly explain why desertion rates amongst regiments 
stationed at home far outstripped those of regiments abroad.
143
 The ability 
of some soldiers to seamlessly reintegrate into civilian life was 
understandably more of a factor for regiments serving at home.
144
 There was 
often a degree of sympathy and support to be found amongst civilians for 
those soldiers who deserted because they could no longer bear the privations 
of army life, because their families needed their presence and earning 
capacity at home, or for the forgivable madness of love.
145
 In the popular 
culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, the figure of the 
deserter was more often cast as a tragic and sympathetic figure than as an 
unsympathetic criminal.
146
 Community unease at recruiting practices of the 
army, and local sympathy for specific deserters played their parts and 
attempts by civil or military authorities to apprehend deserters at times 
provoked active resistance by civilians sympathetic to the deserters’ 
plight.
147
 For example, in September 1804, an attempt by Captain Shaw of 
the 81st, to retrieve an errant recruit from St Giles, London, exploded into a 
full scale riot and siege of the Horse-shoe Inn.
148
  For many in civil society, 
the act of desertion was seen less as a crime than a repudiation of the 
soldier’s ‘unfree’ status and as such there was often great reluctance on the 
part of civil authorities to apprehend and prosecute deserters.
149
 Indeed, as 
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Linch argues, that reluctance to prosecute at times veered into outright 
collusion ‘by those whom the government expected to uphold the law.’150 
This reflected the rather complex relationship that existed between 
the civil population and its army in Britain during this era, with many 
considering a professional army to be wholly at odds with notions of liberty. 
As Brumwell argues, ‘distrust of the soldier went to the very core of 
national character’, in eighteenth-century Britain. 151  Even when the British 
soldiery could claim the laurels of victory and be lauded for their bravery 
and sacrifice, ‘the Redcoat remained a sinister and despicable figure in the 
eyes of his countrymen, [... to whom...], the professional soldier was both 
unnecessary and un-English.’152 Similarly, in his exploration of British 
military law in the eighteenth century,  Steppler argues that, ‘Common 
soldiers were ridiculed, for being “bloody backs”, called “slaves”, and 
sneered at as men who had lost their rights as Englishmen.’153 Such insults 
speak to a sense of a fundamental separation of the professional soldier from 
the perceived protections of civil society.
154
 As such, it is unsurprising that 
there was often a degree of sympathy and tacit support for those soldiers 
who attempted to free themselves from this perceived tyranny.  
Paradoxically, some of the strategies employed by the army authorities to 
combat what amounted to the haemorrhaging of men from some regiments 
when stationed at home, served to highlight popular misgivings about 
standing armies, by dividing the UK into military districts, thereby giving 
the Horse Guards  ‘a permanent military presence that could be used to form 
parties to recapture deserters’, and by the use of off-shore facilities to house 
troops, intensifying the notion, encapsulated in the common phrase ‘gone 
for a soldier’, that men who enlisted in the army were effectively lost to 
their home communities.
155
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Desertion as Contract Breaking 
The role of employment legislation in the lives of working people 
may also have had an impact on popular perceptions of military desertion, 
both in terms of familiarising and demystifying the offence by relating it to 
a civilian experience, for which there was a highly variable level of 
consensus, and differentiating it from that experience in terms of the legal 
protections offered to both parties to an employment contract. Though not a 
capital offence, civil desertion was a criminal offence which could be and 
often was met with fines, corporal punishment or, less commonly, a 
custodial sentence. As Douglas Hay argues, ‘rather than civil remedies 
[...such penalties...] were deeply entrenched in English employment law’.156 
Desertion from the army was a form of contract breaking in some ways 
similar to civil desertion by servants or apprentices; however, the lack of a 
recognised limit to the soldier’s service naturally differentiated the offence. 
For apprentices and servants there was a specified and legally protected end 
to their service: upon reaching the age of twenty-one for apprentices, and 
unless stated otherwise in a mutually agreed contract, a period of one year 
for menial servants.
157
 Though under certain circumstances, soldiers were 
allowed to enlist for fixed periods or for the duration of specific conflicts, 
for much of our period most enlistment into the British army was 
‘unlimited’, with the soldier expected and legally obliged to serve for life, or 
until the army chose to dismiss him.
158
 Even as late as 1819, when limited 
service had become much more readily available, a little over three quarters 
of the men serving in the 33rd were listed in the returns under unlimited 
service, while nearly all the men of the 34th and 37th were on unlimited 
service, at 97% and 90% respectively.
159
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Even for those soldiers who enlisted for limited periods, either for 
the duration of a conflict, as was often the case for those who enlisted from 
the American colonies, for example, or during the early nineteenth century 
when shorter enlistment periods became more generally available, the 
reality of military life could at times prolong that service beyond its 
intended limits. Reliant on a piece of paper, which in the very best of 
circumstances might easily be lost, and in the much less ideal circumstances 
of active campaigning was very likely to be, soldiers were at the mercy of 
an often ad-hoc approach to administration and some commanding officers 
simply refused to accept the validity of their claims.
160
 Among the desertion 
trials from this period are many examples of soldiers who had been denied 
their right to a discharge having apparently served for the agreed period. For 
example, In July 1762, three soldiers from the 62nd were tried at Montreal 
for desertion.
161
 All three had been recruited from the local area for a fixed 
term of three years, but had been denied their discharge at the end of that 
period because they had no certificates to prove their claims. There were 
also theoretical avenues for early discharge through the use of the substitute 
system, and in the latter stages of our period through the purchasing of a 
discharge.
162
 Again, however, though soldiers had the right to request early 
discharge with the provision of a substitute or an offer of payment, the 
decision of whether to allow it rested wholly with the commanding officer 
of the regiment, and many soldiers were refused such requests.
163
 
Popular attitudes towards the treatment of civil desertion were just as 
complex as attitudes towards military desertion, particularly during the latter 
part of our period. On the one hand, the popular view of the Masters and 
Servants acts benefited at times from the notion that it offered protection for 
workers against unfair treatment, with both parties required, for example, to 
offer a reasonable period of notice of termination of service or employment: 
in stark contrast to the entirely one-sided contractual obligations of the 
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soldier, who could be dismissed from the service at any time and without 
any period of notice.
164
 The notion that all parties conducted their business 
under law and that all individuals had legally protected rights was a 
powerful part of the British self-identity. Hay argues that ‘[t]he law also 
gave remedies to workers’, which was ‘of great significance for the public 
perception of the law’.165 On the other hand, the manner in which 
employment law was interpreted and practiced, primarily by lay magistrates, 
was uneven, at times unfair, and in many cases entirely corrupt.  
Though the Master and Servant laws were ‘preserved and 
legitimated’ by the specificity of the local labour cultures in which they 
were embedded, Hay argues that in the early part of the nineteenth century, 
‘both the doctrine in the hands of judges and the nature of its enforcement 
by lay magistrates, including the use of imprisonment, became more 
inimical to labour, at a time of rapid industrialisation and increasing trade-
union organisation.’166 By the end of our period of study the ‘coercive 
aspects’ of employment law had become a serious matter for public concern 
and debate, and emblematic of the emerging trades union and labour 
movements.
167
   
To an extent therefore, attitudes to soldier desertion can be seen not 
just as they relate to the military context, but also as they relate to the wider 
context of working people’s responses to what they increasingly perceived 
as inequitable labour relations. Linch makes the case that volunteers would 
‘default to their civilian mentalities’, when faced with what they considered 
unfair treatment.
168
 Though the men in Linch’s study were ‘citizens not 
soldiers’, the same transfer of civilian mentality to a military setting can be 
seen in the regulars.
169
  That many men carried assumptions of employee 
rights into the service when they enlisted can be seen in some of the 
prisoner defence statements given by soldiers tried for desertion.  Indeed, 
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Coss suggests that some soldiers deserted because they felt ‘that the army 
had broken its contract with them’.170  
Though rarely accepted by courts martial as a reason, many soldiers 
expressed a sense of grievance at what they considered a breach of the 
verbal agreements made by recruiters during enlistment, a breach of contract 
by the army in failing to pay them properly or with the frequency expected, 
or in properly providing for their subsistence.
171
 Private Sebastian Long of 
the 79th, tried in the East Indies by GCM in 1762, claimed in his defence 
that when he enlisted he was told by the Captain that he would be serving in 
a regiment bound for Hanover, and that ‘if he had known that he was going 
on a long voyage by sea he would not have enlisted’. Long also claimed that 
the Captain had ‘promised him ten Guineas Bounty and never gave him 
more than one Guinea and a crown’.172 Henry Dorman, meanwhile, a 
corporal in the 60th, gave as his reason for desertion, a number of promises 
which ‘were not made good to him’, including a promised daily wage of six 
pence.
173
  This fits very much with Gilbert’s study, which demonstrates the 
significance of ‘personal dissatisfaction’ and ‘problems of adjusting to army 
life’ as reasons for individual desertions as well as the ‘paradox’ of harsh 
military discipline as a spur to desertion.
174
 
 
Desertion in the GCM, GRCM and RCM samples 
Of the 1547 trial listings for the six sampled years of the GRCM 
register, 991 include charges of desertion.
175
  Returns from the 33rd, 34th 
and 37th regiments for the period September 1818 to September 1819 show 
a lower rate of desertion charges: out of 62 RCM trial listings for the 33rd, 
28 include desertion charges, while returns for the 34th and 37th show only 
a single desertion charge each, both of which were tried at GRCM.
176
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During the same twelve month period, 143 soldiers were tried by GCM, 
with 57 facing charges of desertion.
177
  
At first glance this suggests that desertion was much more prevalent 
in the 33rd than in either the 34th or the 37th; however, a closer examination 
of the returns shows that, though there were no RCM trials for desertion in 
the latter two regiments, there was a large number of RCM trials for charges 
of being ‘absent without leave’. Of the 106 RCM trial listings for the 34th 
Regiment, 25 show variations of this charge and of the 53 RCM trial listings 
for the 37th Regiment, 10 are for absenteeism. Though some of these do 
relate to absenteeism rather than desertion, some of the charges suggest that 
the soldiers had in fact deserted but had been charged with the lesser 
offence.  For example, Private John Moor, of the 34th Regiment, was tried 
by RCM for  ‘Absenting himself from his Regt. without leave on the 18th 
March & not returning 'till brought back by an Escort about 17th April 
1819’.178   
This may therefore reflect different styles of command and 
understandings of military jurisdiction, rather than any substantial 
differences in the behaviour of the soldiers of each regiment. This fits with 
Linch’s analysis of desertion which suggests that the true levels of desertion 
may be hidden by the use of such alternative charges.
179
 Similarly, in the 
GRCM samples, 113 trial listings include charges of absenteeism of various 
forms, ranging from simple absence from roll call or tattoo, to what most 
likely amounted to an attempted desertion but had been classed as absence 
without leave.  What is clear is that of all the possible military or criminal 
offences for which a soldier might be court-martialled in the British army 
during this period, desertion was the most common. That said, it is worth 
emphasising that whilst desertion was the most likely charge for a soldier to 
face, that did not in any way mean that most deserters were tried, even 
taking into account the possibility of the lesser charges of absenteeism.
180
   
Taking a closer look at the trials in which desertion charges feature, 
several common themes become apparent. One of these is a tendency for 
some soldiers to desert in pairs or groups. Though it is often hard to identify 
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whether or not soldiers were acting together, or simply being tried at the 
same court martial session for separate offences, there are some crude 
measures which suggest that this was a key element of soldier desertion. 
Throughout the GRCM register, there are groups of soldiers from the same 
regiment, or division, tried for desertion on the same date, often with 
identical standard charges, but with the entries listed separately with 
individual record numbers.  There are also several examples of pairs and 
groups of soldiers tried on the same day, for the same or similar charges, but 
listed under the same record number. There is little reason to assume any 
greater level of consistency in reporting in this matter than in most other 
aspects of military justice, therefore it is likely that some of the soldiers 
tried on the same date under separate record numbers may indeed have been 
acting together. It is similarly likely that some of those listed under the same 
record number may have been acting separately.  
Ignoring cases listed under separate numbers except where the 
particular charges strongly indicate collaboration, and ignoring cases listed 
under the same number where the charges strongly indicate a lack of 
collaboration, there are 46 instances of soldiers tried in pairs or groups, 
involving 107 men.
181
 Given that there are many more instances of soldiers 
from the same regiment, tried on the same day for identical standard 
charges, this is likely to be an underestimate. This may reflect the sense of 
camaraderie, noted by Linch, in soldiers who deserted together, with the 
‘risks of the initial act’ and the dangers of being ‘on the run’ prompting 
soldiers to act in groups.
182
  
Though most of the register entries offer very little context to 
charges of desertion, analysis by Gilbert of the transcripts of desertion trials, 
suggests that alcohol may have been a significant factor in many desertions. 
Out of 455 prisoner defences examined by Gilbert, of soldiers convicted of 
desertion during the Seven years War, around thirty percent claimed alcohol 
as the cause of their desertion.
183
 However, there are reasons for caution. As 
deserter trials primarily involved soldiers who had been apprehended, along 
with some who voluntarily returned to their regiments, they may have 
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exhibited distinct behaviours and strategies for absconding from those who 
deserted successfully. In particular, Gilbert suggests that the men who 
deserted successfully were more than likely sober, with the men who had 
‘found their courage in the bottom of a bottle’ far more likely to be 
caught.
184
 It is also useful to bear in mind the potential for drunkenness to 
represent a form of ‘temporary madness’ and therefore be offered as a 
defence to mitigate the soldier’s actions, in the hope of mercy from the 
court.
185
 That said, it is interesting to note that of the 113 cases of 
absenteeism in the GRCM sample, 13 included additional charges of 
drunkenness, or a description of the soldier as intoxicated on his return, as 
did 11 of the RCM trials for absenteeism.
186
  
There are also some common themes in terms of accompanying 
charges, often relating to other regulatory offences, but also some criminal 
offences. Perhaps surprisingly, given the role of violence in soldiers’ 
resistance of authority and regimental boundaries, desertion charges are 
rarely accompanied by charges of violence. Out of 991 GRCM trial listings 
which include charges of desertion, only six carry additional charges of 
violence. Again, though, there is a need for caution: of the soldiers tried at 
GRCM for absenteeism, 25 faced accompanying charges of violence.  
Even taking that into account, however, this still seems a fairly low 
figure. Far more common is the pairing of desertion with theft and fraud 
charges. Though a more detailed analysis of this charge pairing will be 
offered in Chapter Five, it is worth noting this common pairing within the 
courts martial records. Across the six years sampled, 564 soldiers were tried 
and convicted of theft, and 24 of fraud or embezzlement.  Of those 564 
convictions for theft, 409 were accompanied by convictions for desertion, 
and of the 24 fraud convictions, six involved soldiers who had also deserted.  
In the first sample pair of years, desertions accompanied half of all thefts 
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and frauds, and in the second and third pairs twice as many theft charges 
were accompanied by desertion than not.   
The ‘theft’ or ’loss’ of regimental clothing and equipment in 
particular seem to have been a common accompaniment to desertion; 
however, it was also not unknown for absconding soldiers to steal the 
clothes and equipment of their fellows. For the soldier who deserted, or 
attempted to desert, the army entirely, if not for the soldier who deserted to 
a different regiment, desertion was a severing of his relationship with the 
military, and even for the soldier who bounty-jumped, it was a severing of 
his relationship with his original regiment. As such this provided a very 
different context for crime than acts committed when the soldier anticipated 
continued service and therefore the need to maintain working relationships 
with his fellows. This context, along with that of bounty jumping will be 
considered in greater detail in the discussion of theft and fraud crimes in 
Chapter Five; however, it is worth considering here that in some cases, theft 
and fraud may also have spurred, rather than merely accompanied the act of 
desertion.  
In many of the GCM cases examined by Gilbert, in which fear of 
punishment was identified as a cause of desertion, this was precipitated by 
the loss, sale, or theft of soldiers’ necessaries, and it was the resultant 
deficiency in necessaries which was to bring about punishment.
187
 Several 
of the trials collated and transcribed by Helen McCorry, show a similar 
pattern. At a GCM trial held in Scotland, in July 1753, Private William 
Stickley, of Lord Viscount Bury’s Regiment, was convicted of desertion, as 
well as the theft of his own and a comrade’s necessaries. In his defence 
Stickley claimed that: ‘his cartridge box with ammunition was taken out of 
his quarters on Friday’, and that: ‘he lost his bayonet on Saturday evening 
when in liquor and being afraid of punishment he went of[sic]’.188 There are 
numerous instances of soldiers having engaged in minor frauds or petty 
thefts, for whom fear of punishment for those acts was a clear factor in their 
decision to desert. A soldier from the 8th Regiment, for example, claimed at 
his trial for desertion in 1757, that he had ‘made off’ with his comrades 
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money and then was afraid to return. Another soldier, from the 55th, told a 
complicated story about getting into debt, being unable to pay it back, 
stealing money and then deserting out of fear and drunkenness. A soldier 
from the 44th claimed that he had lost his coat and hat in a 'quarrel' and was 
scared to return without them.
 189
     
Related offences – suicide and self-harm 
Closely related to the offence of desertion were offences of suicide 
and self-harm, often in order to escape severe punishment, or to render the 
soldier unfit for further service. As with desertion these offences took many 
different forms, from attempted suicide, to cutting off thumbs or fingers. For 
the researcher of military history these are often heart-breaking cases to 
read, even when the charge is all that is left to us. It takes little imagination 
to consider the desperation of a soldier like Gunner Barker and his attempt 
to ‘retard his Cure’ whilst recovering in hospital from a flogging, most 
likely to postpone the remainder of his punishment.
190
 
 Self-inflicted injuries of various kinds occur at semi-regular 
intervals throughout the courts martial records, suggesting that they were an 
ongoing, intermittent problem for army authorities during the period.  
Indeed, by 1849, revisions to the Articles of War specified a wide range of 
possible infractions of this nature, from soldiers feigning illness entirely, or 
deliberately disobeying orders, ‘thereby producing or aggravating disease or 
infirmity, - or delaying [a] cure’, to wilfully maiming themselves or others 
‘with intent thereby to render [themselves] or any other soldier unfit for 
service.’ 191 And in 1850 this list was expanded further to include any 
soldier who ‘shall tamper with his eyes’ to render himself unfit. 192 As with 
many military charges, however, for much of our period these offences 
could quite easily be covered by the catch-all charge of ‘disgraceful 
conduct’, with further definition applied in some, but not all cases and 
certainly not with any degree of consistency in reporting across different 
regiments and different courts martial.  
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Across the six full years sampled from the GRCM register, there are 
13 instances of soldiers charged with self-harm offences.
 193
  Of these, three 
were charged with attempting to maim, or disable themselves from further 
service, nine were charged with wilfully disabling, wounding, or maiming 
themselves, and one with ‘wilfully occasioning a sore to disenable himself 
from service’. In one of the cases the soldier concerned was charged with 
both ‘desertion’ and ‘attempting to disable himself from further service’. No 
such offences were recorded in the returns for the three regiments sampled; 
however, in the registers of GCM trials conducted during same the twelve 
month period covered by the regimental returns there are three cases of self-
harm, with all three soldiers charged with ‘maiming’ themselves.194  
With so few details, most of the trial entries can tell us little about 
the circumstances which precipitated these acts of self-harm. The transcripts 
of two GRCM trials, however, show the close relationship between this kind 
of offence and desertion. In both cases the soldiers in question had deserted 
from their regiments and in both instances the injuries involved damage to 
the hand. The first case concerns Thomas Housley, of the 36th Regiment of 
Foot. Having deserted from the regiment, Housley had been traced to his 
home by officers intent on his arrest. When the officers attempted to see 
him, his wife insisted he was not there. They went away and returned later. 
On their return they found Housley with his hand bandaged, a bucket full of 
blood and his wife insisting that she had cut off his thumb ‘and that she 
would cut his throat before he should serve for a soldier’.195  
Housley was examined by a surgeon who, at the court martial, 
deposed that the injury could not have been done whilst he slept, as he had 
claimed, but had to have been done with both his knowledge and his 
cooperation. Husband and wife had clearly acted together to prevent him 
being sent for further service. An additional factor to consider in Housley’s 
case, is that he was not a long-serving solder in his regiment. In fact, 
Housley had previously been a militia man, with the Tower Hamlets militia 
regiment, and had only recently enlisted in the 36th. According to the 
prosecution, Housley had deserted from the regiment, shortly after receiving 
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his bounty, and whilst en route with the recruiting party to the depot.  This 
fits therefore, with the analysis of desertion as more of a factor for newly 
enlisted recruits, and strongly suggests that the difference in experience 
between militia and regular service may have been a factor in Housley’s 
decision to desert. 
 In the second case, Private Jeremiah Buckley, of the 19th Foot, was 
charged with desertion, losing or  selling his necessaries, and for  ‘wilfully 
maiming himself, by cutting off the first part of the right thumb [...] with a 
view of rendering himself unfit for the service’. Buckley pleaded guilty to 
the first charges, admitting that had swapped his uniform for civilian clothes 
and thrown his firelock into the river, but insisted that the removal of his 
thumb had been necessitated by an injury he had suffered whilst working in 
a quarry; a story disputed by the examining surgeon. In quite a damning 
testimony the officer who had apprehended Buckley deposed that he had 
asked whether the officer thought he might be discharged because of the 
injury.  This case clearly fits the pattern of self-harm as a form of desertion, 
but it also offers another interesting piece of evidence: Buckley was initially 
apprehended as a deserter after a civilian passerby informed his officers of 
the presence of a man on the bridge who appeared ‘sickly’. Despite Buckley 
being dressed in civilian clothes, the informant assumed he must be a soldier 
because, ‘he had cut off his thumb’.196   
That the civilian should make such an assumption of Buckley purely 
on the basis that he had cut off his thumb gives some indication that such an 
act was seen during this period as peculiar to soldiers. Indeed, self-inflicted 
injuries within civilian populations, though known and recognised, were 
generally understood in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to be 
due to one very particular cause, that of hysterical insensitivity to pain, and 
were the subject of very little academic investigation until the period 1860 
to 1900, when, as Sarah Chaney contends, ‘the bulk of writing on self-
mutilation outside a military context appeared’.197  
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Deliberate self-mutilation, though known to exist in the civilian 
context, was generally assumed to be primarily a soldier’s act and the 
majority of writing on self-mutilation prior to 1860 reflects this.
198
 In 
Sketches of Imposture, Deception and Credulity, published in the 1840s, 
Richard Davenport, a ‘miscellaneous writer’, dedicated a whole chapter to 
the subject of ‘malingering’ and self-mutilation in the army.199  Most of the 
anecdotes Davenport related appear to have been reproduced in their 
entirety from the evidence offered by Dr John Cheyne, then Physician 
General in Ireland though formerly of the Medical Department of the 
Ordinance, in his 1824 Medical Report on the Feigned Diseases of Soldiers. 
Their inclusion in what amounts to a popular history of deception strongly 
suggests the common perception of malingering as a military experience. 
Along with attempts to feign various ailments, including deafness and 
lameness, Davenport claimed that soldiers found ingenious methods to bring 
about serious ailments, or the appearance of the same: ‘[r]emarkable 
ingenuity and a very considerable knowledge of the powers and effects of 
medicinal agents, have been shown by those who [...] would not be 
suspected of such information.’ This suggestion casts a rather different light 
on the case above, of a soldier using ‘some escarotic substance’ to prevent 
his back from healing. 
In the introduction to his report, Cheyne noted the extent of the 
problem of ‘malingering’, suggesting that ‘in many corps, [...it was...] an 
intolerable nuisance’.200 He also points out the lack of consistency with 
which regimental surgeons attempted to deal with the problem. Prior to the 
report, Cheyne circulated a series of queries ‘among the staff and regimental 
officers on the Irish establishment’ and his report was based largely on their 
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responses.  Interestingly, according to Cheyne, soldiers not only engaged in 
deceptive practices, but systemized them into transferable information. 
Attributing this to a ‘kind of free masonry among soldiers’, he explained 
that he had ‘no doubt that these methods have been systematised, and that 
they are preserved in many regiments, and handed down for the benefit of 
those who may be inclined to make a trial of them’.201 He gave as an 
example, the case of a soldier from the 18th Hussars who, having recently 
returned from the King’s Infirmary, was treated by the regimental surgeon 
for ‘a rupture’. The details of the case were forwarded to Mr Obre [...] 
Surgeon to the King’s Infirmary’, who, ‘in reply, inclosed a paper that had 
been picked up in the ward of the infirmary, in which this man lay, 
containing “a receipt for making a rupture”.202 The instructions, as set out 
by Cheyne, were very detailed and included the manner in which to ‘bring 
down the inflammation’ after the ‘rupture’ had served its purpose.  A second 
example seems to offer similarly compelling evidence of information 
sharing between soldiers, and indeed a degree of collaboration from friends 
and family: 
In the years 1804 and 1805, the great increase of ophthalmia in 
the 50th regiment, and the re ported detection of frauds in other 
regiments led to suspicion in the mind of the surgeon of that 
corps, and consequent investigation, by which a regular 
correspondence was detected between the men under cure and 
their parents and friends. The ophthalmics requested that 
corrosive sublimate, lime, and blue stone might be forwarded to 
them, through which they hoped to get their eyes in such a state, 
as would enable them to procure their discharge.
203
 
 
In this case the soldiers concerned were not merely attempting to 
secure a discharge, but rather, according to Cheyne, to secure a discharge 
with pension. A ‘rupture’ or an ailment like severe ‘opthalmia’, were 
significantly less likely to raise suspicion than was a severed thumb and 
both were common ailments among soldiers. Given how difficult it was for 
soldiers, even if severely disabled in the line of duty, to be awarded a 
pension, this seems somewhat naive.
204
 Though in both of these cases the 
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intent was not to cause permanent damage, but to create the illusion of it, 
soldiers who attempted the above method of creating temporary damage to 
their eyes suffered extreme pain to create that illusion and ran the very real 
risk of permanently damaging their eyes, sometimes to the extent of 
blindness.
205
  
It should be noted that, however endemic commentators like Cheyne 
may have considered the problem of malingering to have been, particularly 
in some regiments, it was nonetheless a minority of soldiers who engaged in 
such behaviour. Cuthbertson considered that for the majority of soldiers the 
army were likely to face the opposite problem: that of soldiers playing down 
or attempting to conceal illness and disease as a way of avoiding having to 
spend time in hospital.
206
  That said, it would seem a minority of soldiers 
engaged in self-harm and dangerous practices in order to secure themselves 
a route out of military service.  
Cheyne offered a caveat to his assertion that most soldiers engaging 
in malingering were doing so in order to escape duty, or secure a discharge. 
Some, he contended, were acting on ‘the same wayward fancies [...] which 
influence hypochondriack [sic] or hysterical patients in the middling and 
upper ranks of life’. He gave several examples of civilian patients engaging 
in the pretence of ill health, and some going to great lengths to feign 
symptoms; however, whilst Cheyne accepted that ‘a similar caprice’ might 
affect some soldiers, for whom there was ‘some unaccountable gratification 
in deceiving his officers, comrades or surgeon’, these seem to have 
accounted for a very small number of cases.
 207
 The majority, he suggested, 
had clear motives for feigning, or occasioning injury or ill-health.  In 
particular, and somewhat echoing the findings of many studies into the 
causes of desertion, he suggested that in assessing the likelihood of 
malingering in a soldier, enquiries should be made into:  
whether he has been much in hospital, is lazy and averse to his 
duty, which he is ever ready to evade; whether the half yearly 
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inspection is at hand, or he has exceeded the period of his 
furlough and is afraid to return to his corps. Whether he [...] has 
a prospect of lucrative employment if he were discharged, [...] 
whether he has any intentions of marriage. [author’s italics]208 
 
A more drastic form of escape than self-harm or mutilation, suicide is a little 
more difficult to categorise. Suicide attempts appear much more rarely in 
the courts martial records than wilful maiming and indeed, whilst such cases 
are present in the wider military justice record, there are no such cases in the 
records sampled for quantitative analysis in this study. It is important to 
note, however, that such an act would only feature in a court martial trial if 
the attempt was unsuccessful. Many factors may have played a part in 
leading some soldiers to take, or attempt to take, their own lives, some of 
which may have had little direct relationship to service conditions.
209
  
As with desertion, suicide was recognised as criminal within civil 
society and such acts were effectively prosecuted after death, with the 
estates or property of the deceased forfeited to the crown upon a verdict of 
suicide.
210
 Suicide was a major concern for civil authorities in Britain. As 
Roland Bartel explains in his analysis of suicide in eighteen-century 
England, ‘near the start of the eighteenth century the English people 
acquired a reputation [for suicide] that they came to regard as a major 
national problem’.211 England was, incorrectly, considered by contemporary 
commentators to have the highest rates of suicide in Europe, so much so that 
Walpole dubbed suicide ‘death a l’Anglaise’. 212 
Soldier suicide in the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century British 
army is not a well studied subject; however, some work has been done in 
this area. In ‘Suicide in the British Army, c. 1815 – c. 1860’, John Rumsby 
explores some of the common features of soldier suicide, having discovered 
through an earlier study a particular propensity for suicide among the 
cavalry regiments in India.
213
 Rumsby gives several examples of suicide 
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among the soldiers of the 16th Lancers, with methods ranging from 
drowning, which was a very common method of suicide for both soldiers 
and civilians during this period, to soldiers turning their guns on themselves, 
often in full view of witnesses.
214
 According to Rumsby, whilst overall the 
rates for suicide were much higher for soldiers than for civilians, even when 
serving at home, the highest rate by far was for soldiers serving in India, and 
the most likely arm of the service to experience high suicide rates was the 
line cavalry.
215
  
Rumsby’s analysis raises some intriguing questions about the soldier 
experience, not least of which is the seeming similarity between soldiers of 
cavalry regiments in India, and the particular civilian communities from 
which the majority of those men were drawn. As he explains, ‘[c]ivilian 
suicide rates amongst the artisanal and service occupations, classes heavily 
represented in the cavalry, were half as high again as for all occupied 
males.’216 In contrast, the lowest levels of suicide recorded during this 
period were for the Household Cavalry, suggesting that different service 
types resulted in very different suicide rates.
217
  
In some cases, there appears a very clear and direct relationship 
between the service experience of the soldier and the act of suicide. 
Drawing from military memoirs, Coss gives two examples of military 
personnel who seem to have committed suicide primarily to avoid the pain 
and humiliation of flogging. In one case, a comrade of Thomas Morris of 
the 73
rd
 Regiment, having been sentenced by court martial to 300 lashes for 
what we are told was a relatively minor offence, chose instead to commit 
suicide with his musket, using a string attached to the trigger and his toe. In 
the second case, recorded by Judge Advocate Larpent in his journal, a 
commissariat clerk shot himself to avoid the pain and humiliation of 
corporal punishment for a fraud conviction.
218
 Rumsby also gives several 
examples of suicide in the 16th Lancers which follow a similar pattern, with 
shame or fear of punishment clearly a factor.  
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In her essay, ‘Death by Suicide in the British Army, 1820-1900’, 
Janet Padiak also considers both the high levels of suicide amongst serving 
and former soldiers and army responses to this problem.  According to 
Padiak, the issue of soldier suicide became a matter of concern for army 
authorities during the nineteenth century, with the British army beginning to 
analyse newly collected data on soldier sickness and mortality in the 1830s 
and 1840s.
219
 Their findings suggested that the mortality rate for soldiers 
stationed at home during peacetime was double the rate for civilian males of 
comparable age. These results came as a surprise at the time, with many 
analysts anticipating that soldiers in peacetime would have a lower mortality 
rate than their civilian counterparts because of the ‘healthy warrior’ effect. 
Soldiers were screened at enlistment for ‘superior physique’ and absence of 
disease. Once enlisted, soldiers were subject to a system designed to keep 
them healthy and battle ready, with ‘superior nutrition’ and ‘comprehensive 
medical care’.220  
Analyses of the data showed that suicides were clearly a factor, with 
suicide rates amongst soldiers in peacetime significantly higher than 
amongst civilians. Padiak explains that  contemporary analysts posited the 
main reasons for high suicide rates amongst soldiers were likely to be ‘a 
combination of factors, such as dislike of military life, long length of 
service, drunkenness and fear of punishment’, all of which ‘contributed to a 
soldier’s despair’.221 The similarity between these assumed reasons and 
those offered by many deserters to explain their actions is clear.  
Along with the lack of reliable collated figures for specific causes of 
death among soldiers prior to the 1830s, the high levels of mortality due to 
disease throughout this period effectively masked the problem of suicide, 
with the pragmatism of the army leading to a much greater focus on disease 
as a more common and preventable cause of death.
222
  Indeed, when the 
army began to keep accurate records of mortality for soldiers in 1818, they 
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omitted ‘accidental causes’ of death, including homicides, heart attacks, 
suicides and deaths whilst on furlough. ‘Suicide per se’, Padiak argues, ‘was 
not of interest to the army’ as a systemic issue at that time.223   
However, though it was only in the early nineteenth century that the 
extent of soldier suicides began to emerge, specific instances of high suicide 
rates within parts of the service had been noticed much earlier. During a 
House of Lords enquiry into officer absences on Minorca in 1741, a key 
concern was a spate of soldier suicides and self mutilations. In their 
examination of Major General Anstruther, the Lieutenant Governor of 
Minorca, the questions asked by the House and the answers he gave made 
clear a causal relationship between the lack of relief for the regiments, two 
of which had not been relieved for over fifteen years and two more for 
twenty-six years, and the ‘many melancholy [sic] Instances’ of suicide and 
self harm. When asked about the nature and frequency of the incidents, 
Anstruther explained: ‘There have been a good many instances of soldiers 
upon that Island shooting off their Hands and some of them shooting off 
their Feet, and some shooting themselves through the Head, of those that 
have been the longest there; by which your Lordships will observe they will 
incapacitate themselves from earning their Bread at Home rather than 
continue there.’224 
Padiak’s assertion that the army was not concerned with suicide 
prior to the 1830s, and viewed it as the result of personal weakness 
‘aggravated by alcohol, idleness, or a tropical climate’ is well made; 
however, the evidence offered by Anstruther and the tone of the questions 
asked of him by the House of Lords committee suggests a degree of 
cognizance of, and even sympathy for the impact of army mismanagement 
on the soldiers’ state of mind and willingness to serve.225  
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Suicide as a means to escape punishment or as a result of ‘despair’ 
was by no means limited to soldiers.  That said, the higher suicide rates 
among soldiers during the early nineteenth century, and indeed the apparent 
continued trend for high suicide rates among soldiers in the modern era, 
suggest that there were elements of the soldier experience which made them 
much more vulnerable to suicidal action.
226
 As Padiak argues, the soldier 
may simply have had fewer options for resolving the problems that affected 
both soldiers and civilians. Alongside a lack of options, however, there may 
also have been particular stresses inherent in military service to which 
civilians were not subject, or to which they were less subject.  
For example, the apparent relationship between high alcohol use and 
increased risk of suicide, noted by contemporary commentators and borne 
out in modern understandings of mental health is also a factor to consider 
and worth keeping in mind during the discussion of drunkenness as a 
common offence within the courts martial records.
227
 As will be shown in 
Chapter Three, though drunkenness was a commonly cited problem within 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, there is evidence to 
suggest that alcohol was a particularly acute problem for the military and 
that alcohol use was an important element of soldier culture.  There is a 
need for caution here, however, in ascribing alcohol as a cause of suicide. 
According to Rumsby, while alcohol played a part in many of the suicide 
cases he explored, the reasons for men taking their own lives were often 
complex, with a ‘tangle of motives’, some service related, and others not. 
Though alcohol may have been a ‘contributory factor’ in these cases, it ‘was 
unlikely to have been the root cause’.228  
In the cases examined by Rumsby, the most common causes appear 
to have been crime related, with soldiers committing suicide out of shame at 
their offence, or fear of the resulting punishment, interpersonal problems 
‘exaggerated’ by the close confines of the regimental community, and in a 
further echo of the most common reasons for desertion, ‘disappointment’ at 
the disparity between the expectations of service raised by the recruitment 
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sergeants and the reality of service in the regiment, or simply an inability to 
adjust to or cope with service conditions.
229
  
Along with an increased likelihood of suicide, military service 
shaped the methods used by soldiers to kill themselves.  According to 
Rumsby, the most common method of suicide among soldiers was shooting 
themselves.
230
 With Anstruther’s evidence in mind, it seems that this may 
also have been a common feature of soldier suicide, and indeed self-
mutilation, in the earlier part of our period; a point worth bearing in mind 
for the discussion of violent crime in Chapter Four. That this was similarly 
mirrored in the tendency for civilian suicides to utilise the tools of their 
trade again suggests that elements of the act of suicide were occupation 
specific.
231
  
Conclusion 
Soldiers who deserted, whether by absconding or taking their own 
lives, or who rendered themselves unfit for further service through self-
mutilation, were often responding to the particular context of military 
service.  For most of the period under study, the nature of their service 
disallowed the legal withdrawal of their labour, and as can be seen from the 
case of the Minorca regiments they could be held to that service indefinitely, 
without the protections afforded to their civilian counterparts. Even for 
those soldiers who enlisted for limited periods, either for the duration of a 
conflict as was often the case for those who enlisted from the American 
colonies for example, or during the early nineteenth century when shorter 
enlistment periods became more generally available, the reality of military 
life could at times prolong that service beyond its intended limits.
232
  
Soldiers were in some ways at the mercy of an often ad-hoc 
approach to administration at a regimental level and some commanding 
officers simply refused to accept the validity of their claims.
233
 Among the 
desertion trials from this period are many examples of soldiers who had 
been denied their right to a discharge having apparently served for the 
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agreed period: as for example, the three soldiers from the 62nd who were 
tried for desertion, having been denied their discharge. The power to impose 
often brutal physical punishments for even minor infractions, placed some 
soldiers in fear and was, for many of those who removed themselves from 
service through illegal means, a clear factor in their decisions to do so.
234
 
The higher rates of suicide among soldiers than among civilians, even when 
serving at home, along with the especially high rates of suicide among the 
cavalry regiments serving in India, and the spate of suicides in Minorca, is 
testament to the particular stresses of army service and the much narrower 
range of options available to soldiers to change their immediate 
circumstances, while the tendency noted by Rumsby, for soldiers to utilise 
their weapons as the most common method of committing suicide shows 
that military service fundamentally shaped the soldier’s experience of 
suicide.
235
 Though some of the motivations and impetus behind such actions 
had their analogue in civilian cultures, desertion, suicide and self-mutilation 
highlight a soldier-specific experience. 
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Chapter Three: Military Offences Part 2 - Disorder and Regulatory 
Offences 
 
Introduction 
If soldiers were in effect subject to two distinct sets of law, civil and 
military, it is also fair to say that military justice served two distinct 
functions: the prosecution and punishment of criminal activity and the 
regulation and administration of military discipline.
236
 Indeed, ensuring 
military discipline rather than the pursuit of justice was the prime concern 
for army authorities and many of the offences tried by court martial were 
wholly military in nature, and would not have been considered criminal in 
the civilian sphere: insolent language, sleeping on post, being drunk on 
duty, to name a few.
237
  
Other offences of disorder, such as rioting or creating a disturbance 
would have been recognised as crimes of disorder or breaches of the peace 
in the civilian sphere. Alongside desertion, regulatory offences were the 
most common charge types preferred against soldiers by courts martial at all 
three levels, whether as standalone charges or accompaniments to other 
offences. For many soldiers, therefore, courts martial represented a response 
to breaches of discipline, rather than criminal activity.
238
 This chapter will 
explore aspects of soldier disorder and consider what these offences can tell 
us about soldier-specific experiences of crime and justice, as well as some 
of the ways such offences demonstrated continuity with the civilian cultures 
from which soldiers were drawn. 
Defining regulatory offences 
The range of regulatory offences that appear in the military justice 
records is extensive. As well as desertion and making away with 
necessaries, soldiers faced courts martial for many different military 
offences:  falling asleep on sentry duty; being incorrectly attired when 
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inspected; overstepping the boundaries of camps; breaking or failing to 
adequately maintain equipment; disobeying or failing to properly carry out 
orders; insolence towards officers and NCOs; abusing military animals; 
firing off their muskets in camp; wasting ammunition, and the ever present 
charge of drunkenness.  Often though, and particularly when the soldier was 
tried by RCM and no full transcript of the trial is available, it is impossible 
to know precisely what the offence was, with the charges stating simply 
‘unsoldierlike behaviour’, or ’disgraceful conduct’.239  
 Where charges give more detail, some offences are fairly simple to 
categorise: soldiers charged with falling asleep at their post, or being drunk 
at parade had clearly transgressed the bounds of military order without 
necessarily acting in a criminal fashion. Other regulatory charges offer more 
of an interpretive challenge. Mutiny, for example, like desertion was an 
offence which could occur along a sliding scale of seriousness. Large-scale 
mutinies in the armed services were a cause of concern both to military and 
civil authorities, and popular reactions to such mutinies, particularly during 
times of war, were understandably negative.
240
 Soldiers and sailors 
represented the nation’s defence and a refusal by them to fight or adhere to 
the authority of their commanding officers by definition potentially 
threatened that defence. But much like the charge of desertion, the charge of 
mutiny could cover many actions, and its application within courts martial 
was far from consistent, particularly at the lower level of the RCM.
241
 
Refusing to obey an order, disrespectful language to a superior officer, 
making comments about service conditions could all lead to charges of 
mutiny, or the related charge of using mutinous expressions.  
Unlike civilians, soldiers lived under martial law in times of peace 
and war, home and abroad. According to the Mutiny Act and the Articles of 
War, any form of mutiny could be met with a death sentence. In the practice 
of the law, military authorities distinguished between more and less serious 
forms of this offence. Of the many offences which could be considered 
capital under the act, striking a superior officer and sleeping on sentry duty, 
were some of the most common offences for which soldiers were court-
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martialled during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rarely though, 
were soldiers executed for these offences without there being some 
additional aggravating factor, or in response to a particular in-time need for 
the army to make an example of an unfortunate soldier.
242
  
Regulatory offences in the GRCM, GCM and RCM samples 
Of the 1547 trial listings for the six sampled years of the GRCM 
register, 422 include regulatory offences, with 218 trials listing regulatory 
offences without other accompanying charges.
243
  A similarly high 
proportion of the trials at RCM level record regulatory offences: out of 62 
RCM trial listings for the 33rd, 27 include charges of regulatory offence, 18 
of which had no other accompanying charges; of 101 trial listings for the 
34th, there are 86 charges of regulatory offence, with 52 of these as 
standalone charges, and for the 37th, of the 53 listings, 38 show regulatory 
offences, with 35 as standalone charges.
244
 During the same twelve month 
period, across the whole service, 143 soldiers were tried by GCM, with 38 
facing regulatory charges.
245
   
Many of these cases record fairly simple examples of irregular 
behaviour, such as the GRCM trial in 1814, of Private Jason Gallivin of the 
1/73rd, for ‘Appearing in the Street irregularly dressed & refusing to go to 
the Guard Room’, or the RCM trial in 1819, of Private Samson Hollis of the 
33rd, for ‘[l]aying down & quitting his Post when on Sentry’.246 There are 
also numerous examples of soldiers falling asleep on duty, such as Private 
Timothy Moore of the 94th, who had been ‘[f]ound asleep on his post’, or 
Private Lawrence Parkinson of the 56th, who was ‘[f]ound asleep when on 
duty as Sentinel’, and many cases too of drunkenness.247  In some of the 
cases though, we see a much more active picture of disobedience and 
unruliness, with soldiers ‘rioting in the barrack room’, or engaging in 
‘mutinous conduct.’ 
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Key features of disorder and regulatory offences 
Resisting authority 
A common feature of many regulatory offences is their apparent role 
in the soldier’s lexicon of resistance and negotiation and this has been the 
focus of some study in recent decades. Burroughs, for example, 
characterises insubordination as ‘instinctive reactions or conscious protests’ 
and considers desertion and absence without leave in particular as 
‘widespread forms of protest against the conditions of army life’. According 
to Burroughs, while desertion was a common response to dissatisfaction 
among younger soldiers, for older soldiers, though they were ‘inured to the 
demands of barracks life [...]their rankling discontent and frustrations might 
well be manifested in drunkenness or unruliness’. 248 More recently, Will 
Tatum considered the negotiated nature of military authority. Rather than 
the apparently absolute authority of officers over men, Tatum’s study 
demonstrates a more fluid relationship, in which ‘the practical bounds’ of 
that authority ‘were the result of give-and-take interactions between officers 
and enlisted men’, and identifies a range of strategies and behaviours, 
through which soldiers expressed their frustrations with specific and general 
conditions of service, creating the context for discourse with officers.
249
 
These strategies were at times a deliberate and direct attempt to force 
negotiation, and at others a less deliberate and direct response to service 
conditions. Taken together, Tatum argues that these behaviours demonstrate 
that soldiers, far from ‘hapless victims’ of overweening and arbitrary 
authority, as they have often been portrayed, were instead ‘active agents’ in 
the military system.
250
  
Contemporary concerns over soldier behaviour and service 
conditions within the army also recognised in soldier crime elements of 
resistance to authority, though they framed the expression of that resistance 
in much more reactive terms. Proponents of reform, like Henry Marshall, 
for example, writing in the 1840s and arguing against the common 
perception of soldiers as, ‘the very dregs of the population, - ignorant, 
vicious, and idle’, considered that ‘a certain order of crimes, [...were...] the 
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necessary result of the organization, discipline, usages, and services of the 
army'.
251
 An advice book for soldiers and non-commissioned officers, also 
written in the 1840s, suggests that many men, particularly when drunk, were 
‘goaded’ into committing crimes by overbearing NCOs.252 In this case 
agency is ascribed to the NCOs, with advice against pushing the men under 
them to such extremes, and instead to act with ‘forbearance’. It is notable 
that in the section of the book aimed particularly at private soldiers, 
passivity and acceptance are offered as the best defence against unfair 
treatment.
253
 For Marshall and the author of the advice book, the 
peculiarities of army service and the system of authority under which 
soldiers lived were themselves the cause for a great deal of soldier 
offending.  
Along with the rather oblique charge of ‘disobedience of orders’, 
which could cover a multitude of sins from accidental disobedience to 
outright defiance, charges such as that against Private Charles Barclay of the 
2/18th, who was convicted in 1813 for ‘Declaring he would never carry a 
firelock or do a day’s duty’  or the charges against Private James Wilks, of 
the 87th, for ‘throwing down his Firelock and using mutinous language’, 
seem to fit quite naturally into the category of active resistance and 
negotiation tactics identified by Tatum and Burroughs.
254
 Most compelling 
is the intermittent appearance within the courts martial records of soldiers 
charged with writing letters or preferring complaints. Tatum suggests that 
soldiers often followed a pattern of escalation, beginning with attempts to 
seek solutions to problems through channels of communication with officers 
and the command structure. He gives several examples of groups of soldiers 
attempting to resolve their grievances through verbal and written 
communication with their immediate officers as well as the higher echelons 
of command, some of which resulted in those grievances being heard and 
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responded to and others which, as he put it ‘fell on deaf ears’.255  Verbal 
appeals to immediate officers, were followed by written appeals further up 
the chain of command, and when these avenues had proved unsuccessful, 
soldiers resorted to more drastic action, such as outright mutiny.   
Throughout the courts martial records, there are examples of 
soldiers, and indeed officers, tried for preferring malicious accusations, or 
writing ‘improper letters’. In the six years sampled from the GRCM register, 
there are five cases of soldiers tried for making frivolous, improper, or 
malicious complaints, three for writing letters and one for making a 
malicious accusation against an officer. Though we do not know the content 
of the letter, the trial of John Martin, a militia soldier from Stockport, in 
1813, demonstrates the dangers of engaging in this kind of negotiation 
strategy. Convicted of ‘Unsoldierlike Conduct in writing a Letter calculated 
to create bad order and insubordination’, Martin was sentenced to 700 
lashes.
256
 Similarly, Private Brian Docherty of the 28th, stationed in Corfu 
was convicted in 1825, of ‘Writing two Letters with a malicious intent’ and 
sentenced to four months imprisonment with hard labour.
257
 
Whilst Tatum makes a compelling case for the structure of the 
system in which soldiers lived and served shaping their available options 
and responses in ways ‘that differed significantly from their civilian 
labourer counterparts’, it is important to take account of some of the 
parallels that did exist between military and civil employees.
258
 Tatum’s 
criticism notwithstanding, Peter Way’s argument that soldiers’ ‘rhetoric’,  
‘economic motivation’ and strategies, up to and including the ‘withholding 
of labour’, ‘echoed [...]plebeian crowd actions and early workplace 
disputes’, is not easily dismissed.259  
Perhaps the biggest structural difference for soldiers was the 
existence of a strictly delineated chain of command;
 260
 however, though 
most civilians did not exist within such a chain of command, they 
nonetheless made use of some similar strategies to make their grievances 
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known.
261
 Where soldiers might, after finding no answer to a problem from 
their immediate superiors, send a letter further up the chain of command, 
civilian workers, faced with an insoluble problem with their employers, 
would sometimes seek redress from local justices or magistrates, and if that 
failed might collaborate on letters or petitions to parliament. John Rule 
gives several examples of such petitions, including that of the weavers of 
the West Country who petitioned Parliament in 1756, to seek redress for the 
reduction in wages imposed by their employers.
,262
 Though there are clear 
distinctions between a trade or industry representing themselves in this way 
and a small group of soldiers seeking redress from the higher echelons of 
command, there are also similarities, not least in that they demonstrate a 
sense of right to redress.
263
  
Soldiers, though they existed within a very different framework of 
authority, nonetheless retained their sense of rights as employees. Soldiers 
brought with them a culture of workers’ rights and continued to employ 
some of the methods and strategies used by their civilian counterparts when 
faced with what they considered unfair treatment.
264
 An example from 
Tatum’s study demonstrates both the pattern of escalation from initial to 
formal complaint and the sense of natural justice and employee rights felt by 
soldiers. Ten marines from General Wolfe’s regiment were charged with 
mutiny for refusing to do any duty in the fleet until they had been paid their 
‘sea pay’, which at that point was two years in arrears.  In their defence 
statements the men set out the various steps they had taken to try to resolve 
their problem prior to resorting to mutiny as a last resort. First they spoke to 
the regiment’s paymaster, who ‘promised’ that they would be paid. When 
that promise was not kept, they ‘sent written petitions’ to their colonel and 
the Secretary at War, and received no answer from either.  Some of the men 
then ‘engaged in additional acts of resistance at the time of their arrest’. One 
private ‘flung down his hat in an insolent manner’ another threatened to go 
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over their officers’ heads by writing to the Secretary at War ‘to have one 
officer cashiered’.265  
In Redcoat:The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, 
Richard Holmes also argues that mutiny and disobedience were often the 
result of a sense of grievance at a perceived ‘breach of trust on the part of 
the authorities’ and gives further examples of mutiny by soldiers in the face 
of unwarranted stoppages, or other perceived injustices.
266
 The case of the 
Western Fencibles is a particularly interesting one. Their mutiny in 1779 
was caused by anger at their commanding officer for having purchased 
sporrans from a London tailor at a much higher price than local tailors 
would have charged and then passed that cost onto the men through their 
stoppages.
267
 Such disputes over cost and quality of items purchased or 
contracted on behalf of soldiers were far from uncommon. Given that 
soldiers had no personal purchasing power in such matters, but were 
nonetheless tied to those purchase decisions this seems an understandably 
fraught aspect of army life.  
According to Gordon Bannerman, disputes over the quality of food 
provided by civilian contractors for camps at home were rare, at least during 
the mid-eighteenth century; however, for regiments serving overseas there 
were far more complaints, with suggestions that ‘poor quality provisions 
were [...sometimes...] deliberately provided’, and, ‘old and new provisions 
blended together’268 Divall’s study of the 30th Regiment suggests that these 
problems still existed in the nineteenth century, with ‘many horror stories of 
adulterated food’ and meat that was  ‘more bone than flesh’: a serious 
matter for soldiers whose meat rations were based entirely on weight and 
who would, through stoppages, bear the cost of those rations.
269
  
Tensions over food purchasing, both in terms of price and quality 
were therefore not uncommon, which may explain why several soldiers of 
the 34th faced RCM trials for refusing to accept meat from the commissary. 
In August 1819, privates William Noble and John Eagan were tried and 
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acquitted of ‘refusing to receive any of the meat supplied by contract’. 
Though acquitted, the fact that they were court-martialled at all suggests 
that this may have been a recurring problem, particularly when one 
considers the additional charge faced by Noble of, ‘saying he was one man 
who refused to take the contract meat [...] in front of the whole company’.  
A month later three privates were tried, and two found guilty of: 
‘endeavouring to Administer an Oath to Certain Men of the first Company, 
binding them not to go to the Regimental canteen’.270  
There is the danger of over-emphasising the degree to which some of 
these behaviours represent a firm expression of agency on the parts of 
soldiers. Those soldiers Tatum identifies as engaging in less deliberate 
forms of resistance and negotiation, responding immediately to service 
conditions in destructive and sometimes self-destructive ways, can also be 
seen to represent the lack of agency which characterised some aspects of 
soldier service. Though not ‘hapless victims’ of authority as they have often 
been depicted, they were nonetheless, in a very real sense, ‘trapped’ within 
the military system from the moment they enlisted: they were for the most 
part, soldiers for life, with no right to leave the service; they had ‘no direct 
influence over conditions of service, and gatherings for discussion were 
forbidden’, and the avenues for redress for soldiers who were subjected to 
unfair treatment or outright bullying were few and far between.
271
 As 
Burroughs argues, some soldiers ‘were provoked into committing offences 
by the treatment they received from domineering officers or vindictive 
NCOs’. 272  Though this could still be characterised as a form of agency, and 
indeed Burroughs refers to such behaviour as ‘instinctive reactions or 
conscious protests’, it also underlines the lack of freedom inherent in soldier 
service, particularly when coupled with the potential for severe sentences 
for those soldiers who responded in this manner. In this sense, then, 
soldiers’ available options did indeed differ ‘significantly from their civilian 
labourer counterparts’.273 
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Between the two extreme positions of mutiny and acceptance, there 
was ‘a shifting zone of negotiation’ between the men and their officers.274 
Though all the formal power and authority lay with officers, the relative 
rarity of death sentences for even the most serious mutiny charges shows the 
impracticality of exercising that absolute power whilst ignoring genuine 
grievances.
 275
 However differentiated by rank and authority, soldiers and 
their officers existed within a relationship, the successful functioning of 
which required a degree of mutuality. Consequently, the way in which 
mutiny or disobedience was treated by regimental authorities was highly 
contextual.
 276
 
Two examples of mutinous behaviour show this very clearly. The 
first comes from the recollections of Lieutenant John Shipp, formerly a 
soldier who rose through the ranks. In his memoirs, Shipp recalls an 
incident of mutiny in two companies of the 10th Regiment in India. It had 
become the custom, Shipp explains, for the men arriving at Fort William to 
have eight rupees stopped from their pay, with no explanation offered as to 
why this money had been stopped. The men, naturally upset at the loss of 
this money sought answers from their officers, who were themselves ‘in the 
dark’ as to why the deductions had been made. ‘The greater part of the two 
companies then marched, in a sober deliberate manner, towards Major-
General Sir Hughe Bailey's quarters, to seek redress’.277 It was explained to 
the men that the deductions had been made in order to ensure a proper burial 
should any of them be unfortunate enough to require one. Far from being 
satisfied with this explanation, the men returned to their barracks angry and 
proceeded to fuel their anger with alcohol, ‘till at length they became bent 
upon open rebellion and mutiny’. What makes this recollection so 
intriguing, is the role of the officers in attempting to quell the rebellion:  
Both companies were doatingly [sic] fond of their officers, who 
took great pains to explain to them that violent measures, and 
taking the law into their own hands, would never be likely to get 
their wrongs redressed; but that, on the contrary, those very acts 
deprived them of the power of interceding for them, and 
                                                     
274
 Tatum, ‘Military Justice and Negotiated Authority’, p. 109 
275
 Ibid.p. 109. 
276
 Ibid.,p. 109. 
277
John Shipp, Memoirs of the extraordinary military career of John Shipp: late a 
lieutenant in His Majesty's 87th Regiment, Volume 1 (London: Hurst, Chance, and 
Co., 1830), p. 117. 
92 
 
 
 
explaining to the proper authorities the grounds of their 
complaints.
278
 
 
For most of the men this was enough to stem the tide of rebellion; however, 
some were still unhappy and, ‘spreading wide the infectious sparks of 
mutiny’. Again, the officers were called upon to intercede. The colonel of 
the regiment, who Shipp tells us the men ‘loved dearly’, arrived and ‘the 
men became passive’, but, when the ‘hated’ adjutant arrived, ‘the shouting 
of, " Kick him out!"—" Turn him out!" resounded through the barracks, and 
he had a narrow escape for his life’.279 Once the adjutant left, the men 
settled down and the barracks were again peaceful. The following morning, 
the men were refunded their eight rupees. In this instance the relationship 
between the men and their officers was clearly crucial in restoring order. 
Recognition of a genuine grievance and a willingness by the officers to 
engage with the men, coupled almost certainly with a degree of pragmatism 
when faced with a fairly large number of unhappy soldiers, prevented the 
incident from escalating into something much uglier and more dangerous.  
The second example of mutinous behaviour, from the recollections 
of William Surtees, occurred in a very different context and was handled in 
a very different manner. In this case, the incident occurred as the regiment 
was marching towards Orense, close behind the enemy’s rear guard: ‘[A]s 
our General was passing the column, a cry was passed from the rear to open 
out to allow him to pass, the road being very narrow. One of our men, as the 
General came near, happened to say, loud enough for him to hear, that “he 
had more need to give us some bread," or words to that effect’.  In this 
instance, faced with a single soldier voicing his anger and frustration, in the 
context of a hard and dangerous march almost within sight of the enemy, the 
General’s response was wholly different to that of the Colonel in India. 
According to Surtees, the soldier’s words ‘so exasperated the General, that 
he instantly halted the whole brigade, ordered the man to be tried by a drum-
head court-martial, and flogged him on the spot’. 280  
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Most of the cases above clearly relate to soldiers responding to 
systemic issues. Sometimes, though, when soldiers resisted authority it was 
at a very individual and personal level. The chain of command was 
sacrosanct to the British army system, but as an organisation it was made up 
of people, not all of whom got along as individuals. Personal dislikes, 
disagreements and grievances played their part in prompting acts of 
rebellion or disobedience. As will be discussed further in Chapter Six, the 
relationship between soldiers and their NCOs was often one of particular 
tension. NCOs represented the immediate face of authority for ordinary-
ranking soldiers, with a constant presence and supervisory role.
281
 At the 
same time, NCOs were drawn from the ranks, and personal ties and enmities 
could easily carry forward into their application of, and the soldiers’ 
acceptance of, authority.
282
 
 Though we have only the charges recorded and no trial transcript, 
the case of James Murphy of the 34
th
 Regiment may reflect one such 
personal disagreement. According to the regimental returns, Murphy was 
tried by RCM for ‘Coming to the Room of Corporal Bible after hours & 
attempting to break open his door’, and then ‘abusing’ and ‘hitting’ Bible.283 
This is a fairly extreme example, with violence as well as harsh words, but it 
is a useful case to consider. Though we do not know whether Murphy’s 
disagreement with Bible was of a professional or personal nature, unlike 
many of the cases of soldier violence or insolence to officers and NCOs, his 
actions do not appear to have been immediately precipitated by an unwanted 
or unwelcome command: Bible was not ‘on duty’ at the time, but in his 
room, nor does it seem that Murphy was being admonished or punished by 
Bible at the time.  
Riotous behaviour 
Close kin to mutiny, the charges of rioting or riotous behaviour also 
appear intermittently throughout the courts martial records, and like mutiny, 
provide an intriguing insight into soldier cultures and their relationship to 
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civilian cultures. As with most of the charges examined here, riot charges 
could cover a range of behaviours, some of which clearly fit the traditional 
legal definition of rioting, and some of which do not.  
Altogether, in the GRCM samples, there are 14 examples of soldiers 
convicted of rioting, or riotous behaviour, and seven examples in the GCM 
sample.
284
 From the regimental returns, the 33rd convicted 2 soldiers of riot 
charges, the 34th convicted four soldiers, and three soldiers were convicted 
by the 37th.
285
 Looking at the charges in more detail, however, emphasises 
the need for caution when dealing with court martial charges. The legal 
definition of rioting as an offence required the involvement of at least three 
people as well as the active committing of an illegal act.
286
  As mentioned 
above, the use of the charge of rioting in the military setting may not always 
have corresponded to this legal definition, referring instead to the type of 
behaviour alone, with the number of people involved not considered 
relevant. This is particularly apparent in cases of individual soldiers charged 
with rioting or riotous behaviour: in such cases, either the unfortunate 
soldier concerned was being held solely responsible for group action, or his 
actions would not have met the legal definition of rioting. The charge of 
riotous behaviour is a particularly awkward charge to categorise in this 
context, seemingly treated by regimental commanders as an interchangeable 
charge with mutiny, as for example in the case of Private Michael McHugh, 
of the 37th, who was convicted of ‘Riotous and unsoldierlike conduct in 
attempting to strike Lieut. Johnson in the execution of his Duty’.287 
Recording vagaries aside, this offence type seems to have fulfilled a similar 
role to mutiny within the soldier’s lexicon of resistance and negotiation and 
indeed the two charges were often paired.
288
 Unlike mutiny, however, riot 
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was a recognised criminal offence within the civilian sphere as well as an 
offence against order within the military.  
Again, we see a continuity of civilian expectations into soldier 
culture. Just as rioting formed part of the soldiers’ lexicon of resistance and 
negotiation with their officers and the military system, it also formed an 
important part of the political lexicon of the civilian communities from 
which those soldiers were recruited.
289
 Riots were a common feature of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain’s informal political culture, 
indeed they were a common expression of popular discontent across 
Europe.
290
 Tony Hayter suggests that this period was ‘the high noon of mob 
disorder in England’.291 Large-scale eruptions of popular discontent, such as 
the Gordon Riots, were so impactful and intertwined with national politics 
that they remain in the public consciousness even now. But the more 
common experiences of rioting during this period were smaller scale 
expressions of discontent over localised and immediate concerns. Food riots 
in particular were a common feature of the local political landscape, 
especially in response to specific shortages and rising prices, as was the case 
in the mid-1790s. According to Cynthia Bouton, from the mid-eighteenth 
century, food riots became, ‘the most common form of popular protest’ in 
England.
292
  
Though rioting was an offence that demonstrated an element of 
cultural continuity between civil and military worlds, it was, for much of the 
eighteenth and even early nineteenth centuries, also an offence that literally 
separated the civilian and soldier, pitting the two against each other through 
the army’s role in policing civil unrest. The use of soldiers to quell public 
disturbances heightened the tensions between civilians and the military in 
Britain, and indeed, during the earlier part of our period, in the colonies too. 
As Brumwell contends, ‘the redcoated infantryman or dragoon was the 
ultimate defender of the state.’293   At the same time, soldiers billeted in 
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towns and soldiers returning after periods of warfare were seen by many as 
a potential source of riot and disorder.
294
 Soldiers were therefore seen 
variously as both the state response to and likely cause of civil unrest.  
It is difficult to know what impact this position may have had on the 
soldier’s attitude towards rioting, but it is clear that for some soldiers rioting 
held very different connotations than it did for civilians, particularly those 
civilians who shared their socioeconomic class. For many soldiers, and 
indeed their officers, this part of military service was both distasteful and a 
cause for ‘shame’.295 Brumwell gives several examples of soldiers and 
officers who expressed distaste for and unease at their roles in quelling riots. 
Private James Miller, of the 15th Foot, we are told ‘clearly loathed’ the 
duty, and whilst his military service abroad was a source of pride, ‘his 
regiment’s role [...in...] “quelling of mobs, and trifling riots”’ [...were...] 
“disagreeable duties”’ that  ‘brought him nothing but shame’.296  
Clearly then, while mutiny and riot often represented a continuance 
of civilian culture in terms of soldier offending, they also represented a stark 
separation, at least in terms of civilians of a similar social class. It should be 
noted that for the business and civic leaders of towns, the role of soldiers in 
quelling disturbances was often met with gratitude, as demonstrated in J. E. 
O. Screen’s study, ‘The Eighteenth-Century Army at Home, as reflected in 
Local Records’. Screen gives several examples of soldiers being rewarded 
by civic leaders, either financially, or through gifts of clothes and shoes, 
such as the reward of ‘twenty guineas to the Blues at Nottingham in July 
1777’.297 
Drunkenness 
Another clear pattern which emerges from the courts martial records 
is the prevalence of drunkenness both as a charge in its own right and a 
contributory factor to other charges, although the rate at which charges of 
this nature are brought differs between the levels of court martial.   
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Out of the 27 charges for regulatory offences from the 33rd, 10 
involve drunkenness, with eight of those being variations on the charge of 
‘Drunk on Duty’. Similarly, 44 of the 86 trials for regulatory offences 
returned by the 34th include charges of drunkenness, with 28 being 
variations of the ‘Drunk on Duty’ or ‘Drunk for Parade’ charges, and of the 
38 trials for regulatory offences returned by the 37th, 13 include charges of 
drunkenness, of which seven specify that drunkenness was whilst on duty or 
parade.
298
  Of the 422 trial listings from the GRCM register which include 
regulatory charges, 122 involve charges of drunkenness, with only seven 
referring specifically to drunkenness on duty. This is a significant 
proportion, though lower than in the RCM returns.
299
 By contrast, of the 38 
GCM trials of privates and NCOs for regulatory offences between 
September 1818 and September 1819, only nine show charges of 
drunkenness.
300
  
Again, this would suggest that drunkenness as a regulatory charge, 
and instances of drink-fuelled rule breaking, were much more likely to be 
dealt with at RCM than GCM or GRCM level. This suggests that whilst 
drunkenness was treated seriously by regimental authorities it was not 
considered a serious enough offence to warrant a full GCM, unless it was 
accompanied by other charges, part of a pattern of repeat offending, or 
perpetrated by a soldier holding some rank or engaged in a sensitive role, 
such as sentry duty.  Divall suggests that whilst NCOs would often be 
acquitted by courts martial for other offences, this was not the case for those 
who faced charges of drunkenness.
301
 Similarly, Paul Kopperman suggests 
that, during anti-drinking ‘campaigns’ by zealous commanding officers, 
whilst officers were at less risk of punishment than private soldiers, NCOs 
were ‘very much at risk, as part of their responsibility was to set an example 
for the troops’.302This may in part explain the difference in the proportion of 
drunkenness as a regulatory offence between NCOs and privates: 41% of 
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NCOs court-martialled for regulatory offences faced alcohol-related 
charges, compared to only 27% of privates.  
The problem of alcohol abuse amongst soldiers was a matter of 
concern and discussion by military authorities and commentators throughout 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and was considered by many 
to be the root of most of the disorder and criminal offences committed by 
soldiers.
303
 Though this mirrored a growing concern within the civilian 
sphere about drunkenness generally, there was a clear sense that the 
problems of alcohol abuse were magnified by military service.
304
  In his 
evidence to an 1834 House of Commons enquiry into drunkenness in both 
civil and military spheres, Dr John Cheyne, who had served for fourteen 
years in the Medical Department of the Ordnance, and a further fourteen as 
Physician General in Ireland, claimed that, ‘nearly all the punishments in the 
army were referrible to the use of ardent spirits’. Having heard of the 
‘temperence system in America’ and that three quarters of all punishments 
and disease in the American army were the result of alcohol, Cheyne 
circulated a request for information to all surgeons in the British army and 
received answers from almost every regiment.  Their responses showed that 
‘at least three-fourths of the punishments and diseases in the army’ were a 
direct result of alcohol consumption. When questioned further on the impact 
of addiction to alcohol, Cheyne claimed that, ‘abroad, it [...was...] the 
principle cause of [...] of the soldiers’ being invalided at an early period of 
life’.305 The Duke of Wellington shared this view, claiming that alcohol was 
‘the parent of every other military offence.’306 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of alcohol in the day 
to day lives of serving soldiers and the subject looms large in the memoirs 
of soldiers and officers alike. Coss gives many examples of tales of 
drunkenness and debauchery from the memoirs of soldiers who served in 
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the Penninsular, some of which were in the context of post-victory excesses, 
but some of which suggested that, for many soldiers, the ability to hold their 
drink was, along with plundering,  a ‘learned avocation, in which [... they 
...] put great stock’.307 The propensity of soldiers to sell or exchange almost 
any item in order to procure alcohol is also recurring theme. Indeed, in 
describing the high value of the Waterloo medal to those soldiers who 
received it, Rifleman Harris drew attention to the reluctance of soldiers to 
part with their medals even for drink, in terms which make clear that this 
was almost unique:  
‘To shew [sic] the importance attached to such distinctions in 
our service , I may remark that, though the Waterloo medal is 
intrinsically worth two or three shillings, and a soldier will 
sometimes be tempted to part with almost any thing for drink, 
yet, during the fifteen years in which I remained with the rifles 
after Waterloo, I never knew a single instance of a medal being 
sold, and only one of its being pawned’.308  
 
Interestingly, the single example of a medal being pawned was a soldier 
pawning his medal for wine. Alongside items of personal value, soldiers 
would also pawn or sell their necessaries and accoutrements, and it is very 
likely that this was at least partially responsible for the high numbers of 
soldiers charged with making away with or selling their necessaries.  
Whether alcohol was indeed the ‘parent’ of most offences is difficult 
to ascertain, but it certainly seems to have been at the root of a large number 
of crime types, from making away with the soldier’s own necessaries, to 
burglary and theft from civilians. Indeed, Brumwell contends that, certainly 
for the mid to late eighteenth century, ‘it is unusual to find a court case in 
which alcohol does not play some part’.309 With stoppages at times 
accounting for almost the entirety of the soldier’s daily pay, he was often in 
a position where the purchase extra alcohol required outright criminal 
activity or creative use of occasional opportunities for profiteering.
310
   
From the very start of their military career, alcohol consumption was 
central to the soldier’s experience.  Recruiting sergeants, who themselves 
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received money for each recruit they brought in, made liberal use of drink 
first to encourage and then to buttress men’s decisions to enlist.311  It is 
important to recognise that whatever individual reasons a soldier may have 
had to drink, whether to an ordinary or problematic degree, as a sociable 
activity, or a solitary vice, he did so in the context of a system which 
colluded in providing him with opportunities to drink, even as it struggled to 
temper alcohol use.
312
 Soldiers were provided with alcohol as part of their 
rationed diets, primarily in the form of beer or rum, and for those serving 
overseas, particularly in warmer climates, alcohol played an important role 
in preventing scurvy.
313
 Indeed, it would seem that, despite growing 
concerns over alcohol consumption and its perceived role in exacerbating 
crime and disorder, the quantity of alcohol included in soldiers’ rations 
increased during the eighteenth century.
314
  
It is also important to note that, whilst some officers and regimental 
commanders attempted to regulate or prevent drunkenness, the officer class 
itself was prone to heavy drinking. As Kopperman points out, just like the 
soldiers under them, ‘subalterns were on occasion punished for misbehaving 
while drunk’.315 In his recollection of service in the 54th Foot, in Canada in 
the 1780s, William Cobbett described what amounted to rampant 
drunkenness among the commissioned officers; a source of great annoyance 
to Cobbett, as Regimental Sergeant Major: 
But I had a very delicate part to act with those gentry; for, while 
I despised them for their gross ignorance and their vanity, and 
hated them for their drunkenness and rapacity, I was fully 
sensible of their power [...] as I never disguised my dislikes, or 
restrained my tongue, I should have been broken and flogged for 
fifty different offences, had they not been kept in awe by my 
inflexible sobriety, impartiality, and integrity, by the 
consciousness of their inferiority to me, and by the real and 
almost indispensable necessity of the use of my talents. They, in 
fact, resigned all the discipline of the regiment to me, and I very 
freely left them to swagger about and to get roaring drunk 
[author’s italics]316 
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Though Cobbett’s assessment of his officers is far from objective, it 
does underline the role some officers may have had in promoting a culture 
of drunkenness in their regiments, as indeed does Kopperman’s assertion 
that some officers sold alcohol to the men in addition to their rations.
317
 
The soldiers’ desire for alcohol often went far beyond the accepted 
and mandated rations, straying into the much stronger drink. Even here 
though, the degree of collusion on the parts of officers and command was 
very high, despite the many attempts to curb levels of drinking among the 
troops. In his analysis of alcohol abuse in the eighteenth-century British 
army, Kopperman considers the degree to which officers colluded with 
soldiers’ attempts to acquire alcohol, seemingly in direct contravention of 
their stated goals to the contrary. And in many cases, laudable attempts to 
prevent greater access to alcohol ran aground on the law of unintended 
consequences.
318
 Some officers, for example, argued that soldiers’ pocket 
money should be limited, as a way of preventing them getting drunk. Rather 
than force soldiers to embrace sobriety, however, this simply increased the 
need for both ingenuity and criminal activity. As John Bell, a former 
regimental surgeon, observed of the soldiers stationed in Ireland, ‘The 
crimes most commonly committed by the men, were, pledging their 
necessaries for whiskey, and stealing those of their comrades for the same 
purpose.’319 Even attempts by the army to mitigate the impact of alcohol by 
providing a milder rum to the troops in the West Indies, merely provided the 
soldiers with a new item to barter, as they exchanged their weak rum for the 
much stronger local variant.
320
 
The kind of alcohol available to soldiers differed depending upon 
where they served, and geographical contexts certainly impacted in some 
ways on the degree to which soldiers ‘needed’ to drink. Many commentators 
suggested that soldiers stationed in India were more inclined to alcohol 
abuse than were soldiers stationed at home. Divall’s study echoes this in her 
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comparison between the behaviours of two battalions of the 30
th
 Regiment, 
one stationed in India, and the other remaining in Britain. The extent to 
which this plays out in the courts martial records is questionable, however. 
Looking at the sample sets from the GRCM register, the percentage of trials, 
held in India and South Asia, which include alcohol-related charges is 
variable: in the years 1819 to 1820, almost a third of the 92 trials were for 
alcohol-related offences, whereas for the years 1825 to 1826, only two of 
the 57 trials were for drunkenness. That said, such offences were rarely tried 
at this level in Britain: of the 124 British trials in the 1813 to 1814 sample, 
only five were for alcohol-related offences, with a single trial out of 69 in 
the 1819 to 1820 sample, and five of 209 in the 1825 to 1826 sample.
 321
  
And looking purely at the individual regimental returns, alcohol charges do 
seem to have been a little more prevalent in the 34th, stationed in India, than 
in either the 37th in Canada, or the 33rd at home.
322
 
Interestingly, in terms of percentages the soldiers most likely to be 
tried at GRCM for alcohol-related charges, appear to have been those 
stationed in Gibraltar: during the period 1813 to 1814, 3 of the 10 trials held 
in Gibraltar were for alcohol-related charges, five of the nine trials from 
1819 to 1820 were for such charges, and 26 of the 67 trials for the years 
1825 to 1826.  If we look at a single year of GCM and GRCM trials held in 
Gibraltar, running from January to December, 1818, there were 11 soldiers 
tried by GRCM for alcohol-related charges, and 10 soldiers tried by GCM. 
Geographically, the highest number of cases at GCM level  came from 
Malta, with half the trials for drunkenness that year held there; while at 
GRCM level, the cases are far more spread out, with three soldiers tried in 
Africa, two in Jamaica and one each in Canada,  India, The Ascension Isles, 
Malta, France and Britain.
 323
  
The particular problem of alcohol offences among soldiers stationed 
in Gibraltar has been studied in some detail by Ilya Berkovich, as a case 
study in the effectiveness of military discipline and control. Though slightly 
earlier than the period covered by the GRCM and GCM samples, it would 
seem that very similar patterns of behaviour were in force, and most likely 
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similar responses by military authorities. Most important for understanding 
alcohol offences was both the absolute ineffectiveness of attempts to curb 
soldiers’ drinking and the completely contradictory approaches taken by 
those in command. Much as Kopperman notes that alongside attempts to 
stop the men drinking, officers and commanders simultaneously facilitated 
the same, so Berkovich demonstrates very clearly the constant and 
continuous mixed messages given to soldiers by their commanding officers 
in Gibraltar.
324
  
The central role of alcohol in the soldier’s life may have been in part 
a continuation of the role of alcohol in civilian culture, with drinking an 
important aspect of sociability as well as a way of ensuring a supply of safe 
drinking water. Hurl-Eamon draws an interesting comparison between the 
ritual of a recruit using his bounty to buy a round for his new comrades and 
a similar ritual for new apprentices.
325
 But there were also aspects of 
military service which added to soldiers’ seemingly unquenchable desire for 
alcohol. One reason for this put forward by many contemporary 
commentators was the boredom which was such a regular feature of army 
life. As Cheyne explained in his evidence: ‘The soldier has a great deal of 
leisure time, and he has not much variety of occupation, and he seeks for 
excitement, as everyone would do who is unoccupied’.326  
Despite the promises of excitement offered by recruiting sergeants, 
and indeed the flurries of high activity whilst on active service, a high 
proportion of the soldier’s life was spent dealing with boredom and this was 
particularly acute for those soldiers serving in places like India and the 
Bahamas. According to Sir John William Fortescue, in his Short Account of 
Canteens in the British Army,  whilst the soldier serving in ‘temperate 
stations’ was ‘often employed in making roads and the like’, for the soldier 
serving in ‘hot climates [...] when once the morning parade was over, the 
men had little to do but sit and look at each other’.327 Life in camps and in 
barracks, sometimes offered little in the way of diversion beyond military 
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exercises and occasional employment in non-military occupations, and 
boredom was a regularly cited reason put forward by military commanders 
for the attraction of alcohol for their men.
 328
  Another contributory factor, 
and one which again may have been particularly impactful for soldiers 
serving overseas was the heavily salted food, which made up the mainstay 
of soldier’s rations. Meat was preserved by ‘steeping it copiously in brine’ 
and as Tony Hayter puts it, the resultant salty meat ‘caused agonies of 
thirst’.329  
To the modern mind, there is a factor missing from contemporary 
analyses, and unfortunately it is one which is almost impossible to quantify: 
what would now be described as post traumatic stress. Hurl-Eamon 
discusses this aspect of the soldier experience briefly, in her study of soldier 
marriages in the eighteenth century, suggesting that for some soldiers this 
may have been a contributory factor in high levels of alcohol consumption, 
and social and domestic disturbance, and Rumsby likewise considered this a 
potential factor in soldier suicides.
330
  Venning makes the point that both 
soldiers and their wives drank heavily, particularly on campaign, when they 
lived ‘constantly in the presence of death and suffering’ and so sought 
solace in the bottle.
331
 Though the concept of post traumatic stress was not 
recognised at the time, we can nevertheless see a recognition of the impact 
of soldiering on the mental state of the soldier in the many references to 
‘despair’ in contemporary analyses of soldiers’ health and well-being, like 
the Minorca enquiry.
332
 It is important to recognise that soldiers in the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth- century British army, like their modern 
counterparts, were subject to particular stresses and sometimes traumatic 
experiences as a natural and inevitable part of their service. That some 
soldiers may have sought solace in drink should come as little surprise.  
As a caveat to this it is important to note that, just as there were 
officers who drank as heavily as the men, there were also soldiers who 
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viewed drunkenness with just as much dismay as those commanding 
officers who sought to stem the problem. As Cobbett’s recollections show, 
he himself was abstemious and the drunkenness of his superior officers was 
a source of annoyance for him. Similarly, other soldier memoirs stress their 
author’s temperance, often in the face of ridicule; though, as Kopperman 
suggests, ‘those who did [abstain] could play a significant role in shaping 
the drinking habits of their comrades’.333   
Conclusion 
As with desertion in the previous chapter, it is with regulatory 
offences that we see some of the clearest distinctions between the civilian 
and soldier experiences of crime and justice. English employment law 
undoubtedly advantaged employers, placing a clear emphasis on the 
compliance of the employee, treating non-compliant employees as quasi-
criminal and enshrining in law the rights of some employers to physically 
chastise them; nonetheless, employees in the civilian sphere were not at risk 
of loss of life or limb for disobedience, insolence or contract breaking. Yet, 
paradoxically, it is often regulatory offences that most clearly demonstrate a 
sense of cultural continuity between the ordinary soldiers and the working 
communities from which they came. The soldier’s experience of mutiny and 
riot, disobedience and disorder, raise important questions of soldier identity:  
however separated by geography or military structures, soldiers brought 
with them elements of their civilian culture, often expressed in behaviour 
that was considered mutinous by military authorities. 
This raises interesting questions about soldier identities, and 
suggests that, rather than a binary separation between civilian and soldier, 
enlistment complicated identity. What we see in the application by soldiers 
of similar strategies in employment disputes to those employed by civilians, 
is the negotiation of that identity, with soldiers at times leaning closer to a 
civilian mindset. 
Another area of both continuity and distinction was in the role of 
alcohol in soldiers’ lives. Though drunkenness was a serious concern for 
civilian authorities and alcohol an important part of civilian culture, in the 
soldier’s world, it took on much greater importance overall. Different 
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regiments and locations played a part in creating different drinking cultures; 
however, these differences seem dwarfed by the general similarities in 
experience across the army as a whole. Despite the distinctions, if any 
experience in the British army could be said to have been almost universal, 
it was the apparent primacy of alcohol in the soldier’s life. This was shaped 
and promoted by active and inadvertent collusion by officers, and 
contextualised by service conditions and structures. As well as an offence in 
its own right, drunkenness was clearly a contributory factor in some 
regulatory offences and soldier disorder, and its prevalence seems to have 
been a direct result of army service.  
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Chapter Four: Violent Crime 
 
Introduction 
So far we have concentrated on what might be termed military 
crimes, or those offences designated as such in the Mutiny Act. As well as 
military offences, soldiers were also court-martialled for many offences 
which would have been considered criminal under English law, and which 
fit the definitions of crime set out in the introduction 
334
 In this chapter we 
will consider the role of violent crime and crimes against the person in the 
lives of soldiers, its prevalence within the military justice records, its key 
characteristics, how it was treated and the responses it drew within 
regimental communities. Along with identifying and, to a limited extent, 
quantifying violent crime within a regimental setting, this section will also 
consider questions of victimhood and rank-specific experiences of violence 
and violent crime.  
 
Violent Crime in Context 
In any discussion of soldier crime as a distinct phenomenon it is also 
necessary to consider crime in the civilian sphere. This would be a difficult 
enough proposition for property crime despite the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century preoccupation with questions of property and ownership, 
violent crime, however, presents its own range of distinct problems.
335
 The 
point at which a violent act crosses over from being an unpleasant personal 
interaction to a crime is often culturally differentiated, with some level of 
violence accepted as a part of life depending on the cultural context.
336
 Even 
when violence was recognised by the victim as criminal, the next steps of 
reporting and prosecuting may have proved difficult, or even impossible 
given the costs they were likely to incur. As Barry Godfrey and Paul 
Lawrence put it: ‘it was not until the early nineteenth century that local 
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county authorities began to take the burdensome costs of prosecution off the 
shoulders of individual crime victims’.337  
Levels of reporting of violent crime cannot speak to the prevalence 
of violence within a society. For the period under study, this is further 
complicated by a lack of consistent reporting within the legal sphere. We 
have no reliable, official, collated figures for violent crime amongst 
civilians in Britain during the eighteenth century, or the first half of the 
nineteenth, though there are parliamentary reports from the early nineteenth 
century which attempted to collate general figures for criminal convictions 
in England and Wales.
338
 Alongside the problems of reporting there are 
additional difficulties of definition, with the meaning of violence and its 
place in popular culture subject to shifts in emphasis and cultural 
importance.
339
 In their analysis of crime in eighteenth-century Britain, Barry 
Godfrey and Paul Lawrence consider how those meanings may have 
changed, and raise the question of how they may have been affected in 
Britain by the high death toll wrought by epidemics, food shortages and a 
century of intermittent warfare, culminating in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars, with their unprecedented levels of recruitment and loss. 
Clive Emsley, meanwhile, in his study of violence in English culture, 
considers the ways in which the dichotomy of public and private 
contextualised and shaped those meanings, even in cases of fatal violence; a 
consideration which has particular resonance in the context of soldiers who, 
arguably, had fewer rights to privacy than their civilian counterparts. 
340
 
A handful of particularly gruesome murders, reported in shocking 
detail in newspapers and stamped onto the public consciousness through 
ballads and folk retellings, can give such crimes undue prominence in 
popular culture. Though the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal system 
was preoccupied with property crime, by the mid-nineteenth century 
popular conceptions of violent crime became dominated by ‘the ultimate 
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crime’ of murder.341 Yet violent crime occurred along a sliding scale of 
intensity and purpose, from crimes such as robbery with the threat of violent 
assault to unlawful killing.  In addition, some relationships were defined in 
part by rights of violence held by one person over another. The prevalence 
of some forms of corporal punishment in the eighteenth century, both as an 
official tool of justice, and a personal mechanism of discipline within homes 
and workplaces further complicates the definition of violence as criminal.
342
 
In our analysis of violent crime in the British army, it is important that we 
take account of those culturally specific understandings of violence, and in 
particular the use of violence as a signifier of relationships of power, 
authority and control.
343
  
Unlike property crime, in which possession may in some cases be 
proven without witnesses to the actual theft, in cases of violent crime, 
without witnesses to the event, any prosecution would rest on an attempt to 
set the word of the victim against the word of the defendant. In the context 
of eighteenth-century English justice, with its reliance on the concept of 
‘character’, this systematically disadvantaged those of a lower social class if 
their word and character were weighed against those of a person of high 
social standing.
344
 Though in legal terms an attack by one person upon 
another was the same regardless of the social status of the parties involved, 
in reality a lack of witnesses could mean a person of high social status might 
assault someone of lower social status with impunity.   
In regimental communities, an understanding of authority was 
underlined and enforced through a rigid and formalised set of relationships. 
As Burroughs puts it, the army was an ‘authoritarian, hierarchical, and 
largely self-contained institution’.345  In such a context, a private soldier 
violently assaulting another private soldier and a private soldier violently 
assaulting an officer could not be considered the same act and were 
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differentiated within military law. In such cases, an attack by a private 
soldier against an officer was both a personal assault on the officer, and an 
attack on the office he held.  
We should also consider the role of certain forms of violence in 
forging and expressing masculinity in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century British culture. In Hard Men: The English and Violence Since 1750, 
Clive Emsley explores the changes in perceptions of violence and rates of 
violent crime in England during this period, and presents a picture of an 
England where both fights and violent physical sports were commonplace; 
though, attitudes towards such activities began to change from the middle of 
the eighteenth century.
346
  
Even with attitudes changing, the shift was more in the tone of 
accepted violence than its incidence. The rise of the notion of ‘fair play’ as 
an essential component of acceptable masculinity, and in particular the 
masculinity of an English gentleman, may have subtly changed the shape of 
masculine violence, but it did not necessarily reduce it.  Emsley contends 
that throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English men 
were viewed by foreign visitors as particularly and peculiarly given to 
fighting, with many visitors from continental Europe commenting on ‘the 
aggressive physicality of the English’ and their tendency to ‘settle quarrels 
with a fist fight in a ring made of bystanders’.347 Interestingly, by this 
reading, violence appears not just as a private act of quarrelling, but a public 
expression of the masculinity of the quarrellers.   
Perhaps even more telling of the role violence played in confirming 
and expressing masculinity was the popularity of fighting as a leisure 
pursuit. Fighting for prizes, just as fighting for honour or redress, drew 
audiences and provided some of the street scene entertainment of any busy 
city, as a form of entertainment which seemed to appeal across class 
boundaries. Emsley tells us, that George IV, ‘patronised pugilism and had 
eight champion pugilists decked out as pages at his coronation’.348 Whilst, 
according to Robert McGregor, in George III’s reign, ‘a “Jack Tar” 
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masculinity [... associated primarily with the lower classes ...], was 
promoted [...by the press...] as an example for many in Britain to follow’. 
349
This culturally accepted form of violence carried a high social cost, and 
deaths were not an uncommon result of such street fights. In London in 
particular, such violence led to considerable loss of life, with, ‘kicks or 
punches inflicted in a fight’, being ‘the single most common form of death’ 
leading to a coroner’s inquest.350  
Attitudes and responses to crime in general in Britain, changed 
considerably during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Fears 
of revolution at home, in the wake of the French Revolution, and gathering 
disputes over food prices and working conditions heightened tensions, and 
partly in response our period of study saw the earliest iterations of what 
would later become a formal police force. Contemporary opinions expressed 
through print media and parliamentary speeches suggest that by the early 
nineteenth century it was a commonly held view that society was becoming 
more violent.
351
 In a purely practical sense, the nature of violent crime was 
also changing, with new weapons becoming more readily available.  It was 
in 1803 that Lord Ellenborough’s Act made a capital offence of ‘shooting 
with intent to kill’.352  
Running alongside the growing cultural and political sensitivity to 
violent crime and disorder was an intensifying debate about the use of 
corporal punishment in the military, beginning in earnest in the latter 
decades of the eighteenth century and gaining prominence during the first 
decades of the nineteenth.
353
 Regular soldiers were identified in part by the 
fact that they were subject to such punishment, and the impression given by 
some of the more polemic contributions to that debate is one of brutalised, 
as well as brutal men, living within an inherently violent system.
354
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Yet it is important not to assume for those soldiers an unconditional 
acceptance of authorised violence. As well as the strategies noted in the 
previous two chapters, when faced with what they perceived to be an 
injustice, some soldiers sought to use the official channels of the military 
justice system to their advantage. Though they are relatively rare, there are 
examples throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of 
soldiers, tried and sentenced by regimental courts martial, requesting that 
their cases be reheard by a general court martial. The number of such 
requests granted by military authorities was low throughout this period, 
although in his analysis of eighteenth-century regimental courts martial, 
Gilbert notes a ‘spate’ of such cases in Halifax, Nova Scotia, between 1729 
and 1752.
355
  
According to Gilbert, military authorities consciously veiled the 
process of judicial review, providing soldiers with no information as to their 
rights in this area or the manner in which they should proceed. For the few 
soldiers who were granted recourse to a GCM the results were almost 
always negative. Appeals against regimental sentences were usually 
unsuccessful and indeed most often led to further punishment for the soldier 
concerned.
356
 Yet, throughout the eighteenth century and into the 
nineteenth, when the process became on the one hand much more difficult 
to begin but on the other more robust once started, there was a small but 
constant presence of such cases at GCM level. This suggests that soldiers 
were more cognizant of their perceived rights under military law, than the 
brutalised contemporary image of them seems to show.
357
   
‘The Ultimate Crime’ 
Despite its relative rarity as an act, the crime of murder has 
traditionally been used as the key indicator for violent crime levels within a 
society.
358
As with the civilian justice records for this period, murder and 
attempted murder appear infrequently in the military justice records.  This 
appears to hold true at every level of the court martial system, with few 
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general, or general regimental courts martial recording charges of this 
nature. Within the six years worth of records sampled from the GRCM 
register, there is only one recorded charge of murder. Private Thomas Carr, 
of the 56th, stationed in Mauritania, was tried and convicted of murder on 
the 15th March 1826.
359
 Unfortunately, no indication is given as to the 
identity of Carr’s victim, nor the circumstances in which the murder was 
committed. In addition to this single charge for murder, there are two other 
trials in the sample which record charges related to murder: an attempt by 
Lance Corporal Leonard, of the 69th on ‘the life of a Private’ and the trial of 
Private Thomas Laykin, of the 24th, tried in 1820 at Ghazeepore, for 
‘Having his Musquet loaded with a design to commit murder’.360 Though 
there are examples throughout the record of soldiers making threats on the 
lives of others, and in particular their superior officers, these three cases are 
the only examples in the six sample years of murder, attempted murder, or 
premeditated intent to murder.  
 Given the parameters within which each level of court martial was 
intended to function, and indeed the relationship between military and 
civilian justice, differentiated as it was between the service at home and the 
service abroad, we might reasonably expect that crimes of this nature would 
have been tried within the civil sphere if committed at home, and at a GCM 
when committed overseas. Interestingly, a collection of trial reports for 
GCM and GRCM trials conducted overseas during 1826, the same year as 
our single GRCM trial for murder, contains no trials of a similar nature, 
either for murder or attempted murder.
361
 A note of caution is needed here, 
however. The collection of overseas court martial reports for 1826 gives 
little indication of completion. Many of the reports contained within it are 
damaged, with some almost completely illegible in places, though in most 
cases it is possible to read the charges, if not the evidence and defence put 
forward in the trial. It seems highly likely that some records from this 
collection may not have survived at all.  
The two year sample of the GCM register covering the years 1818 
and 1819, however, contains several cases of murder or attempted murder: 
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four soldiers were convicted of murder, with three acting together in a single 
incident, and one acting alone. A further three soldiers were tried for firing 
weapons at other people; however, whether their intentions were to commit 
murder is not known and none of them faced a specific charge of attempted 
murder.
362
  
Though capital crimes committed by soldiers stationed at home 
would most likely have been prosecuted within the civilian justice system, 
such crimes when committed overseas would usually have remained within 
the military justice system.
363
 According to Charles Oman, in his history of 
Wellington’s Army: 1808-1814, there were ‘six or eight instances’ during 
the Peninsular campaigns, of men hanged for killing fellow soldiers. He also 
notes with some surprise that two soldiers who killed their officers ‘were 
hanged, rather than shot’, as might have been expected were their crimes 
acts of mutiny, rather than ‘of private spite’, further underlining the 
important role of personal relationships between soldiers and officers as a 
possible factor in resistance to authority, and the need for caution when 
ascribing systemic causes to what may have been personal disputes. 
364
  
Interestingly, though, and very much complicating the picture, one 
of the soldiers tried by GCM in Bangalore, for ‘Firing a pistol at a private’, 
was ‘handed over to the civil powers’ and his trial aborted because the 
offence was ‘[n]ot amenable for trial by court martial’.365 In, Inside the 
Regiment, meanwhile, Divall gives several examples of soldiers, handed 
over by the 30th to the civil authorities, to face trials for murder. Though 
none of the cases are recorded in any of the regiment’s returns, Divall 
identifies the details of two of them through other means.  From a report in 
the Leinster Journal, there is the case of Sergeant Edward Laughron, 
‘hanged at Mullingar for the murder of his wife‘, and from the journal of an 
officer of the 30th, there is ‘the case of a soldier who suddenly turned 
against an Indian, calling him a blackbird and shooting him.’366 
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Even with the above caveats in mind, it seems clear that the number 
of soldiers prosecuted by the army for murder or attempted murder was low 
compared to trials for other criminal acts, suggesting a broadly similar 
experience of the ‘ultimate crime’ for civilian and soldier alike. In his 
assessment of ‘Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century 
England’, Arthur Gilbert presents a breakdown of all capital crimes tried by 
General Court Martial in the British army between 1776 and 1782.  Out of 
461 trials for potentially capital offences, 36 were murder trials, and of the 
350 trials ending in conviction, 14 were convictions for murder.
367
  As 
Gilbert notes, finding reliable comparable figures for civilian trials and 
convictions is problematic; however, those studies which have been 
conducted on civilian capital trials and convictions seem to show a broadly 
similar, low incidence rate of this type of prosecution.
368
  As a final caveat, 
we must remember that not all unlawful killings resulted in a prosecution 
for murder. As in the civilian sphere so in the military, a range of 
circumstances might prevent such a prosecution, from lack of a suspect, 
witnesses or evidence, to an unwillingness to class an act of killing as 
murder in legal terms.  
Though the evidence is anecdotal, the memoir of William Surtees, 
Twenty-Five years in the Rifle Brigade,is particularly interesting in this 
light.  In the memoir, Surtees recalls an incident involving a sergeant from 
his own regiment. A grenadier from another regiment had come over in the 
hope of persuading his wife, who had left him for the sergeant, to return 
with him. According to Surtees their conversation became heated, and the 
grenadier ‘became so exasperated at her continued refusal, that he, in a rage 
of jealousy and anger, drew his bayonet and plunged it in her bosom’.369 Her 
cries drew people to them and the grenadier was confined to the prison tent.  
Surtees tells us: ‘I believe he was not brought to trial for it, as her ill conduct 
probably had been considered as in some measure palliating what he did, 
and that he might be supposed to have been irritated to a degree of madness 
when he perpetrated the fatal act.’370  
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Surtees caveats his account with a degree of uncertainty. It was his 
‘belief’ that there was no trial, and as such we cannot be sure this was the 
case. But the account is remarkably free of sensationalist language, and the 
use of such caveats is in keeping with much of Surtees’ writing. His 
language throughout the memoir is careful and seems always at pains to 
recognise the potential vagaries of memory. Whether the grenadier was or 
was not tried for the killing of his wife, and Surtees’ further recollection that 
he believed the man had gone on to serve in a distinguished fashion suggests 
one potential reason military authorities may not have sought to prosecute, 
the claim that he was not tried is put forward without any sense of surprise, 
or dismay. This account raises some interesting issues. First and most 
obvious is what it suggests about the different ways that fatal violence may 
have been viewed and treated, both at an individual and judicial level. It 
throws further doubt on the ability of prosecution rates to represent levels of 
violence and it complicates our understanding of what makes a violent act a 
violent crime.   
Most importantly this case also shows elements of a soldier-specific 
experience of violence, which echoes Rumsby’s contentions about suicide 
in the army. Rather than some prosaic household object turned weapon, we 
have a soldier, armed with a bayonet, the deadly use of which, he was well 
trained in; a point to which we will return later in this chapter.
371
 Though 
murder appears no more prevalent within military communities than within 
civil communities, the shape of such deadly violence was highly specific. In 
the following sections, this shaping of violence by the military experience 
will be explored as it relates to other, less deadly forms of violence. 
 
Violent Crime in the GCM, GRCM and RCM samples 
An additional complication when attempting to categorise violent 
acts or threats within the trial records, lies in decoding the language used in 
the charges.
372
 Some charge types are clearer and more informative than 
others.  Thomas James, a private in the 1/73rd  was tried in Sidney, on the 
14th April 1814, for ‘[s]triking the Serjeant of the main Guard when on 
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duty’.373  This can be clearly and easily categorised as a violent act. In 
contrast, the trial of Private John Armstrong, of the 60th, in May of the same 
year, in which he was charged with ‘[b]eing Drunk and mistreating the 
Inhabitants’, is a little less easily defined.374 What exactly is meant by terms 
such as ‘mistreating’ or ‘maltreatment’ in each case is impossible to know 
for sure; however, its use in some instances strongly suggests that this is an 
indication of, if not outright violence, then certainly aggressive behaviour. 
Such cases have therefore been categorised as including a charge of 
violence.  
Similarly ambiguous is the charge of ‘using threatening language’. 
This could cover anything from directed threats to an unnamed individual, 
or generalised assertions of violent intent with no directly targeted 
individual, placing it more comfortably with offences such as mutiny and 
riot. This particular charge appears in several different forms, and in some 
cases the suggestion of violence is more clearly intimated. In order to 
categorise these charges, this analysis draws a distinction between the 
simple charge of ‘using threatening language’, which has not been included 
in the violence category, and more forthright charges, such as ‘using very 
violent and threatening language’, which have been included, alongside  the 
use of threatening language against a named individual.  The charge of 
‘robbery’, meanwhile, is assumed to include a violent component according 
to the definition of that crime in English common law during the eighteenth 
century.
375
  
Compared to regulatory offences and property crime, the number of 
trials involving violence is low. Across the three pairs of years sampled 
from the GRCM register there are 136 trials listed which show a violent 
component, ranging from threatening language or behaviour to actual bodily 
harm, and in one instance, murder.
376
 Quantitative analysis of such a small 
number of cases must be approached with caution, and can only offer 
indications of possible patterns, rather than firm conclusions.  
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Table 4.1: Overview of Violence charges in GRCM sample
377
 
 1813-1814 1819-1820 1825-1826 Total 
No. of  trial records 271 203 150 174 377 372 1547 
No. of  trial records with 
indication of violence 
33 33 12 13 25 19 135 
Percentage of trial 
records with indication of 
violence 
12% 16% 8% 7.5% 6.5% 6% 9% 
 
It is important to remember that these figures show only the number 
of trial entries carrying charges of a violent nature, and what appears at first 
glance to be quite a large disparity between the first pair of years and the 
two that follow may be misleading. Multiple defendants were sometimes 
tried together for charges relating to a single incident. Similarly, multiple 
defendants would sometimes be tried separately for the same offence, or for 
related offences. For example, between the 9th and 20th of December 1813, 
five soldiers of the 84th, serving in Trichinopoly, were tried for 
disobedience, riotous behaviour, and various threats of violence.
378
 Though 
they were tried individually, and each faced a slightly different set of 
charges, those charges suggest they may have been a closely related series 
of incidents. Such clusters of trials around single or related incidents occur 
twice as often in the first sample set than in the two that follow.  In the first 
sample set there are two clusters of three and two pairs of defendants, while 
the second and third sample sets each contain a single pair and a single 
cluster of three.  
Identifying the category of a defendant is a relatively simple task. 
Almost all of the trial records showing a violent component involve a 
defendant of the Private or equivalent rank, with only three cases of non-
commissioned officers tried for violent offences. Identifying and 
categorising the victims of those crimes poses more of a challenge. Charges 
in the register do not always name or otherwise identify the victims 
involved. Even when they do give an indication of the victim, that 
indication is sometimes vague and unhelpful.  For example, in the case of 
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John Connor, a private in the 47th, tried in Ava, in 1825, the charges refer to 
him ‘[a]ttempting to force the Sentry & assaulting several Persons’. Whilst 
it is easy to identify the sentry as a fellow soldier, we have no way of 
knowing for sure whether the ‘several persons’ Connor assaulted were 
civilians or other military personnel.  Similarly, on 22 June 1820, Private 
Gottlieb Muller, of the 60th, was tried for ‘Desertion & wounding a Person 
who brought him back’.   
It seems likely that this refers to a civilian attempting to claim the 
reward for apprehending a deserter. Certainly, there seems an overall 
preference within the register for identifying whether or not the victim was a 
service man, if not giving the name, then usually the rank. However, many 
of the records also refer in more specific terms to civilians, usually referring 
to them as ‘natives’, ‘inhabitants’, or  ‘towns people’. Given the nature of 
the register, drawn as it was from the collated returns of trials held 
throughout the British army, the styles of the charges and terminology used 
vary considerably. In cases where the victim is not identified, but the victim 
type can be reasonably inferred, a victim category has been assigned. In the 
more oblique cases, or where there is no readily inferable victim, no victim 
category has been assigned.  Altogether there are 124 trial records for 
violent offences, which show an identifiable or inferable victim type: 
 
Table 4.2: Victims of violent crime by GRCM sample
379
 
Victim Type 1813-1814 1819-1820 1825-1826 Total 
Civilian 12 2 6 20 
Fellow 8 1 5 14 
Officer/Employer 10 7 3 20 
NCO 29 10 25 64 
Other Service 3 0 3 6 
 
Of those 124 trial records, over half concern NCO victims, and 
NCOs are the largest category of victim in all three sets, a pattern which is 
repeated in the individual regimental returns of RCM trials, and which, 
taken alongside the surprisingly low number of NCO perpetrators, adds 
further emphasis to the need for a separate analysis of the NCO experience 
of crime.  
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The remaining half of identified victim types shows very similar 
figures overall for officers and fellow soldiers, with equal numbers in the 
first year set, a higher proportion of officers in the second set, and a higher 
proportion of fellow soldiers in the third. Though by no means a large 
group, civilians represent a sizeable percentage of identifiable victims of 
violence or threat within the sampled records of the GRCM register. They 
are the second largest victim category overall and in two of the three sample 
sets. The smallest category of victim in all three sets is that of men from 
other services, such as the navy, or the marines.  
It is important to reiterate, that this is likely to be an under-
representation of civilian victims of violent crime, with violent assaults on 
civilians, and in particular assaults on civilians at home, far more likely to 
have been prosecuted through the civilian criminal justice system and 
therefore absent from these figures. It is noticeable that of the 20 cases with 
an identifiable civilian victim, 19 concerned soldiers serving overseas, in 
Europe, India, and North America, with the one remaining case coming 
from Birr, in Ireland. A single year of Regimental Courts Martial conducted 
in the 34th, whilst stationed in Bangalore, shows a fairly large proportion of 
civilian victims, at a little over a quarter of those identified. In the same 
year, the 33rd, stationed at home at Hilsea, recorded only six trials for 
violent crime, none of which involved a civilian victim.
380
  
Figures for officer victims on the other hand may be over-
emphasised: an assault on a superior officer represented both a criminal and 
a serious military offence.
381
 As such, it would be in keeping with the broad 
divisions of jurisdiction according to seriousness of offence, that such cases 
may have more readily occasioned the convening of a GRCM or GCM, than 
a corresponding assault on a private soldier, for which an RCM may have 
been considered sufficient. That said, this may be offset by the charge of 
‘insubordination’, which could refer to violence towards a superior officer, 
but which could also refer to non-violent non-compliance. As such, trials 
with the simple charge of insubordination have not been included in the 
officer victim category.
382
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Looking at the three regiments for the period September 1818 to 
October 1819, taking account of RCM, GRCM and GCM, of six trials for 
violent offences recorded for the 33rd at Hilsea, five were conducted at the 
RCM level: two involved fellow soldier victims, and three involved NCOs. 
The sixth case, in which a private was convicted of ‘mutinous conduct in 
striking an officer’, was tried by GCM.383 For the 34th, in India, there are 16 
trials for charges of a violent nature, including one with no identifiable 
victim, all tried at RCM level, with almost half of those involving an 
identifiable victim in the NCO category, none involving officers, and the 
remaining half split equally between fellow soldier and civilian categories. 
During the same period, the 37th Regiment, stationed in Canada, recorded 
four trials for violent offences, one involving an NCO victim, one a civilian 
victim, one a fellow soldier and one an officer.  
The trial with an officer victim and the trial with an NCO victim 
were both conducted at GRCM level, but they were clearly not equivalent 
charges. The latter case we have already examined in terms of the way 
charges were recorded at different levels of court martial, but it also 
illustrates the lack of equivalence between NCO and officer victims. Private 
Bland was court-martialled for being drunk on parade and striking a lance 
sergeant in the execution of his duty, and also for escaping confinement two 
days earlier and resisting a sergeant, again in the execution of his duty.  The 
trial of Private Michael McHugh, the following September, was on the 
single charge of ‘Riotous and unsoldierlike conduct in attempting to strike 
Lieut. Johnson in the execution of his Duty’. 384   The reasons for recourse to 
a GRCM level trial are clearly different in these two cases, with Bland’s 
trial being heard at this level because of the serious and aggravated nature of 
the violence, alongside other serious military offences, and McHugh’s 
because of the rank of his victim.  
It would be a reasonable assumption, given the relationship between 
military and civilian jurisdictions at home, and given the close proximity of 
soldiers and civilians in that setting, that alongside the courts martial held at 
Hilsea, there may well have been some soldiers prosecuted through the 
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criminal courts. It is correspondingly unlikely that there would be very 
many examples within the civilian sphere of assaults by private soldiers on 
their officers, which the military authorities were far more likely to treat as a 
serious breach of military order and discipline. 
 
 Soldiers and Civilians 
Though regimental communities included both soldiers and 
civilians, and soldiers were often billeted within civilian communities there 
is a natural division to be made between the two. As discussed in the 
introduction, the identity of soldiers as soldiers in some ways created a 
sense of cultural distinction, and placed them within a distinct set of rules 
and boundaries from civilians, regardless of physical proximity. As 
Burroughs suggests in his analysis of Crime and Punishment in the British 
Army, 1815-1870, ‘The army was an alien institution to civilians who knew 
little about the soldier's actual life’.385 In some ways soldier violence against 
civilians can often be seen to have been externally focused, that is focused 
away from the companies and regiments in which soldiers served, 
suggesting a potentially distinct set of motivations and contexts to those in 
effect when soldiers acted with violence against one another, or against 
those in positions of command authority over them.  
A common factor throughout the military justice records relates to 
the role of civilians as conduits, both formal and informal, of supply to the 
military communities, and in particular the opportunities they offered for 
accessing alcohol. This is not a surprising trend: as discussed in the previous 
chapter, in most studies of soldier crime the role of alcohol is a commonly 
cited factor across a large range of soldier offending, from desertion to 
insubordination and from robbery to rape.
386
 Burroughs makes the point that 
‘[W]hat made intoxication such a major cause of crime was that other 
offences were more readily committed by those incapacitated by drink.’387 
This trend of drunkenness as a factor in crime may have been 
exacerbated by the particular role civilian communities played in providing 
alcohol to soldiers, as well as the tendency, for most of the period, for 
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soldiers to be billeted in taverns and ale houses.
388
  In over half of the cases 
of soldier violence against civilians recorded in the GRCM register for the 
sampled years, the primary motivation appears to have been theft rather than 
simple interpersonal violence, with alcohol a fairly common theme, either in 
terms of procurement as a motive, or of drunkenness as a contributing 
factor.  
In such cases it seems soldiers often acted together. In the first 
GRCM sample set, covering the years 1813 to 1814, there were 12 recorded 
cases of soldier violence with civilian victims, relating to nine separate 
incidents. In five of the incidents, involving eight of the 12 soldiers, the 
violence accompanied acts of theft, whilst three of the cases involved 
individual soldiers and were fairly simple cases of theft with violence, or 
with the threat of violence. Private Richard Stump, for example, of the 
62nd, was tried and convicted at Palermo, ‘For being concerned in knocking 
down an Inhabitant & taking money to the amount of Ten Dollars’.389   
Two incidents involved several soldiers acting together and using 
violence to procure alcohol.  Privates Patrick Crosby and Thomas Browne, 
of the 1/34th, were tried by GRCM at Secunderabad, for ‘Entering the Shop 
of a Native and forcibly taking Liquor’, whilst three soldiers of the 1/69th, 
also stationed in India, were tried for being ‘Absent from Hospital without 
Leave’ and for ‘obtaining Liquor from the Inhabitants by force & breaking 
their Chattels’.  The second sample set had only two cases recording 
possible civilian victims. In one, the soldier concerned assaulted ‘a Person’ 
who had apprehended him as a deserter, and in the other, a drunken soldier 
was convicted of, ‘Wilfully firing Ball Cartridge at the Inhabitants & 
wasting the Ammunition’. 390 
 In the third set, of the six records, covering five incidents, three 
relate to theft with violence or threat, and in one of these cases we see 
soldiers acting together. At Gibraltar, Privates Thomas Morrison and 
Thomas Patterson were tried separately for the same incident. Both faced 
the charge of being ‘Absent from Guard’, with Patterson facing the 
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additional charge of ‘Illtreating an Inhabitant & Wife’, and Morrison the 
additional charge of ‘Illtreatment & Theft’.391 
These cases demonstrate both the attractions of civilian conduits of 
supply, and the group mentality of soldiers as distinct from their civilian 
victims. In Coss’s study, the group mentality of soldiers on campaign acted 
to protect civilians from violence, with theft deemed an acceptable form of 
‘reconnoitering’, but theft with violence considered a breach of their 
unwritten code of behaviour.
392
 At the same time, the formation of that 
group mentality, was because he was ‘[i]isolated from civilian society 
[...and...], reordered his world around the small cadre of men with whom he 
endured campaign life and combat’.393 Coss recognised the potential for this 
code to become weakened during periods of military inactivity when the 
survival of individual soldiers was less dependent on their fellows, as well 
as at times of fracture and dislocation as regiments and battalions were 
broken up or reassigned. Even so, for the majority of the men serving in the 
British army, violent acts of theft may have been a step too far, but where it 
did occur, it seems often to have followed a similar pattern of group 
identification fundamentally separating them from their civilian victims. 
Another strand of violence which demonstrates this sense of cultural 
distinction between soldiers and civilians needs to be considered, though it 
is one which is almost entirely absent from the courts martial and regimental 
samples. Aside from the rather vague charge of ‘rioting’, very few of the 
trials listed in the GRCM, GCM and RCM samples mention acts of violence 
by soldiers against civilian authority figures. There was one case, however, 
from the GRCM sample, involving two gunners from the Royal Artillery, 
stationed at home. The two soldiers were tried together, clearly for the same 
incident. Both were charged with ‘making a disturbance’, whilst one faced 
the additional charge of ‘Ill-treating a constable’.394  
Several cases of soldier violence against constables can be found in 
civilian system. A Quarter Sessions bundle, from 1805, held by the Essex 
Record Office contains a report of an ‘assault on parish constable of 
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Braintree by soldiers quartered at Swan Inn’.395 Another case from 
Wandsworth, this time from 1783 and again contained in a Quarter Session 
bundle shows ‘William Banghan and Richard Radford, private soldiers in 
the Eighty-fifth Regiment of Foot, accused of assaulting the constables of 
Wandsworth while they were searching the 'Two Brewers' at 
Wandsworth’.396 That they were searching a pub, most likely for deserters, 
suggests one possible reason for a clash of military and civil authority. 
Screen also gives several examples of soldiers acting violently against 
civilian authorities, including an incident in Kinsdale, in 1785, in which, 
‘the elected head of the corporation [...] was “riotously attacked in the 
execution of his office by some soldiers of the fourth regiment of foot, now 
quartered at Charles Fort”’.397 
Though much of the evidence in the military records points to a 
sense of cultural distinction between soldiers and civilians, this was not a 
universally applicable trend.  In communities with a settled military 
presence the opportunities for a more cooperative relationship were far more 
apparent than in places where soldiers were temporarily stationed or simply 
passing through. Hurl-Eamon’s study of military families in London during 
the late eighteenth century demonstrates quite well the way in which 
soldiers and sailors along with their families represented a semi-permanent 
presence in the capital, and there are examples to be found within the 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey trial records and contemporary newspapers, 
of soldiers and civilians acting together in various forms of criminal 
activity, including robbery and assaults. In one case, for example, John 
Langar and William Dickinson, both soldiers, were tried at the Old Bailey 
for the assault and robbery of John Boulton, in which crime they were 
assisted by Thomas Cousins, who was ‘a bricklayer’ and apparently 
unconnected with the army.
398
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Rape and sexual assaults  
After violent theft, the second biggest category of violent crime 
against civilians recorded in the GRCM samples was sexual assault or rape. 
Unlike the cases of violent theft, cases of rape and sexual assault recorded in 
the GRCM register all involved soldiers acting alone. In the first sample set, 
along with the five incidents of violence and theft, there were four incidents 
of violence without any accompanying charges of theft, with three of them 
relating to rape or sexual assault. Private John McCullion, of the 69th, was 
tried at Seringapatam, for ‘Attempting to violate a Native woman when he 
was on Sentry’. Private Thomas Barrett of the 30th, was tried at Cannonore,  
for ‘Attempting to abuse a Child, & striking the Sergeant’ and Private John 
Mulcahey of the 86th, was tried at Masulipatam for ‘attempting to commit a 
rape’. Intriguingly, two of these cases of sexual violence also carry charges 
of a military nature.
399
  Barrett and Mulcahey were both sentenced to five 
hundred lashes, with Mulcahey also sentenced to six months solitary 
confinement.  
In the third sample set there were three charges of violence against 
civilians without any indication of theft, two of which involved assaults on 
women. Private Gilbert Leavey, of the 41st, was tried at Prome, for 
‘Assaulting a Burmese Woman & wounding a Native’. Samuel Earls, a 
sergeant in the 66th, stationed in Birr, was tried for being ‘Absent from 
barracks & Illtreating a Female’.400  Taking all three GRCM sample sets 
together, out of 16 separate incidents of violent crime with civilian victims, 
over a third concerned assaults of this nature.  
These are, however, still very small numbers and it is important to 
note that there are no examples of rape or sexual assault against civilians in 
the returns sampled from the three regiments, and only a single case of rape 
in the two year sample of GCM trials: Private Shaw, of the 29th, was 
convicted, 1 June 1818, on the single charge of rape.
401
 With no other 
details included, however, it is unclear whether this was a rape committed 
against an uninvolved civilian, or a woman of the regiment. 
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While rape and sexual assault account for a high proportion of 
violence charges in the GRCM samples, and appear intermittently 
throughout the military justice records, they were nonetheless a very small 
percentage of overall offending, which seems to accord with Coss’s analysis 
of internally enforced ‘group values’. Coss’s study primarily focuses on 
soldiers on campaign in the Penninsula in the early nineteenth century; 
however, cases from earlier in our period show a similar sensibility.  
A case of burglary and attempted rape from New York, in 1779, 
offers on the one hand an example of group action by soldiers against 
civilians in a violent act of theft, and on the other hand an example of a 
soldier attempting to enforce protection of a civilian victim from sexual 
violence. William Green of the Queen’s Rangers, and Thomas Salem of the 
Bucks County Dragoons, were tried by GCM for burgling, along with 
several other men, three houses in Long Island, and ‘grossly insulting the 
inhabitants’. According to one of the victims, during one of the three 
robberies, all of which involved some sort of violence or threat, an elderly 
woman was sexually assaulted by two of the gang, who had taken her off 
into another room in the house. They then returned to the room where the 
rest of the gang still were and an attempt was made to rape a young girl; 
however, at this point, ‘fortunately, one of the gang interfered’ and ‘she 
escaped unhurt’.402  
Though relatively infrequent, such cases appear at all three levels of 
military justice, and may have been an unavoidable consequence of soldiers 
and civilians living in close proximity or in shared communities. Whether 
regimental or divisional communities were separated from civilian 
communities, in camps, barracks, or forts, or were billeted within towns and 
civilian communities, women and children were part of the military scene. 
Victuallers, washerwomen, nurses and prostitutes, unofficial camp followers 
and recognised army wives, women formed an important part of the 
‘travelling city’ that was the regiment.403 
For a small number of men, army service meant the relocation of 
their families, rather than separation from them. Wives, or partners, along 
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with their children accompanied soldier husbands and fathers on the march 
and into camp and some soldiers formed relationships with women and girls 
in the towns and cities to which they travelled. In his examination of the 
lives and roles of army women, Lynn suggests that along with the many 
dangers they shared with their men, for regimental women rape was an 
additional danger, ‘almost exclusively reserved for them’.404  
 For many of the wives and children who accompanied soldier 
husbands, regiments and companies represented, as Annabel Venning 
suggests, ‘an extended family’ and  source of solace and support in times of 
difficulty; however, there were also times when this ‘broke down’ and the 
victims at such times were often the most vulnerable members of the 
community.
405
 Though, there is good evidence to suggest that overall the 
men who served in the British army, were no more likely to be criminal than 
their civilian counterparts, there were nonetheless convicted criminals 
among them, and throughout the eighteenth century, men convicted of 
capital crimes might be offered military service as an alternative to capital 
punishment.
406
 Whether this placed women and children at any greater risk 
of assault within regimental communities than they would have been in a 
civilian setting is debatable and certainly the risks of rape and assault were 
not exclusive to regimental communities. However, as Venning suggests, 
attacks on regimental children in particular would have been ‘shattering’, 
committed by comrades and members of their extended regimental 
family.
407
  
Two cases from Gibraltar, both tried at the same General Court 
Martial session on the 8th August 1775, illustrate the particular dangers 
faced by the children of soldiers in regimental communities. Private Michael 
Gollougher of the 2nd, was tried and convicted of ‘attempting to carnally 
know, or abuse, Frances Berney, a child of nine years and an half old, & for 
giving her the venereal disorder’.408  John Burrows of the same regiment 
was tried and convicted on identical charges, with his victim a five year old 
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girl called Mary Hamilton. These trials relate to two separate, but similar 
incidents. In both cases the victims were soldiers’ daughters. Frances was 
the daughter of Corporal Berney, of the 1st, and Mary the daughter of 
Private Hans Hamilton of the 39th. 
 In both cases the girls displayed a general familiarity with soldiers 
and the wider military community in which they lived. Regardless of social 
status or economic constraints, Mary, at five years old, was unlikely to have 
yet begun to read, but she was able to recognise specific regimental 
markings.  When her parents questioned her, she identified that her attacker, 
‘was a man of the Queen’s’. The elder girl, Frances, also showed familiarity 
with the community of soldiers. She told the court that along with her baby 
brother, carried in her arms, she ‘went into the castle [...] and having seen 
the Prisoner there, she’d ask’d a nosegay of him’.  
As the child of a serving soldier, and an NCO at that, her experience 
of the soldiers of her father’s regiment was likely to have been positive.  She 
had no fear or trepidation around Gollougher, trusting his word that he 
would give her a nosegay if she would only ‘wait ‘til after dinner’. Along 
with Frances’ apparent ready trust of the soldier, witnesses at the trial who 
testified to seeing the girl, with her little brother in her arms, playing and 
picking flowers in the castle grounds, expressed no sense of surprise at such 
a sight. At no point in the trial did anybody express surprise at the children 
wandering in and out of a military installation.  
As Venning points out in her analysis of the Berney case, whilst 
Gollougher was found guilty of molestation and sentenced to a thousand 
lashes, he was not drummed out of the regiment, and ‘Frances Berney 
would have been forced to come face to face with her tormentor until either 
he or her father left Gibraltar’.409 Burrows, possibly because of the very 
young age of his victim received a slightly more severe punishment: he was 
sentenced to eleven hundred lashes, and the humiliation of the first hundred 
being inflicted ‘at the hands of the common hangman’, with the rest by the 
drummers of his own regiment. Like Gollougher, though, Burrows was to 
remain with his regiment and this must have been a difficult and distressing 
situation for Mary and her family.  
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Though assaults on children are relatively rare within the courts 
martial records, they appear intermittently at GCM and GRCM levels, and it 
seems likely that such assaults were underreported, or largely unprosecuted. 
In both cases, the most important and damning evidence brought against the 
men was the presence of obvious signs of venereal disease on their victims 
along with the fact that they themselves had recently been treated for the 
same. Also in both cases, the victims did not immediately tell their parents, 
nor were there any witnesses to either assault. Without the evidence of 
venereal disease it is doubtful charges would have been levied in either case. 
Prosecutions for rape of adult women were likewise fairly rare. Again, this 
may in part be due to a lack of reporting, or the lack, in many cases, of 
enough evidence to proceed.
410
 It is noticeable that in many of the 
prosecutions for rape or sexual assault, those charges are accompanied by 
additional charges of violence, often against individuals who attempted to 
intervene, or who were accompanying the woman at the time, as in the cases 
of Barrett and Leavey. Even taking into account the likelihood of under 
reporting, the number of violent sexual assault recorded in the GRCM 
register appears low. This fits the picture presented by Coss in his analysis 
of soldier behaviour. The group pressure against such acts was very strong.  
 
In terms of the impact on regimental communities there are of course 
important distinctions between rapes and assaults committed against 
civilians outside of the military community, and those committed against 
female or younger members of the military community. Assaults on children 
who were not part of the community were not unknown, though were most 
often dealt with through the civilian justice system. For example, the 
Quarter Sessions of Surrey in 1791 record the case of Robert Wilkinson, a 
soldier who was billeted with a victualler and his family and who was 
accused of assaulting and ‘attempting to ravish’ the five year old daughter 
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of his hosts.
411
 Though nominally civilians, assaults like those committed 
against Frances and Mary would have had a profound impact on their 
soldier fathers. It seems reasonable, therefore, to include the particular 
dangers to female and younger members of the community as part of the 
soldier experience of violent crime. In both cases, the investigations of the 
assaults were undertaken by the girls’ fathers, and it was they who pressed 
for prosecution in each case.  
 
Army responses to violence against civilians 
Taking into account the likely under representation of attacks on 
civilians at home, the numbers of attacks on civilians nevertheless seem to 
have been relatively low and there is no doubt that military authorities 
treated such crimes very seriously.
412
 This at times manifested in a 
willingness to hand offenders over to civilian authorities where possible and 
where appropriate. Divall suggests regimental commanders ‘did their 
utmost’ to honour this, and according to Charles Oman, Wellington was 
assiduous in recognising civil authority in cases of serious or aggravated 
criminality.
413
 It also showed in severe sentencing and an assiduous 
approach to prosecution in cases that reached court martial stage, with the 
majority of such offences dealt with at GCM or GRCM level. Most 
importantly perhaps in the context of the soldier experience of crime, such 
offences were treated and viewed as serious by the rank and file, who 
exhibited a strong sense of their own codes of behaviour and enforced those 
codes through a very effective form of peer pressure.
414
  
 
Civilian violence against soldiers 
One aspect of the soldier experience of violent crime which is highly 
unlikely to be illuminated by a study of military justice records is 
victimisation at the hands of civilian perpetrators.  There are examples, 
however, of soldiers assaulted by civilians in court records and newspaper 
reports. For example, in Southampton, 1 April 1741, John Higgs, a soldier 
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in one of the marine regiments, made an official complaint regarding ‘an 
assault by one Matthew, surname unknown’.415 Whilst in 1787, two men 
were tried and one convicted, at the spring assizes in Winchester, for, ‘an 
assault with intent to rob Joseph Patrick, [a soldier] who had just been 
refused lodgings at the Plymouth Arms, at midnight on 27 September 
1786.
416
  
From an 1820 newspaper report, meanwhile, there is a fairly 
dramatic case, which demonstrates some of the tensions between soldiers 
and civilians, and how that could lead to soldiers being victimised. In this 
instance, the soldier, a private in the 2nd Regiment of Foot Guards, was 
assaulted, ‘in a most violent manner’, by two men, as he was walking home 
to his lodgings, late one evening. Prior to the assault, his attackers ‘walked 
behind him [and] used some very insulting expressions, such as “lobster”, “a 
shilling a day”’, before knocking him to the ground and kicking him until he 
‘bled considerably from the injury he received’. Though the two attackers 
claimed their victim had tried to ‘inveigle a girl into an improper house’ and 
were protecting her chastity, the soldier’s claim to have given no 
provocation was confirmed by the constable, and when someone was sent to 
check the address they had given for her, there was nobody of that name 
living there.
417
 
 
Violence in the Ranks 
Violent assaults by soldiers of the private rank against comrades of 
the same rank appear quite infrequently in the samples. If we look at the 
first sample set of the GRCM register, covering the years 1813 to 1814, of 
the eight records showing charges of violence against soldiers of the private 
or equivalent rank, six involved perpetrators of the same rank, with two 
perpetrators of the lowest NCO rank. From the 1819-1820 sample set there 
was just a single case of violence against a private, and there were five cases 
in the 1825-1826 sample set, all of which involved defendants of the same 
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rank. In the two year GCM sample, there were only four cases of violence 
between soldiers of the same rank, and at RCM, for all three regiments a 
total of six cases. 
 Unlike the cases of violence against civilian victims, theft and 
procurement do not feature heavily as motivation.  In only four of the cases 
were the charges of violence accompanied charges of theft, with the victim 
of violence also clearly the victim of theft in two cases.
418
 In the two cases 
where the victim of violence was also clearly identifiable as the victim of 
theft,  Bernard Kilroy, a bugler in the 42nd, was tried at Fuente Guinaldo, 
for ‘Making away with his Regimental Necessaries and robbing a 
Comrade’, whilst  Lance Corporal C. Klages of the 1st Hussars King’s 
German Legion, was tried at an unspecified location, for ‘Robbing a 
comrade of one Dollar & sixteen Guineas’.419   
In a third case the perpetrator also acted alone; however, it is unclear 
whether the victim of violence was also the victim of theft. The fourth case 
involving both theft and violence charges has been covered in the above 
section on violence against civilians, and is the only one in which soldiers 
acted together. Importantly, in this instance, though the victims of violence 
included fellow soldiers, the focus of both the theft and most of the violence 
was very clearly on the civilian inhabitants of Seringapatam: Patrick 
Delaney, Alex Pedon amd Joshua McCrum, all privates in the 69th, were 
charged with being ‘Absent from the Hospital without leave, & obtaining 
Liquor from the Inhabitants by force & breaking their chattels’. McCrum, 
however, also faced the additional charges of ‘breaking Two Firelocks, & 
forcing & striking the Sentinel’.   
The additional charges against McCrum underlines one of the most 
common reasons for violence between soldiers, and suggests a specific set 
of motivations for violent crimes distinct from those involving civilian 
victims. In this case, it is clear that the violence was perpetrated against 
another soldier because of his role as sentinel, and as part of the 
perpetrator’s resistance to regimental authority, rather than the motivation of 
theft or personal dispute.  
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Of the remaining four cases of violence against ordinary-ranking 
soldiers in the 1813-1814 sample set, three seem to conform to a similar 
pattern of resisting regimental authority, with the victims in two cases 
apparently performing their duty at the time of the offence. Private Edward 
Laskey, of the 25th Light Dragoons, was tried at Bangalore, for ‘Striking a 
Private on Sentry & refusing to return to the Court House’.  Michael 
Connor, a gunner in the Royal Artillery, was tried at Woolwich for ‘Aiding 
Two of the Gunners in a riot & knocking down another in the execution of 
his duty’. Connor Dougherty, a private in the 18th, was tried in Jamaica, for 
‘Striking one of the Private Soldiers & for riotous Conduct’.420 In the third 
case, though the there is no clear indication that the victim was performing a 
specific regimental duty at the time of the assault, the inclusion of the 
second charge of ‘riotous conduct’ suggests a similar theme of resisting 
regimental authority.  Interestingly, in the second sample set covering the 
years 1819-1820, the single case of violence against an ordinary-ranking 
soldier also conforms to this pattern. Edward Field, a drummer in the 36th, 
was tried in Malta, for ‘Using very abusive language & drawing his knife 
with an intention to injure the men on Guard’.421  
In only one case from the 1813-1814 sample set, do we see what 
could be a simple case of interpersonal violence, without either an 
accompanying act of theft, or an indication that the violence was directed at 
the victim’s regimental role, rather than the victim as an individual.  Joseph 
Cole, of  the 31st, stationed in Naples, was tried for ‘Wounding a Drummer 
with a Knife’.422 Even in this case, however, that the victim was a drummer 
may well have been a factor, given the role of drummers in administering 
corporal punishments within regiments.  
In the 1825-1826 sample set there are five cases with charges of a 
violent nature involving victims of private, or equivalent rank. Two of the 
cases follow a very similar pattern of resistance to regimental authority 
described above. Henry Walker, a private in the 19
th
 regiment, stationed in 
Limerick, was tried on several charges of a regulatory nature, aggravated by 
violent resistance.  Alongside charges of being ‘Absent from Roll call, 
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opposing the Guard [...] and attempting to strike a Corporal’, there was an 
additional charge of ‘abusing a sentinel’.  John Connor, a private in the 47th 
Regiment, was tried at Prome for ‘Attempting to force the Sentry and 
Wounding several Persons’.423  Here the violence, or threat of violence 
against the soldier on sentry duty, is implied by the use of the term ‘force’, 
and as with the above cases, this offence was accompanied by other 
offences unrelated to the soldier victim. In all these cases it seems fairly 
clear that the violence or threats against fellow soldiers related to their 
function, or duty, at the time of the attack, rather than motivations of  theft, 
or simple, personal disagreements.   
This pattern of violence as response or resistance to regimental 
authority is even more apparent when considering instances of violence 
against regimental officers and NCOs and clearly forms a significant part of 
the soldier experience of violent crime.  In the first GRCM sample set there 
are eight examples of violence against a victim from the ‘Officer or 
Employer’ category, only one of which does not follow the pattern of 
resisting regimental authority. In that case the soldier was tried for 
‘Desertion and Robbing his Master’. In every other case the pattern of 
resistance is clear. A typical example of this is the case of John Costillion of 
the 104th, who was tried at Kingston, Jamaica in 1813 for, ‘Not proceeding 
on his March, insolent language, resistance to the Escort and threatening 
Lieut. Cready’.424   
This pattern is repeated in the second and third sample sets, with a 
further seven incidents, most of which seem to have been clear cases of 
resistance to regimental authority. Altogether, of the 15 examples of 
violence against officers or employers, only four are unclear as to 
motivation and could potentially have been the result of personal grievances 
rather than resistance to authority; though, it is important to note that in two 
of these cases the soldiers were drunk at the time of the assault, and in two 
cases there were additional charges which strongly suggest the theme of 
resistance was still a factor. For example, James King of the 67
th
, was tried 
at Poonah, in 1825, for being ‘Drunk and striking his superior officer’ and 
Private Keaney of the 13
th
 Light Dragoons was tried at Arcut, in 1819, for 
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‘Making false representations & threatening the Life of his superior’.425  Of 
the two cases with no indication of motive and no additional charges beyond 
the actual assault, both are equally likely to have been acts of resistance. In 
one the soldier was charged with ‘Mutiny (Striking a superior Officer)’ and 
in the other the charge was ‘Striking Capt Reynaud of the same Regiment’.  
In the majority of cases with an NCO victim, the pattern of 
resistance to authority is similarly clear, though the much larger number of 
cases involving NCO victims is something which will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Six. As with the cases of violence against civilians, violent 
resistance to authority seems often to have been at least partly the result of 
drunkenness. According to one veteran, writing in the 1830s and quoted in 
Burrough’s article, ‘soldiers [...]when in a state of intoxication become 
insubordinate, and are as ready to knock down officers as Serjeants[sic]’426  
When examining register entries, it is very difficult to get a sense of 
the context of violent assaults, though as we have seen, there are sometimes 
hints to the wider picture and sequence of events. Trial transcripts though 
can give a much clearer sense of some of the ways in which violent 
resistance to regimental authority could be triggered. Unsurprisingly, one of 
the flash points for such violence seems often to have been instances of 
discipline and punishment. If we consider the case of Richard Hyde, of 
Colonel Herbert’s  Regiment, tried at Gibraltar in January 1753, there is a 
clear sequence of events leading up to the offence of ‘Stabbing Adjutant 
John Deaken,  of the same regiment with a knife, the said Adjutant then in 
the prosecution of his duties’.  
At the trial, five witnesses gave their versions of events, and the 
prisoner called upon a previous RCM to be brought in as evidence in his 
defence.  According to the transcript, Hyde initially threatened Deaken, 
‘offering to strike [him] with his Firelock’, for which he was tried by a 
RCM and sentenced to 500 lashes. At his first trial, Hyde ‘alleged that he 
had not received his full pay’,  and it is not entirely clear why he thought the 
record of that trial might be useful to his defence at his second trial, given 
that the first had concluded that his complaint appeared ‘groundless’. It was 
as Hyde was about to receive his 500 lashes that the attack on Deaken had 
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occurred.  According to the witnesses, Hyde had been brought to the head of 
the parade, where Deaken, acting in his capacity as Adjutant, was to read 
out the sentence of the Regimental Court Martial.  One of the witnesses 
testified that: ‘Before the sentence was read, the Prisoner said What I am to 
Die, am I? Let me die handsomely’ and then after the sentence had been 
read, Hyde, ‘ran at Mr Deaken’, grabbing his collar with one hand, and 
stabbing him several times with a ‘clasp knife’ concealed in the other.  
Deaken attempted to get away from Hyde, twisting from his grip and 
running away, but Hyde pursued him and managed to stab him several more 
times, in the arm and the leg, before another private from the regiment, 
assisted by a sergeant, managed to wrestle the blade from Hyde and bring 
him under control.
 427
    
Hyde’s case illuminates a number of issues around resistance 
violence in regiments: we see that he felt that he had been unfairly treated in 
the first instance, having not received his full pay; his response to that unfair 
treatment was to threaten the adjutant with violence, escalating the situation 
into a major disciplinary issue, and having been sentenced to severe 
punishment, for what he clearly considered to have been unfair treatment at 
the hands of the adjutant, he attempted to seek revenge against him. It also 
shows the level of violence that could easily erupt in such a heightened 
situation, which is worth bearing in mind when we consider the increased 
risk of violence faced by soldiers whose duties, or NCO rank placed them in 
positions of upholding systems of regimental discipline and control.  
There are three other cases of violence against fellow soldiers in the 
GRCM sample sets. Daniel Curmane, of the 12th, was tried at Gibraltar in 
April 1825, for ‘Striking a Private & using disrespectful language’. 
Similarly, during the same month, in the East Indies, Private Bernard Fallon 
of the 16th Lancers, was tried for ‘Striking a Private & using threatening 
language’. In neither case do we have any further details or accompanying 
charges. It is impossible to know whether these acts of violence related to 
interpersonal disagreements, or resistance to regimental authority.  A rather 
more serious example of violence can be seen in the case of James George, 
a private in the 69th, tried in India in 1825, for ‘Using threatening language 
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and shooting a Private through the hand’. 428  Again, there is little to indicate 
the motivation for violence in this case; however, the fact that George shot 
his victim ‘through the hand’ may complicate the issue. We do not know for 
sure that the ‘threatening language’ was directed at the soldier whose hand 
was shot. Whilst it is likely that such a thing would be indicated in the 
charge, it is nevertheless possible that this was not an act of violence against 
another soldier, but an attempt to assist that soldier in maiming himself to 
secure a discharge from the service.  
For cases of violence between soldiers to reach the higher, GRCM 
level of military justice, it would generally be expected that: they involved 
offences of a very serious nature, such as attempted murder; there was 
significant bodily harm, such as the above case of shooting; they 
represented a significant breach of military order, as with the cases of 
resistance to authority, or they involved repeat offenders. It is reasonable to 
expect that we might gain a more representative picture of soldier on soldier 
violence from the lower, RCM, level of court martial. Even at this level, 
however, there is cause for caution: the number of trials for violence 
between soldiers was still very low.  
The returns for our three case study regiments show a total of seven 
cases of violence against ordinary-ranking soldiers between September 1818 
and October 1819, all tried at RCM level. From the 37th  we have only a 
single instance of violence against a fellow soldier, in which, whilst the role 
of the victim was unspecified, the injury to him occurred in the context of 
‘Rioting in Barracks after hours’:  along with rioting, Thomas Wallace, a 
private in the regiment, was charged with ‘Wounding’ another soldier of the 
same regiment.
429
  Of the two cases recorded by the 33rd, one suggests that 
the violence was personal, rather than generalised. Aaron Vaughan, a 
private in Captain Bennett’s company, was charged with ‘Stabbing Private 
William Taylor with his Bayonet’.430 The second case of violence against a 
fellow soldier was much more in keeping with the pattern identified above: 
Private Charles Collinson, of Captain Hewett’s company, was tried for 
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‘Taking away a Boat and rowing across the water after called to desist by 
the Sentry, and threatening to beat him’.431  
Of the four incidents recorded by the 34
th
 Regiment, three appear to 
have involved personal disputes, though some of the entries are only 
partially legible.  Private William Hendman was tried ‘For taking a bayonet 
out of the Arms rack & [illegible] Private James Gaunt through the Barr(ks) 
& exclaiming he would give him a touch [illegible]’.432  There are no 
accompanying charges of riot or disorder, nor is there any suggestion that 
this violence was inspired by alcohol, or focused on the victim’s regimental 
role at the time of the attack.  Private Joseph Brown was tried ‘For 
unsoldierlike Conduct in drawing his bayonet on Private Cochrane & Mrs 
Boyten & attempting to Stab them on the 9th Instant’. 433Again, there are no 
accompanying charges of riot, or disorder, nor any suggestion of 
drunkenness. We are left to wonder precisely what Brown’s relationship to 
Cochrane and Mrs Boyten was, but it seems likely that this was a purely 
personal dispute, and possibly the result of some kind of romantic 
entanglement; though, it is also possible that, given the role of women in 
regiments as sutlers, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Seven, this could have been a dispute over alcohol. Of the remaining two 
cases, one may have been the result of personal dispute and both were 
clearly fuelled by alcohol. Private Timothy Donaghue was tried for being 
‘Drunk & abusing Private [illegible] & insolence to Lieut. Simpkin’. Private 
James Griffiths was tried for being ‘Drunk in Barracks, striking one of the 
Company's Cooks & abusive language to Serj.[sic] Cunliffe in the execution 
of his duty’. 434 
Of the four cases from the GCM samples, one suggests resistance to 
authority. James Quinn of the 1/60th was tried in February 1818 for 
‘Drunkenness, Drawing his bayonet on a serjeant, knocking down a private 
& losing his regimentals’. Again, alcohol was a clear factor in this case. One 
case clearly relates to an assault rather than resistance to authority; however, 
it is not clear whether the victims were truly ‘comrades’ or soldiers from 
another regiment. Jamie Dixon, of the 79th was tried in April 1818 for 
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‘Violently & maliciously assaulting and wounding two soldiers’.435 Neither 
of the other two cases do the charges give any indication of motive or 
context, with one soldier tried for ‘wounding a drummer’, and another for 
‘firing a pistol at a private’; however, according to the accompanying notes, 
the latter culprit, Private Burnott, of the 25th Light Dragoons, was passed to 
the civil powers which strongly suggests that this may have been a personal, 
rather than professional dispute.
436
  
Where personal disputes between soldiers of the same rank appear in 
the courts martial records, we can assume that they represent either 
unusually serious cases of violence, or breaches of the peace. Most soldier 
on soldier violence would not have made it to any of the three levels of 
court martial. Indeed, low levels of violence in the ranks would have been 
an accepted part of regimental life, and there is evidence to suggest that just 
as fist fights were an important element of civilian culture in Britain, they 
played an important part in soldier culture and group bonding, particularly 
during the early stages of a soldier’s enlistment into the regiment.  Consider, 
for example this anecdote from the Journal of ‘Thomas’, who served in the 
71st between 1805 and 1815: 
A recruit who had joined at the same time with myself, was 
particularly active in his endeavours to turn me into ridicule. 
One evening, I was sitting in a side-window, reading. Of an old 
newspaper he made a fool's cap, and, unperceived by me, placed 
it upon my head. Fired at the insult, I started up and knocked 
him down.—"Clear the room; a ring, a ring,—the Methodist is 
going to fight," was vociferated from all sides. Repenting my 
haste, yet determined not to affront myself, I stood firm, and 
determined to do my utmost.  
 
My antagonist, stunned by the violence of the blow, and 
surprised at the spirit I displayed, rose slowly, and stood 
irresolute. I demanded an apology.—He began to bluster and 
threaten, but I saw at once that he was afraid; and, turning from 
him, said, in a cool decided manner, "If you dare again insult 
me, I will chastise you as you deserve; you are beneath my 
anger." I again sat down, and resumed my reading, as if nothing 
had happened. From this time I was no longer insulted; and I 
became much esteemed among my fellow-soldiers, who before 
despised me.[author’s italics]437   
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Shipp recounted a very similar experience during his first days after 
enlistment. In Shipp’s case, having enlisted as a drummer at the age of ten, 
the ‘soldiers’ concerned were all fairly young boys; however, the similarity 
in terms of establishing relationships and status are clear: 
Under this kind of [...taunting...] I reached my barrack, [...] till at 
length I got nettled, and told one of the boys, if he did not let me 
alone, I should take the liberty of giving him a good threshing. 
This "pluck," as they termed it, silenced most of my tormentors, 
and I was permitted, for a time, to remain unmolested. [...] the 
same boy came up to me, and called me a liar, stating that he 
had a great mind to thresh me [...] I got in a rage, and told him, 
if he ventured to touch me, I would fell him to the ground; when 
all the boys gathered round us, and said, "Well done, Johnny 
Raw!" [...].  Finding that I did not venture to strike the first 
blow, my antagonist called me a coward [...] I struck him, and to 
it we went in right earnest. After half a dozen rounds my 
opponent gave in. This, my first victory, established that I was 
neither a coward nor to be hoaxed with impunity. [author’s 
italics]
438
 
 
In both of these recollections we can see not only that fighting 
established new and young soldiers with their fellows, but that the response 
from the rest of their groups was very similar to the tendency noted by 
Emsley for civilian disputes to be settled by fist fights, around which a ring 
of bystanders would form. The emphasis on courage, or ‘pluck’, along with  
victory, and establishing that the author was not a ‘coward’, nor someone to 
trifle with, brings to mind the ‘Jack Tar’ masculinity of the Georgian 
popular press, noted by McGregor, with its emphasis on courage, 
independence and a willingness to fight, as well as the ‘much vaunted idea 
of the duel to reclaim [...] honor’, in the face of grave insult.439  
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Interestingly, and echoing the discussion, in Chapter Two, of the 
occupation-specific methods of suicide, of the four cases identified as 
personal, rather than institutional in nature, three of them involved the use 
of bayonets. As with the allegedly untried case of murder recalled by 
Surtees, the shape and contours of the violence here seem at least partially 
dictated by the nature of the soldiers’ service, with readily accessible deadly 
weapons in the hands of men trained and accustomed to their use.  
As noted by Hurl-Eamon, in her study of eighteenth-century army 
marriage, this seems a common theme, both in the military justice records 
and also civilian justice records of the time.
440
 An example from the General 
Courts Martial records show how, as with the case recalled by Surtees, an 
instance of domestic violence was shaped by the presence of readily 
accessible weapons: on Tuesday 26th October 1779, William Whitlow, of 
the 44th regiment, was tried for ‘having wounded his wife with a bayonet, 
of which wound she died’. In this instance, the prisoner and his wife were 
both on board a transport ship at sea, and having first been seen ‘raising his 
fist’ and shaking it at her several times, he then took ‘a bayonet from of [sic] 
the deck’ and stabbed his wife in the chest.  
As with other examples of soldier violence, alcohol appears to have 
been a factor, with the prisoner counted a ‘quiet’, ‘mild’ and well-liked man 
when sober, but prone to fly into jealous rages when drunk. On previous 
occasions he had been seen beating his wife for perceived infidelity, despite 
all witnesses claiming that his wife had been loyal and not, as he thought, 
sleeping with the sailors. At the time Whitlow stabbed his wife, he had been 
‘sipping at a cup’ and in his rage claimed he would kill his wife, his child 
and himself.   Whitlow was found guilty of the charge against him, but as it 
appeared to the court that he was ‘in a state of lunacy’ at the time, he was 
acquitted of the crime of ‘wilful murder’. 441  
This tragic case, made all the more so by his dying wife’s 
forgiveness of him and claim that he ‘loved her too much’, highlights the 
inherent dangers of readily available weaponry, in this instance a rusty 
bayonet on the deck of the ship, as well as the trained competency in 
weapons use which went hand in hand with military service. 
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An example from the records of the Old Bailey, meanwhile, 
highlights the particular expectations of professional violence and 
competence with weapons that were arguably an inevitable aspect of soldier 
service. William Marshall, a former soldier, was tried at the Old Bailey in 
1826 for ‘feloniously cutting and striking Mary Elizabeth Harding , with 
intent to kill and murder her’.  In his defence Marshall told the court that, 
‘he lifted up the sword to ward of [sic] the blows, and she might have 
received a cut, but not intentionally; for had he intended it, one blow must 
have been mortal’.   Marshall was acquitted of the charges on the basis of 
his own evidence and that of his employer, who stated that ‘The prisoner 
has been an old soldier; and, if he had intended to give her a blow, he would 
have destroyed her instantly.’ 442 
  Examining domestic violence in eighteenth-century army families, 
Hurl-Eamon makes the case that, while violence and assaults within 
marriages seem to have been fairly common, with such behaviour largely 
ignored by others within the military communities, the number of fatal 
incidents was remarkably low given the requirement for soldiers to keep 
their weapons with them. This same logic applies more generally to murder, 
and serious assaults by soldiers: with weapons easily to hand, and men 
trained and inured to violence as a necessary component of their service, it 
is surprising that such cases were as infrequent as they appear to have been. 
Indeed, Hurl-Eamon suggests that soldiers may have actively sought ‘to 
control their fighting impulse’, and may have been more cognizant of the 
risks involved in using weapons.
443
  
Not only, then, was the soldier’s experience shaped by his profession 
in terms of the kinds of weapons available to him, but it is also worth 
considering that soldier service may have made men less violent than their 
civilian counterparts, or at least more conscious of the potential effects of 
violence, and enabled, through their training to better exert greater control 
over their own violent impulses. 
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Conclusion 
There are, as already noted, several reasons for caution in identifying 
the soldier experience of violent crime from the courts martial records. The 
number of cases, of any kind, is relatively low, compared to regulatory 
offences or property crime, which makes statistical analysis much less 
certain and the low number of cases may well reflect a lack of recording, 
rather than a lack of offending. Similarly, as in the civilian sphere, 
identifying violent crimes at all is problematic.  Referring to analysis of 
crimes under English law, Beattie suggests that, ‘simple assault, [...is...] the 
least satisfactory category to deal with’, in part because of the multiplicity 
of meanings which could attach to such an offence, but also because in only 
a few cases, ‘can one learn from the indictment about the circumstances 
surrounding a case’.444  
If such considerations complicate an analysis of assault by civilians, 
this must stand doubly so for assaults by soldiers, particularly if directed at 
their military superiors. Just as the numbers overall are very low, they are 
also likely to be heavily weighted towards violence against officers, NCOs 
and soldiers acting in an official capacity, whilst under representing both 
assaults on civilians and interpersonal violence between soldiers of the same 
rank. Addtionally, the analysis here relates to both violent assault and 
threats of violence, so some of the cases we have examined may not reflect 
an actual intention to do violence on the parts of the perpetrators. Finally, 
the soldier experience of crime as victim may not be adequately reflected in 
military justice records, omitting as they do assaults by civilians. That said, 
some tentative suggestions can be made about the soldier experience of 
crime, and a number of apparent trends and common themes drawn.  
The first broad trend relates to the role of alcohol in violent crime. 
As noted in Chapter Three, the notion that alcohol problems were both 
endemic in the army, and lay at the root of many criminal and disciplinary 
offences is not new. The GRCM and GCM samples and RCM returns seem 
to bear out this pattern. Given the earlier findings that some soldiers 
engaging in theft and resale were willing to be paid in alcohol for the goods 
they’d stolen, suggesting that even thefts of unrelated materials were 
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sometimes still committed in order to procure alcohol, it is unsurprising to 
find evidence within the courts martial records of alcohol as a spur or 
precursor to some violent crime.  
Another broad trend relates to the direction of soldier violence. 
Violent assaults, or threats considered serious enough by military authorities 
to warrant a formal court martial were much more likely to have been 
directed inwards against other members of the regimental community than 
outwards against non-regimental civilians. Though this may be partially 
accounted for by the practice of handing over offenders to the civilian 
authorities in cases with civilian victims, given the disparity between the 
results from 33rd at home, the 34th in India, and the 37th in Canada, it 
seems likely that this trend holds true for regiments serving in locations 
where handing offenders to civilian authorities was much less likely.  
Just as the employment disputes suggest a leaning towards a civilian 
mindset,   in violent crime we see evidence of a more ‘soldierly’ outlook. 
Taken alongside the apparent trend of soldiers acting together in some kinds 
of violent crime against civilians, such as the robbery of civilian shops, or 
obtaining alcohol by force, but primarily acting alone in other kinds of 
violent crime against civilians, particularly rape or sexual assault, this offers 
an insight into who and what soldiers considered ‘fair game’. Though the 
refined ‘group norms’ of battlefield companies may have been diluted or 
weakened in peacetime service, or through the breaking up of battalions and 
regiments, soldiers had a clear idea of what was or was not acceptable 
behaviour towards civilians according to their own unwritten rules.
445
   
Serious violence and threats by soldiers were most likely to be 
directed upwards against representatives of regimental authority or control, 
rather than against each other. This would seem to fit well with Tatum’s and 
Burrough’s assertions about some of the negotiating strategies employed by 
soldiers and is something which will be considered in greater detail in 
Chapter Six. For now, though, it is important to note that the soldier’s 
experience of violent crime was highly contextual, not just in terms of his 
profession, but also in terms of his specific role within the regiment, and 
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more importantly, that this experience altered in line with his career 
progression. 
To conclude, we can see from these trends that while in broad terms 
violent crime for the soldier and civilian during this period was fairly 
similar, in some ways the soldier’s experience was specific to his 
profession. The particular relationships that soldiers had with the chain of 
command, civilian populations from whom they were at times either 
physically or mentally separated, and each other as fellows and therefore 
arbiters of acceptable soldier behaviour, all played their part in creating a 
profession-specific experience of violent crime. Alongside these cultural 
factors, the availability of weapons and formal weapons training meant that 
violence, when it did occur, often took a very specific form and shape.  
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Chapter Five: Property Crime and Offences of Dishonesty 
Introduction 
A large proportion of the courts martial trials examined for this study 
concerned crimes of dishonesty, such as theft or fraud. Though this may 
seem the simplest category to assess, there are complicating factors that 
make defining such offences problematic. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, the practice of ‘bounty jumping’, in which a soldier enlisted 
into a regiment, receiving a bounty for doing so and then deserted that 
regiment to enlist in another and receive another bounty, in some cases was 
a clear act of fraud. Some soldiers ‘jumped’ through multiple enlistments, 
effectively defrauding each new regiment of bounty payments. For some of 
the soldiers who deserted one regiment and reenlisted into another the case 
for fraudulent intention is much less clear. Similarly, the apparent theft of a 
soldier’s own necessaries may represent anything from a sense of moral 
ownership of the uniform for which he had himself paid, through to the 
deliberate defrauding of the regiment, to accidental loss.  
Much of the recent scholarship looking at crime amongst soldiers 
has focused on them largely as an occupational group.  Property crimes in 
particular seem to lend themselves to this interpretation. Hurl-Eamon’s 
work on military families in London, for example, demonstrates some 
compelling similarities between soldiers’ families and the workers and 
families of other trades. And the evidence from both courts martial records 
and soldier memoirs seem to confirm, that many instances of theft by 
soldiers were driven by a similar set of circumstances and contextualised 
within a similar set of cultural assumptions. Petty theft and minor fraud, 
particularly against employers, as well as a conflict between what was 
considered customary rights by employees and theft by employers featured 
in working civilians’ and soldiers domestic economies.446 Low pay and 
insecure domestic economies were prime factors in both soldier and civilian 
theft. As Coss explains, the intermittent failure of the army to fully provide 
for soldiers’ basic needs, particularly whilst on campaign, inexorably led to 
a culture of plundering: ‘the British ranker’, he suggests, ‘had little choice 
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but to become a consummate plunderer.’447In this chapter we will consider 
the role of property crime and crimes of dishonesty in the lives of soldiers, 
its prevalence within the military justice records, its key characteristics, how 
it was treated and the responses it drew within the regimental community. 
Along with identifying and, to a limited extent, quantifying such crimes 
within a regimental setting, this section will also identify some of the rank-
specific elements of theft and fraud 
Theft and fraud in context 
As with the analysis of violent crime in the previous chapter, to 
understand how theft and fraud featured in the lives of soldiers, it is also 
useful to understand how such crimes were viewed and treated in the 
civilian sphere. Property crimes of various kinds dominated the eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth-century judicial landscape in Britain, and at times 
represented the frontline in a definitional war between traditional working 
cultures and developing employment cultures.
448
 It was during this period 
that the so-called ‘bloody code’ reached its heights in English law, as more 
property crimes were rendered capital offences.
449
  
Attitudes towards property crime and the manner in which the law 
dealt with offenders shifted towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth century, with calls for more humane treatment mirrored by 
similar discourse in military circles.
450
 Paradoxically, as defendants in the 
civilian sphere became more likely to face capital charges for property 
crime, their chances of acquittal or of being found guilty of charges of 
reduced seriousness increased.
451
 Some property crimes were relatively easy 
to categorise, and sit at the apex of eighteenth-century British conceptions 
of crime. Housebreaking and burglary, combining both an assault on 
property with an assault on privacy were both common offences and 
prominent in public discourse on crime.  Frank McLynn argues that 
‘[b]reaking and entering private property with felonious intent was the most 
commonly encountered capital crime of the eighteenth century’, with 
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burglary and housebreaking representing ‘the humdrum, inert, unchanging 
rump of crime throughout the century’.452 The horror with which this set of 
offences was viewed in eighteenth-century Britain, can be seen in how it 
was treated in law. Burglary was a recognised capital offence by 1688, and 
this was extended to aggravated housebreaking by day in 1708, and to shops 
and warehouses by 1763.
453
   
Breaking into houses and stealing goods is a relatively simple crime 
to categorise, recognisable as criminal by most if not all contemporaries, 
regardless of class or station. Some offences, though, were not universally 
recognised as theft. As Rule suggests, some crimes ‘were not held to be crimes 
in the popular view’.454 During the eighteenth century in Britain, the status of 
long held customary rights, based on residency, need, or employment, were 
challenged by the propertied and employer classes and in many cases 
overturned and recast as theft.
455
 Conflicts erupted over the ‘perks’ that 
tradesmen and their families considered a natural part of their domestic 
economies.
456
 In her examination of military families’ survival strategies, 
and in particular the role of women in those strategies, Hurl-Eamon utilises 
the Old Bailey trial records to demonstrate a number of key features of 
crimes involving military families. Through them a picture emerges of a 
much more subtle and graduated contemporary view of crime than the bald 
headlines of charge and sentence might suggest. For many of the women in 
Hurl-Eamon’s study, what in law was seen as theft, was for them the more 
forgivable act of ‘borrowing’, often mitigated by the use of pawnbrokers, 
rather than the outright sale of the goods.
457
 That this mitigation was 
expected to be convincing can be attested by the number of times it was 
offered in defence.   
In some cases, then, the definition of acts as criminal was contested, 
and in particular contested between members of the economic class most 
likely to commit those offences and members of the economic class most 
likely to prosecute them. As discussed in Chapter Three, though the 
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relationship between soldiers and their commanding officers was in many 
ways quite distinct from that of civilian employees and their employers, 
soldiers often carried aspects of those traditional cultural assumptions with 
them into the regiments, reshaping and adapting them to a military setting.  
 
Theft and Fraud in the GRCM, GCM and RCM Samples 
As with violent crime, the courts martial records cannot give us a 
complete picture of theft and fraud by soldiers. In particular, the figures for 
theft from civilians may be less representative given the likelihood that 
some crimes would have been tried within the civilian justice system.  
Nevertheless, there are some patterns of behaviour which become apparent 
through the trial records, as well as features of soldiers’ domestic 
economies, some of which show a clear continuance with civilian cultures, 
and some of which appear to show a distinct, soldier experience. They also 
indicate that the soldier experience of theft and fraud was in some respects 
distinguished by rank. 
Across the six sampled years from the GRCM register, there are a 
total of 597 trials, ending with conviction, with charges of theft, fraud or 
embezzlement, including those showing a combination of two or more of 
these charge types.
458
  A little over a quarter of the trials ending in 
conviction from 1813-1814 include charges for theft or handling stolen 
goods, a little over a third of the trials from 1819-1820 and just under half of 
the trials from 1825-1826.  Frauds, in this analysis taken to include 
embezzlement and forgery, are much less frequent charge types, with only 
11 such charges for the years 1813-1814 compared to 125 theft charges, 10 
fraud charges for 1819-1820 compared to 116 theft charges, and just three 
fraud charges for 1825-26 compared to 323 theft charges. Across the two 
sampled years of the GCM register, a little under 30% of the entries 
concerned theft or fraud, with fraud accounting for only three of 86 such 
trials.  
Looking at the three regiments, we see a similar picture. 
Approximately one third of the RCM trials recorded by the 33rd for the 
period September 1818 to September 1819 involved charges of theft or 
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fraud, with the regiment also trying one soldier  for theft at GRCM level and 
another at GCM. Around 40% of RCM trials recorded by the 34th for the 
same period were for theft or fraud, with two soldiers tried at GRCM level 
and none at GCM.  And a third of RCM trials recorded by the 37th were for 
theft or fraud, with no soldiers tried at GRCM or GCM level.  Again, theft 
charges greatly outnumber fraud charges in the RCM returns.
459
  
For the statistical analysis of theft and fraud the same categories of 
victim have been identified as for the analysis of violent crime. Just as with 
violent crime, however, many of the charges do not specify a victim at all. 
In many cases the soldiers concerned faced simple charges of theft, with no 
additional information offered as to the nature of the crime or the kinds of 
goods stolen. In some cases the items stolen were recorded, but not the 
victim. Where there is sufficient reason to assume a likely victim type, the 
case has been assigned to a victim category. For example, the theft of a 
‘great coat’, a staple of the soldier’s regimental necessaries, is assumed to 
have involved a victim from the fellow soldier category. On the other hand, 
where there are insufficient grounds to assume a victim type, none has been 
assigned. For example, in a case from 1814, in which Private Farrell, of the 
26th was found in possession of stolen cheese, it is quite likely that the 
cheese was stolen from a civilian; however, it is equally possible that it was 
stolen from regimental stores, the officer’s mess, the company canteen, or 
the soldier’s employer.460  In other cases, the type of charge has been taken 
to indicate a particular victim type. Much as the charge of robbery is 
assumed, because of its accepted meaning as a legal term, to involve an 
element of violence or threat, so the charge of burglary, as a crime 
committed in a private house, has been generally assumed to involve a 
civilian victim.  
 
Table 5.1: Victims of theft at RCM, GCM and GRCM 461 
Victim Type RCM 1818/19 GRCM GCM   
  33rd 34th 37th Set 
1 
Set 
2 
Set 
3 
1818-
1819 
Total 
Fellow 1 3 1 9 3 0 0 17 
NCO 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 6 
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Officer/Employer 0 0 1 8 1 2 1 13 
Regiment/Army 10 34 8 69 97 283 7 508 
Other Service 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
Civilian 0 2 0 18 0 2 27 49 
 
The overall balance between civilians and military personnel as 
victims of theft and fraud appears broadly similar for each of the sampled 
pairs of years from the GRCM register, with a sharp spike in both for 1813 
to 1814. It should be noted that the spike in civilian victims was less sharp 
than it appears at first glance, given the much higher propensity of 
perpetrators to act together in thefts from civilians than in thefts from fellow 
soldiers: in terms of the number of incidents, the fellow soldier category 
drops to eight, NCO and officer categories remain the same and the civilian 
category falls to 12. Even with this adjustment, however, the rates of theft 
and fraud from both civilians and military personnel were significantly 
higher for this first pair of years. This seems to reflect a continuation of the 
high rates of theft and fraud from non-corporate, individual victims recorded 
in the first six months of the register, covering the second half of 1812.  
On the other hand, the proportion of thefts and frauds from 
regiments or the army as corporate institution was significantly lower during 
this period. Both the spike in civilian victims and the lower levels of 
corporate victims make sense when considered alongside the unusually high 
proportion of Britain’s army actively on campaign during this period. 
Regiments on the march were far more likely to resort to a court martial 
than hand the culprit over to the civil powers, even where the victim was a 
civilian. At the same time, both the opportunities for theft and the need for 
plunder often increased for soldiers on the march, passing through multiple 
towns and villages, and intermittently, but very seriously, failed by army 
supply systems.
462
 Soldiers on campaign also seem to have been less likely 
to desert than when settled and continued possession of serviceable clothes 
and accoutrements was at a much greater premium, which would be 
expected to significantly reduce the number of soldiers charged with selling, 
or making away with their necessaries.  
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One of the more difficult categories of victim to quantify through 
courts martial records is the civilian victim. Whilst some soldier on soldier 
thefts would be dealt with in the civilian system, particularly when they 
occurred in town billets, on the whole, thefts by soldiers from officers, 
fellow soldiers or the regiment would more often be tried within the military 
justice system. Thefts from civilian victims might be tried in either civilian 
or military systems, with a much greater chance that the perpetrator would 
be handed over to the civil powers in such cases.  
Even taking this into account, bearing in mind the GRCM register 
includes trials in many of the places where passing the defendant over to a 
civilian authority was unlikely, the number of identified civilian victims of 
theft seems low. If, for example, we look just at GRCM trials held in 
Gibraltar where soldier offenders would almost always remain within the 
military justice system: in the 1813-1814 sample set, five of the trial listings 
from Gibraltar were for theft, only two of which involved identifiable 
civilian victims, both relating to the same incident. In the 1819-1820 set, 
two trials were for theft with no identifiable civilian victims and for the 
years 1825-1826, 15 of the Gibraltar trials were for theft offences, two of 
which involved possible civilian victims.
463
  
Looking at the three sets of regimental returns for the year 
September 1818 to October 1819, we again see a similar spread of victims 
of theft. Given that at least half of the 33rd were stationed at home during 
the period covered by the RCM returns, it is to be expected that they may 
show fewer civilian victims of crime; however, no identifiable civilian 
victims for either the 33rd, or the 37th in Canada does seem surprisingly 
low, particularly given that a large detachment of the 33rd spent some of 
this period in Guernsey where a court martial would have been far more 
likely than a court case in the civilian sphere.
464
 
At GCM level, the proportion of trials for theft or fraud, in which a 
victim is identifiable at all, is very low.  The charges recorded in the GCM 
register are primarily very simple, with most stating charges of ‘theft’ or 
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‘robbery’. Of those that do specify a victim, or give enough information for 
one to be assumed, as in the case of burglary, the majority appear to have 
been crimes against civilians, though as with the GRCM figures, the 
tendency for soldiers to act together in offences against civilians inflates 
their presence: with this taken into account the number of civilian victims 
falls by almost two thirds to 11, whilst all other categories remain the same.  
Thefts from the regiment or army as an institution account for only a 
quarter of identified victims in the GCM sample. This underlines the 
seriousness with which the army took offences against civilians, with such 
offences much more likely to be tried at GCM than GRCM, or RCM level. 
It also suggests that the ubiquitous offence of taking away necessaries, 
which accounts for four of the thefts against the regiment, or army as 
institution, was treated far less seriously, and was more likely to be dealt 
with at the lower levels of military justice. With only a single instance of 
theft from an officer and a single incident of theft from a sepoy, it seems 
equally likely that thefts from individuals within the regimental 
communities were far more likely to be dealt with within the regiments 
themselves.
465
   
Looking at all the samples together, with six years of GRCM and 
two years of GCM for the whole service and a single year of RCM for three 
regiments, adjusting for numbers of incidents, we can see that overall, 
regiments, or the army as an institution accounted for the vast majority of 
identifiable theft and fraud victims, with thefts from individual victims rare 
and almost equally split between civilians and military personnel. 
Interestingly, whereas NCOs appear to be disproportionately present within 
the courts martial records as victims of violence and threat, they are much 
less present as victims of theft or fraud, outnumbered by both privates and 
officers and accounting for around 15% of identifiable victims from the 
military personnel categories, a figure far more in line with their regimental 
presence than that for NCO victims of violent crime.  The number of 
ordinary-ranking soldier victims, however, seems low compared to their 
presence in the regiment. That said, unlike NCOs, they seem more likely to 
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have been victims of theft than of violent crime. A little under half of the 
military personnel identified as victims were privates. 
There are some important caveats to this, though, and the picture that 
comes through the courts martial records can only be partial at best. If 
civilian victims are likely to be under represented due to some prosecutions 
taking place within the civil rather than military sphere, it is also likely that 
privates may be under represented as victims because of a lack of 
prosecution in many cases. We have already seen how low level violence 
among the men may have been accepted or ignored, and when recognised 
tackled at personal or sub-judicial levels, with both the soldiers’ own 
informal codes and ad-hoc regimental discipline playing their parts, but 
leaving little trace in the records. For soldiers living together, in barracks, 
tents and billets, opportunities for petty theft and pilfering were manifold 
and anecdotal evidence from soldier memoirs suggests that such thefts were 
at least an occasional fact of army life. Unlike violent crime, much of this 
activity would have been unseen, with the loss of the stolen items known, 
but not the identity of the perpetrator. And as we will see in Chapter Seven, 
the black market, which operated within regiments and out into the civilian 
world, offered ample opportunity to dispose of stolen goods.   
Even where the identity of the thief was known, soldiers may have 
been far more likely to seek justice through informal, or semi-formal 
mechanisms than through the formal military justice system. As Coss 
suggests these less formal mechanisms, centred on the soldier’s own 
company and comrades, operated to regulate deviant behaviour for the sake 
of group cohesion and survival, and few acts went so far against that group 
cohesion than petty theft from comrades.
466
 
The low numbers of thefts from fellow soldiers in the courts martial 
records may reflect a lack of recording, or a high rate of sub-judicial 
responses by officers, but they may equally reflect the success of self-
policing within companies.  In one of the entries to his Military Bijou, Shipp 
outlines in some detail, how this informal, or semi-formal system operated: 
The most efficacious remedy, for redressing these little 
pilferings, is committing the delinquent to the castigation of his 
comrades, which they call, in the infantry, "cobbing," and 
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"booting," in the cavalry. The former is flogging with a belt; the 
latter, with the same implement, but on the sole of the foot. 
Besides these, castigations are used, in which every drum boy, 
of the troop or company to which the offender belongs, heartily 
joins. Previous to such inflictions, the delinquent is fairly tried 
by a president—the oldest soldier; members, two next oldest 
soldiers; youngest soldier; next youngest soldier. 
 
In Shipp’s opinion, this system worked well, and ‘Theft in the army 
[...was...]less frequent than any other crime’467 
The potential impact on a soldier’s life of such thefts was in some 
ways the same as it would have been for anyone of his class. For those with 
very little, even a small theft could represent a major loss.  But in some 
ways the soldier’s experience differed from that of his civilian counterpart.  
Time after time we see in the records soldiers, like Private John Turner, of 
the 16th Foot, in Sunderland, convicted of ‘Desertion and making away with 
his own & Comrades Regimental Necessaries’.468  Set alongside that we 
also see, with regularity, soldiers convicted of ‘losing their regimental 
necessaries’ or ‘being deficient in their regimental necessaries’.  Two cases 
from the Boston order book seem to illustrate rather neatly the potential 
impact of the theft of regimental issue on the day to day life of a soldier.  
The first is an entry for the 23rd November 1774 and records the trial of 
Charles Neil of the 18th, ‘on suspicion of making away with a Shirt of Jo. 
Scott’s of sd. Comp.’ for which crime he was sentenced to five hundred 
lashes.
469
  The second case is a later entry from March 1775, which records 
the trial of Thomas Davis, also of the 18th Regiment, ‘For lending a shirt to 
pass the Review.’470 Davis was acquitted, but the fact that it made it to a 
court martial at all suggests that this would have seemed a credible charge to 
regimental officers.  Being ‘deficient’ in the clothes and accoutrements 
which all soldiers were expected to keep had serious implications, 
particularly when soldiers faced inspection and review. 
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For soldier victims of theft, particularly where regimental 
necessaries were concerned, there were clear risks in reporting such a theft 
unless the victim had a good idea of who was responsible, because of the 
potential for drawing a charge of being ‘deficient in’ or having ‘lost’  their 
regimental necessaries and themselves having to face a court martial.  From 
the Proceedimgs of the Old Bailey, the trial of John Antrobus, 26 October 
1814, for the theft of several items of regimental issue, demonstrates this 
very well.  This trial will be considered in more detail in Chapter Seven as it 
offers a good deal of insight into the black-market trade in soldiers’ 
necessaries, but it is also relevant here for what it can tell us about the risks 
faced by soldier victims of theft. One of the items stolen by Antrobus was a 
pair of regimental overalls, and as a result of that theft, John Sullivan, the 
soldier to whom they had belonged was punished and put under stoppages 
to the value of thirteen shillings and sixpence.
471
 In this instance, the 
perpetrator was not a comrade of Sullivan, but the implications in terms of 
his being deficient in necessaries as a result of theft are no different because 
of this.   
 
Key Features of Theft Crimes 
Burglary and Housebreaking 
In English law the offence of burglary was defined as ‘breaking into 
a dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony (normally theft), or 
actually doing so’.  House breaking, meanwhile, was the same offence 
carried out during daylight hours, though considered marginally less serious 
than burglary, in which the likely presence of the victim was assumed.
472
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the offences of burglary and housebreaking 
refer solely to acts, or intended acts, of theft. As with the most serious 
violence charges, such as murder, burglary and housebreaking were capital 
crimes and were therefore supposed to be tried only at GCM level. As such, 
their presence in the GRCM register and the RCM returns is small.   
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Looking at the GRCM register, only three entries show clear charges 
of burglary or housebreaking for the purpose of theft, with a further four 
which are unclear but may have involved acts of housebreaking or forced 
entry to a property:  two privates were convicted of ‘plundering from an 
inhabitant’, for example, which may well have involved forced entry but 
which cannot be assumed as such.
473
 Even at GCM level, where such 
offences were more likely to be heard, the figures seem low, bearing in 
mind McLynn’s contention that burglary and housebreaking represented the 
‘rump’ of capital cases within the civilian sphere. Looking at the GCM trials 
conducted between 1 January 1818 and 31 December 1819, there were 20 
convictions, which were clearly for burglary or housebreaking for the 
purpose of theft, with a further nine in which the charges may refer to such 
offences: three soldiers, from the 2nd Dragoons were tried for ‘feloniously 
stealing in a dwelling house’, for example, but whether they had entered the 
premises illegally is unstated.
474
 Similarly, 10 soldiers were tried and seven 
convicted of ‘Entering a house and assaulting the inhabitants’, but whether 
the soldiers were intending to steal, or had entered the house specifically in 
order to carry out a violent assault is not known.
475
 Even counting these less 
clear examples, when we take into account soldiers acting together, the 
number of individual incidents was small, with only 10 instances of 
burglary or housebreaking for the purposes of theft, and a further two 
possible incidents across two years of the GCM registers; a significant 
proportion of theft cases, perhaps, but given that the registers purport to list 
all the GCM trials conducted by the army at home and overseas, this seems 
lower than might be expected. One possible reason for this may be the 
likelihood of such offences involving a civilian victim and therefore the 
increased likelihood that the perpetrators would have been handed over for 
trial in the civilian system. It is notable, for example, that none of the 
incidents of burglary and housebreaking, recorded in either the GCM or the 
GRCM registers involved soldiers stationed at home, where the likelihood 
of such a crime being tried in the civilian justice system was highest.  
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Further, all of these incidents occurred in 1818, with no GCM 
burglary or housebreaking trials recorded for 1819. Of those 10 incidents, 
five occurred in France, whilst the allies were in occupation. There was also 
a single incident, recorded in the GRCM register for 1818, of an armed 
soldier ‘quitting the camp for the purposes of plundering’, again in France. 
Given the British army in France in 1818 numbered around 25,000 men, this 
is a very small number of incidents; however, it still represents a sharp 
increase. Accepting that the army, in this context, was far more likely to try 
offenders by court martial than pass them over to civilian authorities, and 
that incidents involving soldiers serving in other places may be less well 
represented, it still suggests that spikes in offending may reflect very 
specific conditions and circumstances.  
It would be reasonable to expect that there may have been cases of 
burglary by soldiers, tried at the Old Bailey; however, even here the 
numbers are startlingly low for these years. Indeed, if we take a single year 
of courts martial records alongside the Proceedings, the number of soldiers 
tried for burglary or housebreaking seems vanishingly small. From 
September 1818 to September 1819, only one soldier was tried by GRCM 
for housebreaking, or more specifically, ‘forcibly entering a hut’.476 During 
that same year, nine soldiers were tried by GCM for five incidents of 
burglary.
477
 From our three sample regimental returns for the same twelve 
month period, there were no such offences recorded by the 33rd, nor were 
there any recorded for the 37th, while the 34th recorded a single clear 
example of housebreaking and a second case in which housebreaking was 
implied but in which theft may not have been the intention.
478
 A search for 
the key words ‘soldier’ or ‘regiment’, in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey 
online collection, specifying the sub-categories of burglary and 
housebreaking for the same twelve month period identifies only two cases 
of soldiers tried for such charges: one was tried for burglary but acquitted 
and one who was tried for burglary on the reduced charge of stealing in a 
dwelling house.
479
 Indeed, the same search applied to the six years 
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corresponding to the GRCM sample, identifies only a single case of a 
soldier convicted for either of these offences for the whole six year 
sample.
480
 Clearly, this can only speak for cases in which the defendant has 
been identified as a soldier, and there is no way to know how many soldiers 
may have been tried without being identified as such, but it does seem to 
indicate a low presence overall.  
Taking into account courts martial from outside the years covered by 
the sample, again it is clear that burglaries and housebreaking offences did 
occur intermittently. As noted in Chapter Four, there was a particularly 
dramatic case in New York,  in 1779, in which several soldiers committed a 
series of burglaries, stealing a large quantity of goods, and using extreme 
violence against their victims including assaulting an old woman and 
attempting to rape a young girl. In the same year, another soldier in New 
York was convicted of house breaking, as was a soldier in Minorca.
481
  But 
the relatively low frequency of these offences in the courts martial samples 
suggests that they were by no means a common occurrence. 
Theft with Violence 
Setting aside the most serious kinds of violence, such as murder, 
even fairly mundane property crimes were generally considered more 
serious under English law than violence offences such as assault or 
intimidation; however, thefts which also involved acts of violence or threat 
were considered some of the most serious offences of all.
482
  As such we 
might expect to see a similar placement of these charges within the different 
levels of courts martial as already noted for burglary and house breaking. In 
fact, cases of theft with violence are slightly less present in the GCM 
sample, wholly absent from the RCM samples, but far more present than 
burglary within the GRCM samples. Across the two years sampled from the 
GCM register, 16 soldiers were convicted of acts of theft with violence as a 
clear component of those acts. The number of separate incidents, however, 
was much lower: with only two of the soldiers having acted alone, the total 
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number of incidents was just seven. Across the six years sampled from the 
GRCM register, 32 soldiers were convicted of theft with violence. Again 
soldiers primarily seem to have acted together in pairs or groups, bringing 
the number of separate incidents down to 18.   
Over half of the charges give no indication of the victims of theft 
with violence and in only one of the GCM cases is there an identifiable 
victim: a quartermaster, of the 6th Dragoons, who was robbed by a deserting 
soldier. The cases from the GRCM register are a little more forthcoming, 
with a victim identified or indicated in 11 cases. With such a small 
proportion of identified victims it is difficult to say with confidence at 
whom this kind of offence was most directed; however, it is notable that 
with six civilian victims, three privates, a single officer, and one sailor, the 
proportions of civilians and military personnel are broadly similar to those 
of theft offences generally.  Similar to burglary and housebreaking, it would 
be reasonable to expect that violent theft offences against civilian victims 
might have been more likely to have been tried in the civilian system, 
particularly for soldiers stationed in Britain.   
Again, though, at least for the Proceedings, examples are few and 
far between. A search in the Proceedings for the terms ‘soldier’ or 
‘regiment’, in the violent theft category shows only six soldiers tried and 
five convicted of ‘highway robbery’ for the six years corresponding to the 
GRCM sample, along with a further trial in which two defendants were 
described as having been dressed ‘like soldiers’, but who were not identified 
as soldiers during the trial.
483
 The convictions relate to two incidents for the 
period 1813 to 1814 and a single incident in 1826; however, one of these 
involved a soldier violently robbing a drummer who was newly arrived to 
the same barracks.
484
 In only two cases do the Proceedings indicate soldiers 
violently stealing from civilians.  
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Convictions in the civilian system are worth considering here. 
According to a parliamentary report on convictions in England and Wales 
for the period 1811 to 1817, 2% of all theft convictions were for theft with 
violence and 5% for  burglary or housebreaking. 
485
 Across the three sets of 
courts martial samples 7% of theft convictions were for theft with violence 
and 3% for burglary or housebreaking. Taken together, with burglary and 
housebreaking included both as acts of violation of privacy and as 
potentially putting the occupants in fear, convictions of this kind accounted 
for around 10% of all theft cases, whilst the percentage of thefts which were 
violent in the parliamentary report is just under 7%.   
At first glance this appears to show a higher propensity for soldiers 
to commit acts of violent theft; however, there are a number of complicating 
factors. In the parliamentary report the overall numbers of convictions 
increased steadily across the seven years covered, whilst the percentage of 
theft convictions that included violence or burglary charges also increased, 
though not quite as steadily: in 1811 the percentage was 5%, in 1812 it was 
6%, in 1813 it was 7%, in 1814 and 1815 it was 5%, in 1816 it was 8%, and 
in 1817 it was 8.5%. The results from the courts martial records are far less 
steady.  In the GRCM register sample, 12% of the theft charges for 1813 to 
1814 were for violent theft or burglary, but only 2% of the theft charges for 
1819-1820 and 4% for 1825-1826.  In the GCM register sample, these 
offences accounted for an enormous 40% of all theft convictions, but they 
were all from 1818, with not a single example from 1819. Whereas, the 
court convictions show a low but constant presence of violent theft offences, 
the courts martial convictions show a generally very low presence with 
occasional peaks.   
The reluctance of juries to convict capital charges and the apparent 
preference for conviction on lesser or partial charges also make it likely that 
burglary and violent thefts were under represented by convictions in the 
parliamentary report.
486
 In 1817, for example, 373 people were convicted of 
burglary and 152 for house breaking, but there were also 143 people 
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convicted of stealing ‘in a dwelling house’. Similarly, whilst 154 people 
were convicted in that year for robbery, 257 were convicted of ‘Larceny 
from the person’. And as discussed in Chapter One, the various stages of 
discretion which lay with the victim, along with the onus of apprehension 
and the cost of prosecuting, meant that many of those accused of crimes, 
and who entered the judicial system on the way to prosecution, were never 
tried at all.
487
 Table 3 of the parliamentary report records the number of 
people committed to prison, but for whom ‘no bills were found’ and who 
were therefore ‘not prosecuted’. This group accounted for around 16% of all 
those committed to prison in England and Wales, from 1811 to 1817. 
Though both civilian and military systems were such that a large 
number of thefts and assaults would have gone unreported, the tendency, 
once a crime was reported, for the accused to be channelled back out of the 
system without a verdict was a much bigger factor in the civilian system. As 
Gilbert states, ‘the civilian practice of indicting men whose case might not 
come to trial has no precise military counterpart’.488 Whilst petty theft and 
pilfering among soldiers was likely to be dealt with at a sub-judicial level, 
more serious offences were far more likely to be reported. Once reported, 
the choice not to pursue a prosecution was removed from the victim, by the 
military system. That same system also meant that the victim was not 
expected to pay for the prosecution. Thefts with violence may therefore be 
over represented as a proportion of all thefts within the courts martial 
record. In the civilian system convictions for theft were likely to more 
accurately reflect thefts against people for whom conviction was affordable 
than against those for whom prosecution was unaffordable.
489
 
With all of this in mind it is worth considering that soldiers may 
have been less likely than civilians to commit acts of violent theft, 
particularly taking into account the soldiers’ own internally enforced codes 
of behaviour and the way in which these may have acted both to separate 
the soldier from civilians and also protect civilians from soldiers. At the 
same time, the tendency for soldiers to act in groups may have made such 
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offences, when they did occur, more serious and dramatic. As Philip 
Haythornthwaite suggests, in The Armies of Wellington, soldier crimes were 
‘sometimes magnified by the fact that gangs of soldiers could act 
together’.490  
Coss’s work demonstrates that soldiers’ conceptions of themselves 
as separate often included a sense of responsibility towards non-military 
persons. From the perspective of a civilian victim of the kinds of crime 
endorsed by the soldiers’ codes of behaviour, it is likely that this would 
have offered scant comfort, but the subjects of Coss’s study clearly adhered 
to a set of parameters in which they might act, and which offered a degree 
of protection to non-military victims. A clever confidence trick or an adept 
theft of food, alcohol or clothing all fell within the acceptable parameters of 
the code; however, the use of violence or threat did not.
491
  Haythornthwaite 
makes a similar point, and offers as an example of soldiers’ distaste for 
violent theft against civilians the case of two soldiers from the Tarbert 
Fencibles, who robbed and killed a ‘poor pedlar’ in 1800. Both soldiers 
were convicted, one executed and the other flogged and drummed out of the 
regiment. According to Haythornthwaite, their crime, ‘caused such outrage 
that the NCOs and men of the regiment subscribed half a day’s pay for 
Webb’s widow and family, and advertised in the press  their detestation of 
the act of their fellow soldiers’.492  
Similarly, though housebreaking and looting in the aftermath of a 
victory or siege were not uncommon, burglary and housebreaking in more 
peaceful times appear to have been a rarity and this may have been an 
extension of that protection from violence to include the violation of privacy 
and domestic safety inherent in the crime of burglary.
493
 For soldiers, as for 
civilians, simple thefts, not aggravated by factors such as violence or threat, 
were the mainstay of property crimes.  
As a caveat to this it is important to note that soldiers’ attitudes 
towards civilians did vary according to circumstance. Gavin Daily makes a 
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compelling case for soldiers’ attitudes towards the civilian populations in 
Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War being very much affected by 
‘an underlying contempt for much of the local culture and way of life [...] 
predicated on a bearing of national cultural superiority’.494 In such a context, 
though violent theft was still considered unacceptable by most of the 
soldiers, plundering seemed to go far beyond simple need, with soldiers 
stealing from citizens almost as a matter of course, and the number who did 
act with violence towards the local citizenry seems to have been higher than 
at other times. That said, Coss’s analysis does seem to show that, while the 
local citizenry of Spain and Portugal often saw the worst side of the British 
soldier, certainly in terms of theft and plunder, aside from very specific 
instances of violent excess, such as in the aftermath of the siege at Badajoz, 
the majority of British soldiers did not consider violence against the Spanish 
and Portuguese civilians acceptable.  
Of the 500 GCM conducted by the British army, during the 
Peninsula War, after desertion and regulatory offences, which accounted for 
the vast majority of trials, the next biggest category was non-violent theft or 
plundering offences, with violent thefts significantly smaller in number.
495
 
Though Oman considered that, after desertion, ‘the main offence [...] was 
robbery, of food from the Portuguese peasantry, often accompanied by 
violence, and now and then by murder’, these accounted for a very small 
number of cases overall, with only 80 plundering cases for the six years of 
campaigning, out of 500 GCM trials. Altogether, 57 men were convicted of 
theft with violence, ranging from ‘a blow with the butt-end of a musket’, to 
murder; a little under 10 men for every year of the war.
496
 According to 
Coss, for the most part, the British soldiers ‘exhibited a fair amount of 
restraint’.497 
Common items of theft 
Exactly what soldiers were stealing is not always clear from the 
charges, with many soldiers charged simply with ‘theft’, for having ‘sundry 
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items’ in their possession, or for ‘stealing from His Majesty’s Stores’. 
Similarly, in fraud or embezzlement cases, it is not always clear whether the 
soldier has committed fraud in order to obtain goods or money. In some 
cases though, we are given a clear indication of what soldiers had stolen, 
and taken together they show some interesting trends. Altogether, the trial 
listings for the six sampled years of the GRCM registers, the single year of 
RCM returns from three regiments and the same year sampled from the 
GCM registers specified 373 items, including money, stolen or fraudulently 
obtained.  
Breaking those down, we can see several common categories of theft 
item. Unsurprisingly, the biggest category was soldiers’ own clothing or 
necessaries, with the offence of ‘making away’ with regimental 
‘necessaries’ or accoutrements accounting for 265 of the identified items. 
How many of these were indeed deliberate acts of taking away with a view 
to disposing of the items for personal gain is impossible to know. Though 
the army treated all such acts as a form of theft, for many of the soldiers 
concerned the items may have been lost, or stolen from them by others. 
Most of the prosecutions of this type detailed in the courts martial records 
were for charges of losing, ‘taking’ or ‘making away with’ necessaries, or 
the even less helpful charge of being ‘deficient in necessaries’. In nine 
cases, the charges specify thefts of arms and ammunition, though seven of 
these refer to the soldiers’ own bayonets and sit more comfortably alongside 
the charge of making away with necessaries. Indeed, the term necessaries 
may have been used at times to refer to both the soldier’s uniform and arms. 
If we set aside the 265 cases of making away with necessaries, an unknown 
proportion of which may have been conscious and deliberate acts of taking, 
the remaining 110 items offer a brief guide both to some of the most 
common opportunities for theft and the kinds of item which were most 
easily disposed of within the informal economies of regiments, or out into 
the civilian world.   
The second highest theft item, after necessaries was money, with 34 
of the sampled trial listings specifying that soldiers obtained money through 
theft, fraud or embezzlement. This theft item appears across the board, at all 
three levels of court martial and in the GRCM register across all six years. 
In 11 trial listings the charges showing thefts of money also identify 
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individual victims:  in only three cases was money identified as having been 
stolen from civilians, with the remaining eight cases spread almost evenly 
across the NCO, officer and fellow soldier categories.  Aside from a case in 
which the four perpetrators burgled a house, taking money and goods, and 
another in which the perpetrator ‘defrauded his officer of the price of a 
horse’, most thefts from individuals appear to have been entirely 
opportunistic and unplanned.  Private Seaford, of the 34th, for example, was 
tried in June 1819, by RCM, for ‘Unsoldierlike conduct in having taken 
money from Private Smith’s cot, when he, Private Smith, was in the 
guardhouse’, and a Royal Artillery gunner was tried by GRCM in 
September 1814, for ‘Clandestinely taking £6..1..6.  from the Pocket of a 
Serjeant’.498  
The vast majority of money theft and fraud  concerned money stolen 
or embezzled from the army as an institution, usually from the soldier’s own 
regiment or company, but also including theft from depots and  more 
ambiguous charges such as ‘drawing money on false pretences’.  In six of 
the trial listings, the charges specify that the perpetrators had stolen or 
embezzled money ‘entrusted’ to them. The 33rd tried two men by RCM 
within a few weeks of each other, one for ‘Desertion and making away with 
his firelock and money entrusted to him’ and the other for having been 
‘[a]bsent all night and making away with the mess money entrusted to his 
charge’.499 In a further eight cases, money had been stolen or embezzled 
through the subversion or misapplication of regimental or company 
finances. It should be noted, however, that four of these trials concerned an 
apparent flurry, during the April of 1820, of fraudulent activity by three 
NCOs and a private from the same regiment. On 11th April, Sergeant 
Richard Maloney of the 57th was tried at Clonmel, by GRCM, for 
‘[m]isapplication of Pay money’. Ten days later, at a GRCM held at 
Kilkenny, two colour sergeants were tried for ‘Embezzlement of Pay 
money, taking Discount from Tradesmen and charging the men extra for 
Necessaries’, and a private for ‘Embezzlement of Money entrusted to him to 
pay Tradesmen’.  Another sergeant of the 57th was also tried around this 
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time for ‘Making false representations to deceive his Comm(g) officer’, 
which may or may not have been connected to this fraud.
500
   
After money theft, the next most common category of item was 
fabrics or clothing, not including the soldiers’ own necessaries, accounting 
for 23 of the specified items stolen by soldiers.  Thefts of fabrics are present 
throughout the sampled registers and returns, appearing across all three 
levels of court martial, and in the GRCM register across all six years. 
Barrack sheets and comrades’ clothing seem to have been particularly 
tempting, accounting for six and five of the identified items respectively. 
But we also see the clothing of officers, cloth stolen from civilian 
shopkeepers, and several thefts of clothing in which the victim was 
unidentified.  In a particularly gruesome incident, two privates from the  41
st
 
Foot in India, were tried in July 1825 for, ‘Opening a Grave & stealing the 
cloathes of a Corpse’ [sic] .501  
The next category of theft item was food and drink, including the 
theft of livestock.  Unlike money and cloth, however, these are only found 
in the first GRCM sample, covering the years 1813 and 1814. In this two 
year period, 21 soldiers were tried and convicted at GRCM, for a variety of 
food, drink and animal thefts, including  three men from the 1/69th in India, 
who were tried in July 1813, for ‘obtaining licquor [sic]from the inhabitants 
by force’,  two men from the Hussars, in Villar de Ciervo , tried in March 
1813, and one from the 28th in Coria, tried in April, for ‘sheep stealing’, 
and a man from the 26th, in Gibraltar, tried in May 1814 for, ‘having in his 
possession a stolen cheese’.502   
Whether this spike in trials for food and drink thefts reflected an 
increase in this crime type, or an in-time determination on the part of the 
army authorities to clamp down on such activities is difficult to ascertain, 
but it is likely that food theft was more widespread than it appears from the 
GRCM register. Unsurprisingly, analyses of civilian crime in Britain during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have found the theft of food to have 
been fairly common among the working poor, though more common in rural 
than in urban settings, and other studies of soldier crime have found food to 
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have been a common item of theft.
 503
  That said, theft of food by soldiers 
was an offence particularly associated with active service and campaign 
behaviour, driven by at best food insecurity, and at worst absolute 
deprivation. Several of the cases in the sample come from Spain and 
Portugal, and could well reflect the group survival strategy of 
‘reconnoitering’, identified by Coss as very much a part of active 
campaigning. But this does not explain the apparent flurry of alcohol thefts 
in India, nor the several thefts of food in Gibraltar, both of which involved 
soldiers in settled garrisons with supply depots.
504
  
Stephen Conway’s study of the social, cultural and political impact 
in Britain of the War of American Independence suggests that food thefts 
and pillaging habits formed on campaign could easily bleed into soldiers’ 
interactions with civil society at home and in peace time. According to 
Conway, ‘one officer noted how men who had been in North America were 
accustomed to taking what they wanted in the way of extra food; once they 
returned to Britain they continued to behave in the same way’.505 
Interestingly, Conway gives several examples of soldiers engaging in acts of 
food theft against civilians, most of whom were dealt with at RCM rather 
than being handed over to the civil powers, which suggests that, in such 
cases of minor theft, it may not be safe to assume a higher likelihood of 
soldiers being handed over to the civil powers when stationed at home, and 
also that food theft was more likely to be tackled at the lower, regimental 
level.
506
  
The remaining 23 specified items covered a wide range of goods, the 
majority of which were primarily small personal items, easily hidden and 
easily disposed of: pocket books, watches and even a sponge. Watches in 
particular seem to have been something of a temptation, accounting for 
seven of those small personal items, and as will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven, changing hands with some regularity.  But there were also a few 
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bigger items, such as a boat stolen by seven soldiers in an attempt to desert 
from Jersey, an unspecified quantity of iron, and several portmanteaus.
507
   
For the most part, then, the items commonly stolen by soldiers 
appear broadly similar to the items most commonly stolen by civilians. 
Several studies of crime in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain show 
the same trends: food and clothes, for example, were noted in both Matt 
Neale’s study and John Beattie’s as particularly common items of theft.508 
Though many of the charges of theft from the army do not specify the items 
stolen, instead simply stating that the culprits had broken into, or were in 
possession of ‘sundry items’ from ‘His Majesty’s stores’, or ‘the King’s 
yards’, it seems likely that some of these cases involved thefts of similar 
items to those noted in Neale’s study of crime in eighteenth-century Bristol 
under the category of ‘consumables’,  such as metals and building materials, 
particularly with the above theft of iron taken into account.
509
 
Though not well-represented in the courts martial samples, aside 
from the thefts of arms and ammunition, courts martial transcripts from 
earlier trials suggest that there were also items of theft which were more 
military in nature, such as large quantities of fine grade gun powder. In July 
1779, for example, two men were convicted at a trial in Gibraltar for, 
‘stealing powder, the property of the King’.510 It is likely that some of the 
thefts from the ‘King’s yards’, for example, recorded in the registers, may 
have involved such materials.  This is something which will be considered 
in more detail in the discussion of regimental black markets in Chapter 
Seven.   
What is interesting when considering the various kinds of items 
specified in the charges, is how they were stolen.  Food and drink thefts, 
seem primarily to have involved soldiers acting together, as in the above 
case of three soldiers taking alcohol from inhabitants by force and that of 
the two soldiers ‘concerned in sheep stealing’. This may be partly due to the 
                                                     
507
 WO 90/1: for the deserters stealing a boat, and the theft of iron. Thefts of 
portmanteaus appear several times in both GCM and GRCM registers. 
508
 Coss, p. 83; Beattie, Crime and the Courts, pp. 182-91; Matt Neale, ‘Making 
Crime Pay in Late Eighteenth-Century Bristol: Stolen Goods, the Informal 
Economy, and the Negotiation of Risk’, Continuity and Change, 26 (December, 
2011), 439-459 (440).  
509
 Neale, p. 440. 
510
Trial of Thomas Else and William Booth, 12
th
 July 1779,  WO 71/90, fols. 12-
16. 
171 
 
 
 
high proportion of civilian victims in such cases, but even in the rare 
instances of food theft within the regimental community, this seems to hold 
true. Two gunners from the Royal Artillery, for example, appear to have 
conducted a rather audacious theft from the officers’ mess; though, only one 
appears to have entered the mess and taken the ‘sundry items’, with the 
second helping him to ‘convey’ those items into town. 511  This suggests that 
even when regular access to food was more secure, soldiers’ campaign 
attitudes towards food theft and ‘reconoittering’ remained in force. Another 
example from Haythornthwaite of soldier offending, also suggests this may 
have been the case: the soldiers stationed at the Cork garrison having been 
‘prevented from ill-using traders in the market’, had formed into gangs who 
‘roam[ed] outside the city, stopping incoming “country people” and 
compelling them to sell their potatoes at whatever small price the soldiers 
imposed’.512  
Money, small personal items and clothing belonging to individuals, 
however, for the most part appear to have been stolen by soldiers acting 
alone and on the rare occasions we do see soldiers acting together to steal 
non-food items from individuals, they are generally cases involving a 
civilian victim. Similarly, fraud or embezzlement of money rarely involves 
soldiers acting together. With the above case from the 57th as an exception, 
these tended to be entirely opportunistic and individual crimes. 
 
Soldiers and Civilians 
Despite the sense of separation engendered by the ‘soldier’ identity 
and the efforts to separate soldiers from their communities, particularly as 
recruits, proximity often defined the relationship between soldier and 
civilian far more than did separation; something which can be seen very 
clearly in the system of billeting.
513
 For the majority of soldiers the system 
of billeting in towns would have been a familiar part of life in the army, and 
for many civilians, at home and in the colonial setting, soldiers would have 
been a familiar presence in their towns.
514
 Along with producing some 
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interesting and occasionally explosive social dynamics, this system also 
created opportunities for theft and fraud, for both soldiers and civilians.  In 
1753, at the Old Bailey, Thomas Carroll was indicted for the theft of a silver 
tankard, the property of Roger Peel. According to Peel’s testimony, Carroll 
had stolen the tankard whilst lodged in their home, but that: ‘the prisoner 
pretended to be a soldier (but he was not) and brought a false billet to my 
house, and had quarters there, from Thursday to Monday’.515  
Legitimately billeted soldiers, meanwhile, also found their way to 
the courts, with petty theft and pilfering a seemingly common facet of 
billeted life, along with easy access to avenues of disposal.  From the 1817 
Quarter Sessions rolls in Bedfordshire, for example, we have the 
examination and evidence of John Barnacle, a postboy from Stoney 
Stratford, accusing private Edward Cogan of the 4th or ‘King’s Own’ 
regiment of stealing ‘Four waistcoats, a jacket, a pair of breeches, a shirt 
and a "Waggoners frock" from his bed chamber. Barnacle instantly 
suspected Cogan, one of several soldiers then billeted with his master, and 
followed him to Dunstable, where "The shirt was brought out of the cooks 
shop .... The waggoner's frock was recovered from Houghton Regis’ and the 
rest of the clothes found with Mary Boxward,  servant to Mrs. Gostelow of 
the Waggon and Horses.’516   
The image of the soldier bringing uproar and crime to his civilian 
hosts is a familiar one, and the unease with which some of those hosts 
viewed their guests is apparent in the many complaints made against 
billeting during this period.
517
 But soldiers billeted in taverns and hostelries 
were also at risk of theft by local civilians. In September 1818, Henry 
Hampton, a second-hand trader, was convicted of stealing a large number of 
items, all contained in a box, from the lodging room of George Nowell, of 
the 1st Regiment of Guards. Nowell’s room was at a public house called the 
Duke’s Head, and Hampton was a regular visitor there.518  From time to 
time soldiers were victims of theft by those with whom they lodged. In 
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1816, John Harris, of the Grenadier Guards, lodged at a house in 
Bloomsbury and was the victim of theft by a servant of the house, Mary 
Riley, who stole Harris’s ‘Waterloo Medal’ and then sold it on to ‘a refiner 
in Long Acre’.519   
For soldiers billeted on foreign hosts, particularly during active 
campaigning, the picture was even more complex. Returning to the 
experiences of soldiers in the Peninsula War, the ‘underlying contempt’, 
exhibited by British soldiers towards the culture and lifestyle of their 
Spanish and Portuguese hosts, was itself a spur, or at least partial 
justification for criminal action against them, and in particular seems to 
have added an extra dimension to the art of plundering. As Daly explains, 
the picture painted by the memoirs of Peninsula veterans,  like that of 
Sergeant Lawrence, is of soldiers who ‘got the better of “Spanish wiles” 
proving more cunning than the Spanish themselves’.520 Along with this 
sense of otherness in regard to their hosts, the particular context of the 
Peninsular War, in which the British soldiers were in Spain as liberators, 
gave them an additional sense of ‘entitlement’, and many expressed not just 
a sense of superiority, but also anger and disappointment at a perceived lack 
of gratitude or appreciation from the civilians they were there to liberate.
521
  
Again, though, despite these attitudes being specific to Spain and 
Portugal during the Peninsula war, and recognising the added complexity 
such a context brought to soldier-civilian relations, much of the behaviour 
of the soldiers was very similar to that of soldiers stationed elsewhere. 
Though speaking particularly of the British soldiers billeted on Spanish and 
Portuguese hosts, Daily’s contention that ‘the billet and the question of 
hospitality brought cultural, military and civil identities into relief’ could 
also be applied, to a degree, to soldiers billeted on other civilian 
communities, overseas or at home.
522
 Soldiers may have been more inclined 
towards, or felt more justified in stealing from their Spanish hosts, but the 
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examples of soldiers stealing from British hosts suggests that there may 
have been wider issues of soldier-civilian relations, beyond the specific 
context of war. 
Desertion and Theft 
Across all six years sampled from the GRCM register, 564 soldiers 
were tried and convicted of theft, and 24 of fraud or embezzlement.  Of 
those 564 convictions for theft, 409 were accompanied by convictions for 
desertion, and of the 24 fraud convictions, six involved soldiers who had 
also deserted.  In the first sample set, desertions accompanied half of all 
thefts and frauds, and in the second and third sets the reverse was true, with 
twice as many theft charges accompanied by desertion than not. In the two 
years of GCM trials, 18% of theft charges were accompanied by desertion 
charges as was one of the two fraud charges. Looking at the three sets of 
regimental returns, for the 33rd, around a third of all thefts were 
accompanied by desertion charges as was one of the two fraud charges. 
Neither the 34th nor the 37th recorded any theft charges accompanied by 
desertion charges; however, as discussed in Chapter Two, whilst the 34th 
did not record any desertion trials, there were a very large number of 
absence charges, and a third of those were accompanied by theft charges.  
The ‘theft’ or ’loss’ of regimental clothing and equipment in 
particular seem to have been a common accompaniment to desertion and 
account for the vast majority of these cases; however, it was also not 
unknown for absconding soldiers to steal the clothes and equipment of their 
fellows. There are very few examples within the courts martial samples of 
soldiers stealing from their fellows, and as such, patterns of behaviour 
associated with this offence are difficult to identify. In the 1813-1814 
GRCM sample, there were only eight cases of theft from comrades, a single 
case in the 1819-1820 sample, none in the 1825-1826 sample, and no cases 
in the GCM sample. There were only two cases from the three sets of 
regimental returns: neither of them showed desertion charges, but in one 
case the charges specified that the thief had tried to ‘dispose’ of the clothes. 
In two of the GRCM cases, the defendant was also charged with desertion.  
Regimental clothes and equipment, whether their own or their 
comrades’ effectively provided soldiers with a readily converted or bartered 
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resource, particularly though not exclusively, in cases of desertion. In the 
trial of Private William Coffee of the 19th Foot, when asked what he had 
done with his own clothing and that which he had stolen from a fellow 
soldier, said that he had sold them in Dublin.
523
  
The connection between the two charge types is also illustrated very 
clearly in the case of Henry Galland, of Colonel Lascelle’s regiment, tried at 
Fort Lawrence, Nova Scotia, in 1751, ‘on suspicion of desertion’.  Galland, 
was accused by Thomas Powell, of the same regiment, of having expressed 
an intention to desert. Giving evidence, Powell claimed that whilst drinking 
together Galland made his intentions clear, declaring it to be: ‘the last time I 
shall drink with you anymore’. Powell sought clarification, before advising 
him to go to bed and forget about deserting. Galland’s response is 
illuminating:  along with his assertion that he ‘would not lye another Night 
in the Fort, nor mount another Guard’, Powell told the court that Galland: 
‘lifted up his Coat and shewed some Shirts and other Things in the Lining of 
his Coat and said that was enough to serve him’ [author’s italics].524 With 
Powell’s testimony in mind, Wellington’s contention that the soldiers’ 
necessaries were treated by the men as a ‘cheque-book’ on which they 
might draw is a compelling assessment and something to bear in mind when 
we consider informal economies and black markets in Chapter Seven
525
  
 
Key Features of Fraud and Embezzlement 
As the most likely people to have had access to public or regimental 
funds, as well as responsibility for the overall management of regimental 
economies, much of the scholarship on fraud and embezzlement in the 
British army during this period has naturally focused either on the 
fraudulent activities of merchants, or on the ‘sharp practices’ of officers and 
regimental commanders.
526
 The opportunities available to officers and 
regimental commanders for personal profit, through the misuse of public 
funds intended for the upkeep of the regiment, as well as those available to 
merchants and suppliers through abuses of the supply chain, were a matter 
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of great concern to both public and military authorities throughout the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; though, such opportunities were 
much reduced and fraudulent practices much more heavily policed than in 
previous centuries.  Guy’s analysis of the Oeconomy and Discipline of the 
regiments, sets out some of the ways in which officers were able to subvert 
army systems for their own gain, with ‘false mustering’ as the offence 
which most concerned military authorities and parliamentary paymasters 
alike, though he makes a strong case for that particular offence being much 
less prevalent by the mid-eighteenth century, than the ‘widespread’ 
contemporary accusations of it would imply. According to Guy’s analysis, 
many of the accusations of false mustering and some other kinds of fraud 
‘collapsed as soon as some witness or thwarted accomplice denounced 
them’.527   
Other forms of fraud, however, do appear to have been widely 
practiced amongst officers and regimental commanders, and it is important 
to take these into account when we consider the culture of regiments and 
how they may have impacted on the expectations and behaviours of those 
lower down the chain of command.  If we consider Strachan’s description of 
‘the influences of the officers and of the regiment corporately’ as an 
important factor in improving soldier discipline, and as something which 
was ‘long in gestation and assimilation’, then Guy’s contention that ‘”The 
custom of the army” was such a vital, anomalous and organic feature of 
regimental life that it was difficult  to draw a clear line between legitimate 
profit and outright corruption’, has serious implications for the fraudulent 
practices of some soldiers and in particular some NCOs.
528
 If we consider 
the earlier examples of money theft and fraud, we can see the ‘custom of the 
army’ at play in some of the charges, in particular those for ‘charging the 
men extra for Necessaries’.  That such an atmosphere and culture of 
‘custom’ occasionally merging into outright fraud existed at the very top of 
a regimental community may help to explain how a similar culture could 
exist at the bottom. In both cases there is a conflict between ‘customary’ 
rights and perquisites on the one hand, and legal obligations and 
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responsibilities on the other, with both potentially informed in part by a 
sense of moral ownership or customary rights.   
Fraud and embezzlement made up a very small percentage of 
property and dishonesty crimes overall, much smaller it seems than within 
the civilian system. The parliamentary report on committals to prisons 
shows that in total around 8% of all property crimes and crimes of 
dishonesty were for fraud, embezzlement, forgery or counterfeiting 
currency, with a fairly constant level throughout the seven years covered.
529
 
By contrast, the percentage in the courts martial samples is much lower. 
Taking all the courts martial samples together, fraud, embezzlement, forgery 
and counterfeiting accounted for only 4% of all property crimes. For the two 
years of GCM trials, the percentage was 3.5%, for the three sets of 
regimental returns it was 3%, and for the GRCM samples, the percentage 
ranged from a high of 12% for the years 1813-1814, to a low of 1.5% for the 
years 1825-1826. Again, this does suggest that, if not in terms of the kinds 
of offences soldiers committed, in terms of levels of offending the period 
1813-1814 saw a sharp rise. 
The soldiers who perpetrated such offences were disproportionately 
likely to be of NCO, rather than private rank, though the low numbers both 
of fraud cases and of NCO perpetrators overall necessitates some caution in 
this assessment: of the 592 property crime charges recorded in the six 
sample years of the GRCM register, only 26 were for fraud or 
embezzlement. Only 2% of property crime charges against defendants of the 
private rank were for fraud or embezzlement, compared to 45% of those 
against NCO defendants. Across the two years of GCM trials, there were 76 
privates and seven NCOs convicted of theft, with only three convictions, for 
fraud, of two privates and one NCO. Looking at all three levels of courts 
martial for the three regiments, the 33rd convicted a total of 18 privates for 
theft and two for fraud, the 34th convicted 40 privates for theft, and the 37th 
convicted 14 privates for theft and one NCO for fraud.   
For most ordinary-ranking soldiers, the opportunities for fraud or 
embezzlement are likely to have been limited and it is no surprise that where 
fraud and embezzlement cases did occur they were disproportionately likely 
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to involve a defendant of NCO rank. This suggests that, whilst as victims of 
theft the NCO experience was very similar to that of the private soldier, as 
perpetrators of theft or fraud it was differentiated by their rank, and as such 
emphasises the need to examine the NCO experience as at least partly rank-
specific.  
 In terms of the kinds of offences soldiers committed, many were 
similar to those committed by civilians: much as civilians might embezzle 
from their employer, soldiers embezzled from the army, or defrauded the 
supply systems. Indeed, many of the fraud and embezzlement charges in the 
courts martial samples involve soldiers subverting supply systems in one 
way or another. A lance corporal from the 89th in Jersey, for example, was 
convicted in 1813, by GRCM, of ‘Procuring sundry Articles with forged 
Orders’.  In the same year, a sergeant in the Lancashire Militia was 
convicted of ‘making an improper charge for a knapsack’.  In 1819, a 
private from the Rifles was tried for ‘Attempting to defraud with false 
certificates’, and in 1825, a private was convicted of ‘Taking money from 
the Depot with an intent to defraud’.530 Of the three fraud charges recorded 
in the GCM sample, one involved a sergeant ‘Fraudulently altering receipts 
for carriage of baggage’.531  
Though many of these offences were specific to army systems, they 
have their equivalents in the civilian sphere.  The opportunities for some 
activities, however, seem to have been much lower in the military setting: 
charges relating to counterfeit currency, for example, form the mainstay of 
this category of offence in the civilian convictions, at a little over half of 
such crimes, but there are only four examples of counterfeiting charges 
against soldiers, across all of the samples.  
‘Bounty Jumping’ 
‘Bounty Jumping’, in which soldiers deserted their regiment and 
reenlisted in another in order to claim additional bounties was one of the 
few fraudulent practices that can be said to have been an exclusively 
military offence, with no equivalent in the civilian sphere. It was also an 
offence which seems to have been rank-specific. Though NCOs appear to 
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have been more likely than privates to commit fraud or embezzlement 
offences, this particular offence was far more likely to be committed by 
lower ranking soldiers.  The offence of bounty jumping potentially accounts 
for nine of the 26 fraud or embezzlement cases in the GRCM samples, with 
all nine involving a defendant of private or equivalent rank. This is 
unsurprising given its inherent connection to the offence of desertion and 
the much lower levels of desertion amongst NCOs than amongst Privates, 
something which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. Bounty 
jumping, though, is a difficult offence to identify with confidence.  In some 
cases, the charges recorded against these soldiers make clear the fraudulent 
nature of the offence, specifying that they had deserted after receiving 
bounty. In most cases though the charges state simply that they had deserted 
and reenlisted in another regiment.  As such it is difficult to assess the extent 
of this offence as a deliberate attempt to defraud.  
It is clear, however, that the existence and level of bounties was seen 
by some contemporary authorities and commentators as a spur to desertion, 
with the issue becoming highly politicised, particularly during the 
Napoleonic Wars. William Windham, Secretary of War in the Ministry of 
all the Talents, specifically cited the high bounties available to recruits as a 
factor in high levels of desertion and was supported in this view by Henry 
Grattan, who suggested that they ‘operated as a premium for desertion’.532  
Windham and his supporters placed much of the blame for this on the 
recruitment policies implemented by the previous government, though as 
Linch suggests, the figures for desertion rates did seem to bear out this 
view.
533
 
The two major pieces of legislation considered most responsible for 
creating this context for bounty jumping were the Army Reserve Act (1803) 
which was in effect for a little over a year and then after that was abolished 
by Pitt in 1804, its replacement, the Permanent Additional Forces Act 
(1805). Together they ‘inadvertently introduced an unregulated market for 
men to fill the quotas required under these acts’. 534 On taking the War 
Office in 1806, Windham dismantled the volunteers and revised recruitment 
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policies and as Linch demonstrates, whereas in 1806 the rates of desertion 
for men stationed at home reached a peak of 60 out of every 1,000, these 
rates began to fall year on year, with 50 out of every 1000 in 1808 and 40 
per 1000 by 1809.
535
 Whilst this did seem to add weight to Windham’s 
argument, it is very difficult to know whether the reduction in desertion 
rates were specifically a result of the changes he brought in, running, as they 
did, alongside a raft of measures taken by the Horse Guards to try and 
reduce desertion rates.
536
  
Whether bounty jumping was as prevalent as contemporary focus 
suggests is difficult to say. Some soldiers who engaged in that activity were 
charged with deserting and reenlisting, but we have no idea how many 
others, charged simply with desertion had intended or attempted to reenlist. 
It is likely that some of the soldiers charged with deserting several times 
may have been guilty of bounty jumping, but to assume so would be 
dangerous. Looking simply at those charged with desertion and reenlisting, 
the figures though by no means negligible are certainly not high and account 
for a fairly small percentage of overall desertion charges. Whilst this 
reflected the changes in recruitment policies, the continued presence of re-
enlistment charges suggests that it may still have been a factor, however 
small.  
Anecdotal evidence from memoirs does suggest that for some 
soldiers, serial desertion remained a potentially lucrative activity and the 
bounty a factor in some men’s decisions to desert and re-enlist. When 
O’Neil was first considering the possibility of desertion, in 1810, along with 
the romantic appeal of high adventure and his feelings of dismay at having 
received unfair punishment, he also considered the potential for further 
bounty: ‘It also occurred to me that should I still wish to continue in the 
service, I might go to another part of Ireland, where I was unknown, and 
again receive the bounty-money offered to all enlisting.’537Indeed, in the 
introduction to the modern reprint of O’Neil’s memoir, Bernard Cornwell 
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describes him as ‘a practised bounty jumper’ who ‘received a bounty of 
eighteen guineas from every regiment he joined’.538  
As we saw in Chapter Two, though, some soldiers who benefited 
from the additional bounty may have been motivated less by financial gain 
than by a need for a change of scene and personnel, and even in O’Neil’s 
case, the potential for additional bounties was only part of his rationale for 
deserting.  Returning to the case of Robert Shaw, whose multiple desertions 
and re-enlistments were noted in Chapter Two, we can see that, while his 
defence statement naturally tried to paint his actions in a forgivable light, 
they nonetheless show a very believable sequence of motivations beyond 
the promise of extra bounties. According to Shaw’s statement, his first 
desertion had been due to youth and advice from a grenadier who had also 
deserted.  His second desertion was because he was afraid he would be 
found by his old regiment when they appeared in Ireland. And his third 
desertion was because he felt he would never be respected in his company, 
as a result of having been a deserter.
539
  
In considering the courts martial samples as a whole, we can get a 
sense of the overall place of property offences in the soldier experience of 
crime, but this can also overemphasise such acts within the soldier 
experience of service. Looking at the three sets of regimental returns, 
however, underlines just how uncommon most of these offences were 
within any one regiment, how few of the soldiers appear to have engaged in 
theft and fraud, and how little of what was committed was directed at 
individual victims.  For a single year, across all three levels of courts 
martial, 19 of the 671 soldiers serving in the 33rd were convicted of theft or 
fraud offences, of which five were for making away with necessaries 
without any other accompanying theft charges.  As with the wider analysis 
of property crime, privates in the 33rd seem to have been considerably more 
likely to engage in such crimes than were the NCOs, with the number of 
convictions for theft accounting for around 3% of the men, and no such 
offences recorded for the NCOs. In 11 cases the victims are apparent or 
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implied, with all 11 showing the victim to have been either the regiment, or 
the company.   
The 40 convictions for theft and fraud in the 34th, only 10 of which 
were for thefts other than the soldiers’ own necessaries, seem much more 
dramatic; however, taking into account repeat offenders, the number of men 
convicted of such charges drops to 31, out of 910 serving in the regiment.  
Just under 4% of the men below NCO rank were convicted of property 
crimes during the twelve month period. Again, there were no theft or fraud 
charges brought against NCOs in the regiment. All but two of the trial 
listings show an identifiable victim, though in several cases there were 
multiple victims, not all of which were identifiable: for example, where 
soldiers were charged with theft and making away with necessaries as two 
separate charges. 35 cases show the regiment or company as victims, three 
cases show fellow soldiers as victims, and two cases show civilian victims.  
The 37th recorded 15 convictions for theft and fraud. Adjusted for 
repeat offences, there were 11 men convicted out of the 686 who served in 
the regiment. Ten of those were privates or drummers, amounting to 1.5% 
of the rank and file, with a single NCO convicted of fraud. There are 11 
cases in which the victims are identifiable, with six of those showing the 
regiment or company as victims, and a single case each for the fellow 
soldier, officer and NCO categories. Though technically the final victim 
should be classed as a civilian, in a sense it might also be counted as a theft 
from an NCO: the culprit was found to be ‘in possession of several articles, 
the property of Serj. Hugh’s Wife’.540  
As a final caveat to the soldier experience of theft, it is also 
important to consider how crime may have affected those soldiers who 
committed offences. We have already seen that some soldiers deserted, or 
took their own lives for fear of punishment having committed acts of theft; 
however, for some soldiers that fear may have been accompanied by a sense 
of shame, not just because of the prospect of humiliating punishment, but 
also because of a sense of having let down themselves and their comrades. 
In his analysis of soldier suicides in the line cavalry in India, Rumsby gives 
several examples of soldiers for whom the sense of shame attached to 
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criminal acts, minor rule breaking, or even just failure to fully live up to 
their responsibilities were at least partly causal factors in suicide. In one 
particularly tragic example, a private who harboured ambitions of 
progression was so distraught at having been found at parade to be missing a 
button and ordered to turn out again he, ‘returned to the barracks, loaded his 
pistol with two of his cuff buttons, and shot himself.
541
 Some of the soldier 
accounts of campaigning in the Peninsular War, though they exhibit a kind 
of gleeful exuberance in plundering, particularly of food, nonetheless 
express remorse, or a sense of shame at having resorted to theft.
542
 Though, 
as Daly suggests, there are good reasons to question that remorse in the 
context of reminiscences intended for public consumption, Coss also gives 
examples of soldiers expressing a similar sense of shame and remorse in 
letters to their families. 
543
  
Conclusion 
In many respects, the soldier’s experience of property crime and 
crimes of dishonesty was very similar to that of his civilian counterpart. 
Soldiers and civilians often stole very similar items, and under very similar 
circumstances.
544
 As with their civilian counterparts, soldiers were far more 
likely to be tried for property crime than for violent crime, and the 
prevalence of fabrics, food and small personal items as commonly noted 
targets for theft, holds true across both the civilian and military justice 
records. The manner in which thefts occurred also seem very similar, with 
many of the same concerns about ‘moral ownership’ apparent in civilian 
conceptions of ‘perquisites’ and soldiers’ sense of ownership of their 
uniforms and other regimental necessaries.
545
 Drawn from and often living 
among civilians, soldiers shared some of the same cultural assumptions and 
opportunities for petty theft, and indeed were at times victims of the same 
by both civilian thieves and fellow soldiers.  
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In some ways, however, the soldier experience can be seen to have 
been distinct from that of the civilian. Soldiers were less likely to be tried 
for acts of fraud or counterfeiting offences, with such crimes far more 
prevalent as a percentage of property crime in the civil justice records than 
in the courts martial records. Though these findings can only be tentative, 
the soldier’s sense of himself as distinct from his civilian peers, by virtue of 
his profession, may have reduced the likelihood of violent acts of theft 
against civilians, with such actions transgressing against the informal group 
codes of behaviour which were a vital part of soldier service. On the other 
hand, those same codes of behaviour seem both to have justified non-violent 
crime against civilians, particularly where food and alcohol were concerned, 
and also increased the likelihood of group offending when violence was 
used.
546
  
Army life can also be seen to have provided specific opportunities 
for some kinds of property crime:  the theft of military goods and materials, 
for example, which, as Chapter Seven will explore, found ready buyers in 
the civilian world, and the offence of bounty jumping, which had no clear 
equivalent in the civilian sphere.  It is also clear, that in some ways the 
soldier experience of property crime and crimes of dishonesty was 
differentiated by rank.  In general terms the rates of offending were far 
lower for NCOs than for privates, though they appear to have been at a 
similar level of risk as victims of theft. That said, NCOs seem to have been 
far more likely to commit fraud offences, with the exception of bounty 
jumping, which appears primarily to have been an offence committed by the 
rank and file.  
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Chapter Six: Opportunity and Risk - The NCO Experience of Crime 
 
Introduction 
So far we have primarily considered a general, soldier experience of 
crime in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British army; an 
experience which was broadly similar for men serving as privates and non-
commissioned officers. Despite this similarity between the experiences of 
privates and NCOs, there are also some distinctions to be drawn.  
As a distinct class of soldier in the British army, NCOs have 
received surprisingly little academic attention. Much of the work that has 
been done in this area has primarily been from an operational or institutional 
perspective, as a very small section, or minor mention in a greater work, 
with the focus on the mechanisms and systems of pay and promotion.
547
 
There are very few studies which focus on NCOs as a separate class of 
soldier, worthy in their own right of either a full study, or a substantial 
dedicated chapter in a larger work.  
Two notable exceptions to this are Divall’s study of life in the 30th, 
in which a chapter is dedicated to ‘The Backbone of the Regiment’, and 
examines the particular roles of NCOs and the individual service histories of 
several NCOs in the regiment, including all the colour sergeants, and J. D. 
Ellis’s ‘Promotion within the ranks of the British Army: a study of the non-
commissioned officers of the 28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment of 
Foot at Waterloo.’, which, along with an examination of  NCO rank, 
considers who the men chosen for promotion were, where they had come 
from in terms of occupation and class, why they were selected and the 
qualities they brought to the role.
548
 Though the seemingly common 
experience of demotion as a result of rule breaking or criminal activity has 
been explored in detail, particularly by Divall, other ways in which rank 
changed the NCO experience of crime remain to be understood. 
The statistical analysis of courts martial registers in Chapter Four 
showed NCOs to be disproportionately present as victims of violence and 
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threat, and the violence they faced appeared often to be directly related to 
their roles as NCOs. Chapter Five showed NCOs to be disproportionately 
present as perpetrators of fraud and embezzlement, and the kinds of fraud 
they engaged in again seem often to have been directly related to their 
responsibilities as NCOs.  In this chapter we will consider the roles of 
NCOs and how entry into the NCO ranks may have altered the soldier’s 
experience of crime. 
 
Defining Non-Commissioned Officers 
As a starting point it is important to understand what non-
commissioned officers were, the roles they played within regimental 
communities, and also the place that promotion to a non-commissioned 
officer rank held on the career path of serving soldiers. As with many 
aspects of the British army in this period, this is complicated by the 
idiosyncratic nature of regiments and the somewhat organic fashion in 
which the British military developed across the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Definitions changed across time and were different in different 
parts of the service.  
The simplest definition of a non-commissioned officer was an 
officer who did not hold a commission from the king; however, some such 
officers were classed as ‘warrant’ or ‘staff’ officers rather than non-
commissioned officers. According to Captain George Smith’s Universal 
Military Dictionary from 1779, warrant officers were those officers who 
had, ‘no commissions, only warrants from such boards or persons, who 
[were] authorised by the King to grant them’, while staff officers were ‘the 
quarter-master general, and the adjutant general [in time of war only]; also 
the quarter-masters, adjutants, surgeons  and chaplains of regiments’.549 
Non-commissioned officers were separately listed and defined as ‘serjeant-
majors, quarter-master-serjeants,  serjeants, corporals, drum and fife-majors, 
who are nominated by their respective captains and appointed by the 
                                                     
549
 Captain George Smith, An universal military dictionary, or a copious 
explanation of the technical terms &c. Used in the equipment, machinery, 
movements, and military operations of an army. By Capt. George Smith, Inspector 
of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich (Whitehall: J. Millan, 1779), p. 201.  
187 
 
 
 
commanding-officers of the regiments’.550 A much earlier military 
dictionary from the beginning of the eighteenth century had no listing for 
non-commissioned officers, instead defining ‘warrant and staff officers’, as 
those without a commission from the king, but who were ‘appointed by the 
Colonels and Captains, as Quarter-masters, Serjeants, Corporals: And in the 
same Number [...were...] included Chaplains and Surgeons.’551  
Clearly by the broad definition, officers without a commission 
included a range of roles, only some of which involved relationships of 
immediate authority and command and only some of which were generally 
accessible through promotion from the ranks. Indeed, in some cases, such as 
that of the quartermaster rank, the position was in some regiment types 
considered a very senior NCO rank, and in others a junior officer position 
usually held by someone with the rank of lieutenant.
552
 To confuse matters 
further, the quartermaster had a different function in cavalry regiments, 
where each troop quartermaster was responsible for forage and oversight of 
the care of horses as well as training men in the care of them.
553
   
At the other end of the scale, it is arguable to what extent a lance 
corporal could be properly described as an NCO: this was a nominal rank 
applied to a private who was acting in the role of corporal.
554
 It is generally 
considered to have been the lowest NCO rank and as such will be included 
in this section, alongside the NCO rank of corporal and its equivalent in the 
artillery regiments, bombardier. Similarly, the rank of lance sergeant 
referred to a corporal who was acting in the role of sergeant.  
                                                     
550
 Smith, Universal Dictionary,, p. 201.  
551
J. W. Esq.,  A military dictionary, explaining all difficult terms in martial 
discipline, fortification and gunnery. Useful For all Persons that read the Publick 
News, or serve in the Armies, or Militia, for the true understanding the Accounts of 
Sieges, Battles, and other Warlike Occurrences, 4
th
 edition,  (London : printed for 
T. Read, [1730?] )   
552
Charles James, The Regimental Companion: Containing the Pay, Allowances 
and Relative Duties of Every Officer in the British Service, Volume 2 (London: 
Military Library, 1811), p. 126; also ‘Military Officers, Non-Commissioned 
Officers & Rank and File Soldiers’, The Lachlan & Elizabeth Macquarie Archive 
(LEMA), at <http://www.lib.mq.edu.au/digital/lema/military/officers-and-
soldiers.html#s> {Accessed 15 August 2014] 
553
 James, Regimental Companion, Volume 1, pp. 126-7. 
554
 Though most military dictionaries and treatises from this period refer to 
corporals as full but junior NCOs, some publications such as the Regimental 
Companion, seem to separate them from NCOs; as with the sub heading: 
‘Punishments usually exercised in the British Service on Non-Commissioned 
Officers and Corporals’: James, Regimental Companion,  p. 454 
188 
 
 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, we will be taking the later definition 
of NCOs as separate from warrant and staff officers: so lance corporals, 
corporals, and lance sergeants as junior NCOs, sergeants and colour 
sergeants as senior NCOs and sergeant majors and quartermaster sergeants 
as high ranking NCOs.
555
 Broadly speaking, the high ranking NCOs 
operated at a battalion or regimental level, with, for example, only a single 
sergeant major per battalion and a single quartermaster sergeant per 
regiment, while the senior and junior NCOs operated at troop and company 
levels, with around thirty corporals and thirty sergeants per regiment.
556
 The 
focus of this chapter will primarily be upon these junior and senior ranks of 
NCO.  
The highest ranking NCO in each regiment was the sergeant major, 
sometimes referred to as the regimental sergeant major (RSM). The RSM 
had managerial oversight of the NCOs in his battalion, or regiment, with 
responsibility for their conduct, power of arrest of sergeants and a great deal 
of influence with regimental officers as to their appointments. The RSM 
also had responsibility for the battalion’s duty rosters, as well as ensuring 
that the NCOs and men were competent in drill and manoeuvres.  A good 
RSM was a valuable resource for regimental officers, both in terms of their 
managerial duties, and their military experience: a particular concern for 
younger, inexperienced subalterns who were usually trained in drill by the 
RSM.
557
 
Beneath the RSM were around thirty sergeants, depending on the 
number of companies in the regiment, most of whom performed the 
standard duties of a sergeant, with oversight and governance of the men in 
their companies. The sergeant’s role, like that of most NCOs can be broken 
down into two distinct halves: they had a particular part to play in battlefield 
and parade formation, and they acted as the present officers for their 
companies in camp, garrison, billet and marches. For the purposes of this 
chapter, their role off the battlefield is of most interest. Much of the day to 
day activity of soldiers was directed, overseen and modified by sergeants, 
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following the regulations and orders laid down for them by the regimental 
officers. Sergeants maintained the order of their companies, checking each 
man’s necessaries, noting down any absences, and reporting on all aspects 
of the company as a whole and the men as individuals.
558
  
Sergeants needed to be literate, though some barely qualified as 
such, as they supplied many of the daily reports which formed the basis of 
the regiment’s accounts and records. There were also several specialist 
positions, such as drill sergeant, pay master sergeant, and armourer sergeant, 
which were carried out by sergeants, usually for additional pay, and 
primarily having proved themselves in their rank. These were appointments 
rather than increases in rank; however, they were seen as a kind of 
promotion, or at least recognition of merit.
559
 
Assisting the sergeants, and providing an NCO presence in their 
absence, such as at meal times when the sergeants would mess separately, 
were the corporals. As sergeants were to the company, the corporal was to 
the squad. Defined by James as ‘a rank and file man with superior pay to 
that of the common soldiers, and with a nominal rank under a sergeant’, the 
corporal had ‘charge of one of the squads’, and had the duty of placing and 
relieving sentries, keeping order in the guard, assembling his squad for 
inspection and preparing lists for the orderly sergeant for use in completing 
muster rolls.
560
 
 
Career Prospects 
For some soldiers, particularly those with literacy skills, army 
careers would have included the prospect of promotion to non-
commissioned officer status.
561
 According to Brumwell’s study of British 
soldiers serving in America during the Seven Years War and Cookson’s 
analysis of regimental life in the British army during the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, roughly one soldier in six achieved promotion to NCO 
ranks.
562
 For ordinary-ranking soldiers, opportunities for promotion ran 
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along a chain of command beginning with lance corporal or corporal and 
culminating in the advanced sergeant ranks.  It should be remembered 
though, that the higher up that chain of promotion we look, the further away 
from the ordinary ranker’s experience we move and the less precarious the 
positions seem.  The high-ranking sergeant positions such as RSM and 
Quarter-Master Sergeant placed soldiers much closer to their commissioned 
superiors and they were generally treated as such by the military justice 
system, with higher ranking NCOs facing charges most often tried at GCM 
level and very unlikely to suffer corporal or degrading punishment.  
It was also possible for soldiers to progress from the highest levels 
of NCO rank to the commissioned officer ranks, usually through promotion 
during active service; but, such a jump in status was often a fraught affair, 
and though some commanding officers were very supportive, it was actively 
disliked as a practice by many. According to Strachan, while on the one 
hand, the commanding officer of the 92nd, ‘is said to have threatened to 
resign’ unless he was allowed to ‘reward deserving NCOs with 
commissions’, on the other hand, ‘Wellington, the military press and the 
punishment commission were all reluctant to encourage promotion from the 
ranks’.563 This reluctance may not have been entirely misplaced in all cases: 
Colonel Mountain, despite his reputation as ‘the archetypal soldier- 
philanthropist’, eight of whose officers were originally from the ranks, 
considered that their presence had been disruptive to the regiment, and, 
‘reluctantly concluded that, “in nine cases out of ten a bad officer is made 
out of a good sergeant”’.564  
It was also, for many NCOs a very unattractive prospect: for a 
soldier to reach the rank of sergeant-major required many years of service 
and promotion to the lowest officer rank of ensign put them side by side 
with men who were much younger, often inexperienced, but socially 
superior. One regimental colonel, reflecting on his RSM being given the 
commission, claimed that ‘promotion from the ranks is bad in every way; 
bad for the officers who get a vulgar set amongst them [...], for the men who 
love little indulgences which other officers can give, and [...the former 
NCO...] cannot afford’, and worst of all, it seemed, for the former NCO, 
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who once promoted, was moved ‘out of a sphere from which [he] was 
calculated and into one for which [he was] not’.565 Commission also 
required the former NCO to invest heavily in his new position, turning an 
apparent pay increase into a drop in income in real terms.
566
  Not only did 
promotion move the NCO into a different social class, it effectively carried 
a financial penalty.  
As a side point, it is worth also remembering that for many such 
NCOs a change in social standing would also have had an impact on their 
families, changing their position within the regimental ‘family’ and altering 
their social circle. In the advice offered to Private soldiers, non-
commissioned officers and candidates for commission, the author, ‘an 
officer from the ranks’, set out the potential difficulties for the former 
NCO’s family: 
But if you (as a Sergeant Major or Quarter Master Sergeant) are 
a family man then [...] the difficulties which I have pointed out 
will not only apply to yourself, but to your wife and every 
member of your family. It is not one person who has to be newly 
moulded but four, or six [...] the husband has daily – hourly 
opportunities of improving himself – the wife and children but 
few. What would be forgiven by his generous mess-mates in the 
man, would perhaps not be tolerated in his domestic circle by 
refined and accomplished ladies [...] the married man feels for 
his partner and her little ones who are naturally more anxious 
for, and dependent on, social enjoyments.’567 
 
For all these reasons, along with a dearth at times of vacancies, for which 
competition among the existing officer class was fierce, a fairly small 
number of NCOs were commissioned: by the 1830s, NCOs accounted for 
around 20 commissions a year.
568
  
For most NCOs, the promotional journey began with corporal or 
lance corporal and ended at sergeant; though, for some it ended back at the 
private rank again.  The NCO status of corporals and sergeants once 
achieved was not fixed and retaining their position was contingent upon a 
number of factors, some within their own control and some not. The factor 
most within the soldier’s own control, was his behaviour and conduct: the 
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punishment of being ‘broken’ or ‘reduced to the ranks’ was far from 
uncommon, and indeed it was not unusual for a soldier to be promoted to 
NCO level, reduced to the ranks for an infraction and then regain their 
former position through later promotion.
569
  Cookson makes the point that 
promotion for enlisted men was often a precarious business and so rank, 
with all that word implies, was a much less secure matter for the lower 
ranking NCO than it was for his commissioned superiors.
570
  In his history 
of Wellington’s army, Sir Charles Oman considered that  many of those 
promoted for ‘an act of courage, or of quick cleverness’ during the 
Peninsular War, had to be reduced because of ‘some hopeless failing’ on the 
part of the new NCO.
571
 Sergeants and corporals were only ever a drunken 
fight, minor theft, or fraud away from being privates again. To add to that 
sense of rank insecurity NCO status could, until well into the nineteenth 
century, be removed entirely by the commanding officer’s decision, without 
recourse to a court martial.
572
 
In many ways, then, the relationship between an NCOs career 
progression and his experience of crime were closely linked, with clear 
implications for his sense of identity as a soldier and an authority figure. 
The rank of non-commissioned officer was often a temporary or intermittent 
one and the cultural identity and sense of status that rank allowed 
necessarily fluid.   
In many respects the position of an NCO was full of ambiguity and 
contradiction. Unlike even the lowest ranking commissioned officers, 
sergeants and corporals were not considered fundamentally and 
irreconcilably different from private soldiers. They were drawn from the 
ranks, could be returned to the ranks, and in many ways were still, if not 
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entirely part of the ranks then certainly attached to them.
573
 Corporals in 
particular were counted among the ‘Other Ranks’ in some sections of the 
official regimental returns, though they were listed separately in other 
sections.
574
 The language of military instruction and advice, both in official 
legislation and informal training literature, often makes a clear distinction 
between officers on the one hand and NCOs and privates on the other. In his 
seminal work on the administration and government of the army, published 
in the late nineteenth century, Clode considered that ‘the status and rights of 
the Non Commissioned Officers are the same as those of Private Soldiers 
not of Commissioned Officers’.575  
 At the same time, however, their roles as conduits of command 
authority, overseers of and instructors in soldier performance, and enforcers 
of regimental discipline, necessitated a degree of separation from the men. 
As such, NCOs, particularly sergeants, were subject to rules and guidelines 
that separated them from private soldiers, up to and including regulations 
against ‘fraternising’ with the men, and there was clearly a sense that they 
were separate from both the men and the officers.
576
  For the high level 
NCOs this put them far closer to officers than to the men, with regimental 
sergeant majors (RSM) having the particular duty to instruct new officers in 
matters of drill and exercise.
577
 In barracks and camps, senior NCOs had 
their own messes separate from the men and the commissioned officers.  
Senior NCOs stood between the commissioned officers and the men, both in 
terms of their social standing and their place in the chain of command. But 
they were also part of the body of men, which as Cookson suggests 
‘constituted a hierarchy of status and achievement’. 578  
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Such ambiguity was reflected in experiences of crime and military 
justice. Unlike commissioned officers, NCOs could be tried by regimental 
court martial and could be sentenced to demotion and corporal punishment, 
and it is noticeable in the courts martial samples that the sentence of 
reduction to the ranks was often accompanied by a sentence of flogging.  
Steppler suggests that the army was always ‘very careful to break its non-
commissioned officers first, before flogging them’; however, ‘there were to 
be no mistaken ideas as to their true social status’.579 
Yet, as Divall points out in her study of the 30th Regiment, there 
was often a clear reluctance on the part of regimental officers to carry out 
such a sentence for fear of undermining regimental discipline, particularly 
when the offender was a sergeant. In the case of the 30th, that part of the 
sentence was ‘always altered to [...] solitary confinement’ and ‘no sergeant 
was sent to the halberds’.  In Divall’s study NCOs were also far more likely 
to be acquitted or pardoned than soldiers of the private rank, except when 
facing charges of drunkenness.
580
  
The regimental returns of the three regiments suggest that this 
reluctance to inflict corporal punishment on NCOs applied fairly widely. 
The 33rd recorded trials for two NCOs, a sergeant and a corporal, both of 
which resulted in a sentence of reduction, and both of whom were then 
pardoned.  The 34th recorded six trials of NCOs, three of which ended in 
acquittal, and only one resulted in corporal punishment.  Finally, the 37th 
recorded seven trials of NCOs, five resulting in sentences of reduction only, 
and two in sentences of reduction and corporal punishment. In both cases 
the corporal punishment was remitted. The only example from the three sets 
of regimental returns, of an NCO suffering corporal punishment, involved a 
Sergeant Halmeshaw,  of  the 34th, who had overstepped his authority in 
allowing two privates to be subjected to summary justice at the hands of 
their fellows, and who had already faced an RCM twelve days earlier for 
another incident in which he had confined a private without proper authority 
and out of personal animosity.
581
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 In contrast, the sampled years of the GRCM register show very little 
of this tendency, with NCOs seemingly no less likely than privates to 
receive sentences of corporal punishment and no more likely to be pardoned 
or have sentences of corporal punishment remitted. This may reflect the 
increased seriousness attached to offences for them to be heard at the higher 
level of court martial, or the increased likelihood that such trials involved 
repeat offenders. That said, it may also reflect a lack of recording in 
instances of ‘dramatic last minute reprieves’.582  
Pragmatic concerns about the internal discipline of the regiment may 
not have been the sole consideration in these decisions, however, with 
personal relationships between officers and sergeants likely playing a part in 
some cases. In Edward Costello’s tale of the adventures of Tom Plunkett, he 
relates an incident in which Plunkett, newly promoted to the rank of 
sergeant and having engaged in gross insubordination as a result of being 
very drunk, was tried by RCM and sentenced to be reduced and flogged. 
Costello explains that, whilst Plunkett was ‘a general favourite [...] his 
insubordination was too glaring to stand a chance of being passed over’, 
clearly implying that had his offence been less serious, he may well have 
escaped corporal punishment because he was a ‘favourite’.  Plunkett, 
described by Costello as ‘the bravest soldier of [the] battallion’, was clearly 
respected and well-liked, both by the men and the officers, so much so that 
as word of his sentence spread, ‘there was a general sorrow felt for him 
throughout the regiment, particularly on account of the corporal 
punishment’. And Costello suggests that ‘[i]n this feeling [...]the officers 
participated almost as much as the men’.  The buglers, whose task it was to 
see Plunkett stripped and bound to a tree for his punishment, ‘seemed to 
hesitate’, and as Colonel Beckwith ordered them to ‘do their duty’, his voice 
was ‘husky with emotion’.583 
 
NCO authority and regimental culture 
Though their authority was heavily circumscribed, NCOs and 
sergeants in particular, had the power to make the lives of the soldiers under 
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them more or less agreeable, or unpleasant.
584
  They were the conduits and 
enforcers of regimental authority and the most immediately present face of 
such authority for the men of their companies. The potentially negative 
impact of an NCO on the service experience of individual soldiers can be 
seen in some of the prisoner defence statements in deserter trials.  Richard 
Cousins, of Colonel Hodgson’s Regiment, for example, was tried in 1758 
for his third desertion and in his defence claimed that that his sergeant ‘used 
him ill’ always putting him in mind of his former offences and calling him 
‘a dirty soldier.’585 A series of incidents recalled by the former private 
soldier who rose through the ranks to an army commission similarly 
demonstrates the power of NCOs during this period. Private Soldiers, Non-
commissioned Officers and Candidates for Commission, was written in 
1847, and offered advice to soldiers based on the author’s own experiences 
of twenty-five years of service in the army.  Recalling incidents he 
witnessed during the early part of his career, the author assures his readers 
that the quality of NCOs has much improved and that men entering the 
service at the time of writing were unlikely to find themselves victims of 
such abuses of power. 
586
  
Nonetheless, he sets out some of the ways in which NCOs could still 
affect the quality of life, career progression and experiences of discipline 
and justice of private soldiers: ‘The Sergeant or Corporal may give the 
soldier some petty annoyance in his barrack room; or he may undermine his 
character for a time, or perhaps manage to establish an apparently serious 
charge against him’. With what seems a rather naive assertion, the author 
reassures his readers that ‘truth must triumph in the end’.  Even so, the 
examples he gives of overbearing and ‘tyrannical’ NCO behaviour towards 
privates are quite shocking: a corporal  ‘knocking down a young soldier 
with his fist, saying he "would teach him to behave himself" and afterwards 
putting his victim in the black hole, and getting him six days' pack drill, for 
insubordinate conduct’, and ‘A Drill Sergeant striking another recruit at drill 
across the knuckles with his cane ; and then confining the lad in the guard 
room for dropping his firelock, which he could not hold, because of the pain 
                                                     
584
As with Burroughs suggestion that many men were provoked into criminal 
action by ‘vindictive NCOs’:  Burroughs, p. 551 
585
 WO 71/45, Trial of Richard Cousins,  6 Dec 1758.  
586
 Anon., Private Soldiers, p. 18. 
197 
 
 
 
occasioned by the blow’. In his advice to non-commissioned officers, the 
author warns against engaging with men who were drunk or in a rage, 
detailing some of the ways in which NCOs could provoke men into losing 
their temper; a dangerous thing indeed given the potential for severe or even 
capital punishment:  
Many a man has been goaded on to the perpetration of some 
dreadful crime, which he never would think of in his cool and 
sober moments, merely through the indiscretion or ill temper of 
a Sergeant or Corporal. [...] I saw one man hung, and another 
shot, both of the same regiment ; and it is to be feared that in 
each case, the horrid catastrophe might have been prevented, by 
a little more good sense and forbearance on the part of the non-
commissioned officers concerned.’587 
 
Such incidents, we are told, characterised NCO behaviour far more 
during the early part of the author’s career than in later years, as there had 
been a ‘vast improvement in the non-commissioned officers’, which he 
considered to be primarily due to ‘the men of the present day, being more 
enlightened, and partly to the improved system of governing the army’.  If 
the author is to be believed, however, for much of our period, ‘a non-
commissioned officer was expected to be a tyrant or a bully’. Whether this 
assessment is fair, is difficult to say. Certainly, in the memoirs of soldiers, 
and the popular imaginary of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the figure of the sergeant in particular looms larger than life and carries 
many connotations of bullying and bluster. Though liked and even loved 
sergeants, such as Plunkett, also feature heavily.  
As mentioned in Chapter Five, however, it is important also to 
remember the role played by commissioned officers in creating regimental 
cultures, and setting the standard for behaviour, and our anonymous ‘Officer 
from the Ranks’ makes this aspect of NCO authority clear, noting that ‘such 
little feats will not be so much wondered at’, given that they were 
‘performed almost simultaneously’ with a series of very similar incidents of 
harsh and arbitrary punishment by commissioned officers.
588
 
Perhaps more than any other time in their careers, in the early stages 
of the soldier’s recruitment and training, the NCOs were the face of the 
regiment for the new recruit and abuses of power could have a profound 
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effect on the soldier’s initial experiences of army life.589 Of all the cultural 
images of the NCO, those of the recruiting sergeant and the drill sergeant 
seem the most potent. Farquhar’s 1706 play, The Recruiting Officer, was 
restaged and reprinted many times over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and the character of Sergeant Kite was a significant element of the 
popular perception of recruiting sergeants as untrustworthy predators.
590
 
Men could be and often were hustled into enlisting by the NCOs of 
recruiting parties, through the judicious application of alcohol and bravado, 
sometimes to the extent that men were kept in a state of intoxication until 
their cooling off period had elapsed and they were irrevocably enlisted.
591
 
Once enlisted, the new recruit, unfamiliar with the expectations and rules by 
which his service was governed, was peculiarly vulnerable to unscrupulous 
NCOs. 
In his analysis of British army recruitment in the period 1807 to 
1813, Linch details several ways in which the recruitment process could be 
subverted for personal gain by NCOs, at the expense of new recruits, 
including an example of a corporal defrauding new recruits of their 
marching money and extracting loans from what little remained of their 
bounties after the initial flurry of enlistment drinking.
592
 Early training for 
recruits and acclimatisation to army life was very much in the hands of 
corporals and sergeants, and army authorities along with informed 
commentators recognised this as a key factor in the high levels of desertion 
amongst new recruits.
593
  
Alongside the direct impact of their own behaviour and attitude 
towards new recruits, NCOs played an important role in setting the tone in 
companies and their constituent squads. While sergeants generally messed 
separately from the men, corporals provided an NCO presence at meal 
times, which, depending on the individual qualities of corporals and their 
relationships with the men, could make the difference between an orderly 
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and harmonious mess and a bear pit of bullying and peer pressure. 
Cuthbertson’s System for the Complete Interior Management and 
Oeconomy of a Battallion of Infantry, emphasised the importance of NCOs 
creating, ‘an early liking for the Corps’, in recruits and advised that, along 
with ensuring that the recruit had, ‘a good, old Soldier appointed for his 
comrade’, NCOs were, ‘to be watchful, that he is treated kindly by his mess-
mates, and that they do not endeavour to impose on him’.594 
Alongside the role of NCOs in supporting formal regimental 
discipline, they clearly also played their part in fostering or supporting 
informal strategies for group discipline amongst soldiers. We have already 
seen in Chapter Five that soldiers often preferred to deal with petty theft, for 
example, within their own companies, in the manner described by Shipp, 
and for many other infractions of their codes of behaviour through 
ostracism.
595
 In the Regimental Companion, James described a semi-formal 
expression of company discipline, which he called a ‘[t]roop or company 
court martial’ and which most likely preceded the decision to inflict 
punishment in cases like that described by Shipp. According to James, these 
company courts martial would ‘assemble and punish delinquents for small 
offences, by the permission of the Captain’, and would follow a very similar 
format to that of a RCM, with ‘the president being a serjeant, and the court 
consisting of one corporal and three privates’.  This expression of internal 
discipline was clearly taken very seriously by the soldiers and NCOs, who 
kept minutes of the proceedings, which they handed to the captain for him 
to ‘sanction or annul’ the ‘court’s’ decision.596 
Sometimes, though, the NCO’s role in supporting informal strategies 
could be damaging, and effectively acted to endorse bullying behaviour 
among the men. The one instance noted above, of an NCO in the 34
th
 being 
subjected to corporal punishment, concerned a sergeant who was found 
guilty of, ‘conniving at and authorizing [...two soldiers...] to be privately 
and degradingly punished in their Barrack Room’, for having transgressed 
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an agreement made by the men not to go to the company canteen for their 
meat.
597
  
There were many good, competent and humane NCOs, who were 
able to navigate their peculiar position within the regimental system and 
maintain order and discipline without recourse to brutality and petty 
tyranny. With the theoretical requirements for literacy as a necessary skill 
for NCOs, their recollections form the mainstay of non-officer, soldier 
memoirs from this period, and many of those memoirs demonstrate an acute 
understanding of the dangers of such tyranny, often gained during the early 
years of their service.
598
  But the potential ramifications of an overbearing 
NCO for the soldiers under them, both in terms of company cultures  and 
individual interactions, were a serious matter and may go some way to 
explaining the apparently common phenomenon of violent assaults and 
threats towards NCOs by lower ranking soldiers.                 
NCOs in the GRCM, RCM and GCM samples   
 Wellington’s contention that NCOs were ‘as little to be depended 
upon as the private soldiers themselves’ and the tendency noted above for 
them to lose their rank for various infractions give an impression of NCOs, 
and sergeants in particular, as an unruly and incorrigible bunch.
599
 But as 
Oman suggests, ‘the ideal sergeant was not infrequently found’, and the 
general expectation that they should be chosen from among the best soldiers 
seems generally borne out by their infrequent appearance in the courts 
martial samples.
600
 
Of the 1547 trial listings in the GRCM, only 56 concerned a 
defendant of non-commissioned officer rank, putting them at just under 4% 
of the whole.  This works out at roughly one NCO defendant for every 27 
privates.  In most regiments there were roughly six NCOs per company and 
companies could range from 30 to 100 privates. This meant there was 
usually one NCO for every 17 privates, and as such their presence in the 
GRCM register is lower than might be expected based purely on their 
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relative numbers in the service.
601
  Breaking down the GRCM sample 
further shows that some NCO ranks are more present than others. 
Altogether there were 34 junior NCOs: 10 acting, or lance corporals and 
bombadiers, two lance sergeants and 24 full corporals and bombardiers. By 
comparison and with very similar numbers in the service, there were only 22 
senior NCOs:  18 sergeants and four colour sergeants.
602
 
 In the two year sample from the GCM register, there is a higher 
presence of NCOs, possibly reflecting the greater likelihood of NCO 
offenders being tried at the higher level. At a little over 6% of defendants in 
the GCM sample, or one NCO for every 16 privates, this seems much more 
in keeping with their numbers in the service.
603
  
Taking the regimental returns alongside these results suggests a low 
NCO presence in courts martial overall. Altogether, for the period 
November 1818 to October 1819, the 34th Regiment returned 110 trial 
listings, of which four were GRCM trials and the remaining 106 RCM. Of 
the 110 listings, six concern NCO defendants, with two of those acquitted 
and one tried twice for separate offences. There are 104 listings for privates, 
of whom four were acquitted, one was tried on four separate occasions, four 
were tried three times, and a further four tried twice. From the GCM register 
there are a further three listings for the 34th,
 
all concerning soldiers of the 
private rank,  of which only one concerned a soldier not also listed among 
the defendants in the RCM returns.  
Therefore out of a complement of 816 privates and drummers, 90, or 
a little over 11% were convicted that year by RCM, GRCM, or GCM, 
compared to five NCOs out of a complement of 91, or a little over 5%.  The 
33rd shows a similar disparity, with a little under 9% of the rank and file 
convicted of offences, compared to just over 3% of NCOs. The 37th shows 
a different picture, with only 7.5% of the rank and file convicted of offences 
and 11% of NCOs; however, only one of the NCOs was convicted of a 
criminal offence, with the remaining six convicted of drunkenness. It is also 
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worth noting that NCO presence in the 37th return is heavily clustered into 
December and January: five of the six NCO convictions for drunkenness 
were tried during these two months.
604
  
Though seemingly less likely than the privates under them to 
commit crimes or military offences serious enough to warrant a court 
martial, many aspects of the NCO experience of crime and military justice 
were broadly similar to that of privates. Like privates, NCOs were more 
likely to face regulatory than criminal charges, and they were more likely to 
be tried for property crimes than for violent offences. The common feature 
of drunkenness similarly suggests a common experience, with charges of 
being drunk on duty prevalent for both privates and NCOs.  Looking at the 
regulatory charges, it is clear that in many cases there is little difference 
between the kinds of regulatory offences committed by privates and NCOs: 
charges such as ‘Absent from the Guard & getting Drunk‘, preferred against 
Sergeant John Clarke, of the 64th
 
in February 1816, were no different to 
charges of being ‘Absent from Parade & also Drunk’, preferred in February 
1813, against James Greenham, a gunner in the Royal Artillery.
605
 Indeed, 
in several cases we can see NCOs and privates acting together in 
disobedience and regulatory offences, and facing identical charges: a 
GRCM case from Mauritius, in 1814, for example, had two privates, two 
sergeants and a corporal from the 22nd all tried together for ‘Drunkenness 
& bad conduct on a march & losing their Regimentals’.606  
Despite many similarities, there are some differences in how NCOs 
present in terms of regulatory offences, which underline both the authority 
NCOs were expected to hold and the ease with which that authority could 
slip. Though charges of drunkenness seem a common factor for both, NCOs 
also faced charges for having allowed men to drink, or accompanied them in 
their drinking. Corporal John McCole, for example, of the 26th, was tried by 
GRCM in January 1819, for being, ‘Drunk on duty’ and for   ‘permitting 
men on Guard to get drunk’.607  And while desertion-related offences do 
feature in the NCO experience, they appear far less likely than privates to 
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have been tried for desertion. Whereas over half of the privates tried at 
GRCM during the sampled years were charged with desertion, only a fifth 
of NCO defendants faced such charges. Given the apparent propensity for 
many recruits and new soldiers to desert, or attempt to desert, early on in 
their army career, it is likely that this has skewed the figures for private 
soldiers deserting and this may account for some of the disparity between 
NCOs and privates. If the most likely time for a soldier to desert was during 
the early weeks and months after enlistment, then the corollary of this would 
seem to be that the least likely time for a soldier to desert was at the height 
of his army career. 
608
 
That said, whilst desertion was far less common among more 
experienced soldiers and NCOs than among privates and new soldiers, 
where such cases did occur they appear to have followed a very similar 
pattern of behaviour. With only 12 examples from the GRCM register of 
NCOs deserting, three from the GCM sample and none from the regimental 
returns, it is very difficult to compare patterns of NCO desertion with 
broader patterns of soldier desertion, particularly as all three GCM cases 
and five of the GRCM cases offer only the simple charge of desertion. The 
seven remaining cases where other charges or additional details have been 
recorded, suggest some similarities though: in two cases the deserting NCOs 
made away with their necessaries and in a third with regimental money, and 
in four cases the charges of desertion were accompanied by charges of 
fraud. 
NCOs and Property Crime 
The overall levels of property crime and fraud appear very similar 
for NCOs as for privates. A little over 40% of the NCOs tried by GRCM 
during the six years sampled were charged with some form of theft, fraud or 
embezzlement. Similarly, around 37% of privates faced charges of this 
nature. NCO property crimes were more prominent at GCM level: a little 
over 30% of privates faced theft or fraud charges, compared to around 50% 
of NCOs. At RCM level, though, there was only a single example across all 
three sets of regimental returns of an NCO facing such charges, compared to 
around a third of privates.  
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A close examination of these charges again shows both similarities 
and differences.  Both privates and NCOs were charged with ‘making away 
with’ their own necessaries, though it was much more prevalent for privates.  
If we take away those charges related to making away with the soldier’s 
own necessaries or clothing and consider acts of theft, possession of stolen 
articles, fraud and embezzlement, NCOs were far more likely to face such 
charges than were privates. Overall, around 10% of privates tried by GRCM 
faced such charges, compared to just under 40% of NCO defendants.   
In terms of the kinds of behaviours the charges demonstrate, again 
we can see some similarities, but also some clear differences. The NCO and 
private experiences as perpetrators of simple theft seem broadly similar and 
were differentiated only by the prevalence of such crimes, which becomes 
very apparent when considering cases of NCOs and privates acting together, 
as Corporal Meacham and Private Dixon of the 95th did, when they 
‘plunder[ed] an inhabitant’, in St Simons, in March 1814, and as Lance 
Corporal Bergman and Private Matthias of the 1st Hussars did, when they 
were both ‘concerned in sheep stealing’, in March 1813.609   
As victims of theft, also, NCOs do not seem unusually prevalent 
within the register, appearing roughly as often as privates and commissioned 
officers, and the kinds of theft they were victim to seem broadly similar to 
those experienced by privates.  
Where we begin to see a real difference in the NCO experience of 
property crime is when it comes to charges of fraud or embezzlement.  
Whilst the fraudulent activity of bounty jumping, which accounts for a 
possible 40% of fraud or embezzlement charges against privates, does not 
appear in charges against NCOs, NCOs were far more likely overall to be 
charged with fraud or embezzlement than were privates, and the kinds of 
charges they faced show the difference in opportunity that they had for such 
activities. Only 19, a little over 1%, of the trials of privates in the GRCM 
sample show charges of fraud or embezzlement, compared to roughly 23%, 
of trials of NCOs. Of the 19 privates, eight were soldiers who had deserted 
and reenlisted in other regiments. The remaining 11 faced more obvious 
fraud charges such as ‘Fraud and having in his possession several stolen 
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articles’, and ‘Desertion and drawing £2 fraudulently’, along with several 
cases in which the soldiers either passed counterfeit coins or were equipped 
with the means to make counterfeit coins and two cases of obtaining goods 
or money through fake certificates.  
Though several of the fraud cases involving NCOs were quite 
similar, a number of them show the different levels of opportunity open to 
them as part of their roles within the regimental structure. As respected and 
often trusted members of the regiment, sergeants and their subordinate 
corporals were entrusted with elements of company supply and finance, and 
from time to time this presented  a temptation too far: Sergeant Maloney, of 
the 57th, for example, was charged with ‘Misapplication of Pay money’ 
another sergeant from the Royal Artillery was charged with ‘Embezzling of 
£5..13..1 ½ Levy money’, and as we’ve already seen, two colour sergeants 
of the 57th were charged with ‘Embezzlement of Pay money, taking 
Discount from Tradesmen and charging the men extra for Necessaries’.610 
The one example from the 37th of an NCO convicted of a criminal offence 
was Sergeant Chapman, who was convicted of ‘Contracting Debts at 
Montreal on the account of the 1st Battn. Co., and Embezzling or 
misapplying the Money which he had received for the payment thereof’. 611 
 
Opportunities for fraud 
Along with opportunities to defraud their regiments and companies, 
some NCO’s roles offered opportunities to defraud the men under their 
command. Charging men extra for their necessaries, as the two colour 
sergeants from the 57th  did, was far from unusual, but there were many 
other ways for an NCO to enrich himself at his men’s expense. Of all the 
positions available to the NCO, the role of Pay Sergeant appears to have 
been a particularly lucrative one. The opportunities for self-enrichment 
afforded by such a role were manifold. Pay sergeants acted as conduits for 
supply of necessaries to the men, but they also engaged in other activities 
essential to the internal economies of regiments. According to Shipp: 
The post of pay-sergeant is certainly one of importance, and he 
who holds it a personage of no small consideration. He feeds 
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and clothes the men; lends them money at moderate interest and 
on good security; and sells them watches and seals, on credit, at 
a price somewhat above what they cost, to be sure, but the mere 
sight of which, dangling from a man's fob, has been known to 
gain him the character of a sober steady fellow, and one that 
should be set down for promotion.
612
  
 
A good and honest pay sergeant was a valuable member of the 
regimental community, aside from his formal role in distributing the men’s 
pay, he performed the essential service of assisting soldiers in their personal 
finances and provided access to small luxuries for those who sought and 
could afford them. But the potential for ‘chicanery’ was great and the 
victims of unscrupulous pay sergeants were often the men under their 
command, as John Mercier McMullen, a former staff sergeant makes clear 
in his guide to life in the army, Camp and Barrack Room, or the British 
Army as it is: 
When a man attains to the rank of pay-sergeant, it is almost 
unnecessary to say that his conduct should be guided in his 
pecuniary dealings with the men of his company, by the strictest 
honesty and most scrupulous integrity. Numbers, it is true, act 
quite the reverse of this, and endeavour to defraud those under 
their charge in every way that they think can possibly escape 
detection.
613
 
 
As noted earlier, interaction with recruits also provided opportunities 
for fraud, and while privates were also engaged in the recruitment process, 
this was an area in which NCOs played a particularly prominent role.
614
  
Describing his enlistment as a drummer at the age of ten, Shipp offers an 
insight into one of the ways an NCO might profit from a new recruit. 
Having been dressed in his new and rather ill-fitting regimental uniform, the 
young Shipp left his recently bought civilian clothes with the drum-major, 
who ‘put [...his...] leathers, &c. into his box, of which he took the key.’ One 
of the more established drummers asked Shipp if he knew where to sell his 
‘coloured clothes’, and offered to show him where to go and get the best 
deal. Shipp said he had left them with the drum major, and was sure that ‘of 
course the drum-major would either sell them for my benefit, or permit me 
                                                     
612
 Shipp, Military Bijou, pp. 115-16. 
613
 John Mercier McMullen, Camp and Barrack-Room, or the British Army as it is 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1846), p. 308. 
614
 Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army, p. 3; also, Strachan, Reform of the British 
Army, pp. 51-7. 
207 
 
 
 
to do it; and, if the latter, that I should be thankful for his kindness’. His new 
friend was less convinced, explaining to Shipp that ‘I know he has; but you 
see as how he has no business with them. Them there traps should be sold, 
and you get the money they brings; and if you don't keep your eye on the 
fugleman, he will do you out of half of them’.615 
There were also other ways for NCOs to profit from their positions, 
some of which will be discussed in Chapter Seven when we look at informal 
regimental economies and black markets, but it is important to bear in mind 
that the men who chose to engage in such profiteering were expected to 
shoulder a great deal of responsibility, for a very modest increase in wages. 
Indeed, as Strachan points out, with the development of good conduct 
awards, in the 1830s and 1840s, some sergeants were actually financially 
disadvantaged compared to corporals and privates.
616
 This disparity between 
the high level of additional responsibility and the low level of financial 
reward was recognised as a problem by army authorities. Wellington’s 
assessment of NCOs as no more reliable than the men under their command, 
was offered as an argument for increasing the pay and status of NCOs, with 
their lack of reliability considered a direct result of their lack of reward.
617
  
Returning to Cobbett’s recollections of life as an NCO in the 54th, in 
the 1780s, it is clear that, even for a lowly corporal, the level of 
responsibility and work required, particularly if given additional duties, 
could be very high: 
While I was Corporal I was made clerk to the regiment. In a 
very short time, the whole of the business in that way fell into 
my hands; and, at the end of about a year, neither adjutant, 
paymaster, or quarter-master, could move an inch without my 
assistance. The accounts and letters of the paymaster went 
through my hands; or, rather , I was the maker of them. All the 
returns, reports, and other official papers were of my drawing 
up
618 
 
Even the ordinary day to day duties of a corporal, without the additional 
clerk duties Cobbett took on, placed a great deal of responsibility onto the 
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shoulders of the men who held that rank, for which, as Cobbett explained, 
they received ‘twopence per diem , and a very clever worsted knot’ on their 
shoulder.
619
 Little wonder then, perhaps, that some of the men who were 
presented with opportunities for profit and fraud took those opportunities 
and found themselves in front of a court martial. 
 
NCOs and Violent Crime 
Given their low numbers compared to privates and the apparently 
low levels of violent crime amongst soldiers generally, it is not 
unreasonable to expect a very low number of NCO defendants on trial for 
violent crimes,
 
and certainly the figures for the sampled years of the GRCM 
register along with the returns for the 33rd, 34th and 37th seem to bear this 
out. Indeed, there were proportionately far fewer NCOs tried for violent 
offences than we might expect to see, based on their numbers in regiments.  
Though less present than privates in the records, however, the experience of 
NCOs as perpetrators of violent crime seems similar. In the GRCM samples 
there were only four examples of NCOs tried for violent offences, whilst 
none of the three regiments tried any NCOs for violent offences during the 
sampled year at RCM or GRCM level. At GCM level, across two years, 
there were five cases recorded of NCOs facing charges of violence.  
Of the four cases recorded in the GRCM register, three concern 
Lance Corporals, the lowest NCO rank, and arguably not a true NCO rank at 
all. In two of these cases, the violent offence accompanied other charges and 
in two cases the violence accompanied an act of theft: Lance Corporal 
Leonard, of the 69th, was tried in 1814, for ‘Theft and attempting the Life of 
a Private’; Lance Corporal Tolly Barry, of the 2nd, was tried in 1813, for 
being ‘Absent from Guard, drawing his Bayonet on Sergeant Ruslidge, 
abusive Language, &c’, and Lance Corporal Klages, of the 1st Hussars, was 
tried in 1814, for ‘Robbing a Comrade of one Dollar & sixteen Guineas’.620 
In Barry’s case, we can see that this fits the same pattern of resistance 
violence we might expect to see involving privates, focused as it was on a 
higher ranking NCO and accompanying a charge of absence, whilst the 
                                                     
619
Cobbett,  Progress of a Ploughboy: quoted in Holmes, Redcoat, p. 122. 
620
 WO 89/4. 
209 
 
 
 
combination of theft and violence in the other two cases also seems little 
different to similar cases involving private defendants.  The fourth example 
of an NCO facing charges of violence concerned a sergeant in the 66th, tried 
in 1826, for ‘Being absent from barracks and Illtreating a Female’.621 Again, 
in this case we see charges very similar in tone to some of the cases 
involving defendants of the private rank.   
Of the five NCOs listed in the GCM sample, four were corporals, 
and the fifth a sergeant. All but one of the corporals were involved in 
robberies, either directly or indirectly, and the sergeant was tried with one of 
the corporals, with both facing a charge of ‘abetting a robbery’. In only one 
case was violence clear and a victim given, and again this case fits the 
pattern of upwardly directed resistance violence noted for privates: Corporal 
John Stephen of the 4/60th in Demerara was tried in March 1819, for 
‘Striking a Serjeant’.622 
With so few examples to draw from, the registers can tell us very 
little about how NCOs may have experienced violent crime as perpetrators. 
It seems unlikely, for instance, that Lance Corporal Leonard was the only 
NCO across the six years sampled to have committed a violent act against a 
lower ranking soldier. Minor acts of violence or threat by NCOs against the 
men under their command were far less likely to result in a court martial 
than violent acts by privates against NCOs, in which case we cannot know 
for sure how much low level violence by NCOs went unrecorded, though 
there is evidence to suggest there was a good deal: certainly, in the 
execution of their duty, sergeants in particular could and did use physical 
chastisement. Tatum gives an example of a case, which demonstrates both 
the low level violence meted out by sergeants in the course of their duties 
and the potential for that to provoke a much more violent response by the 
men under them. In July 1759, Thomas Reid, a private serving in the 17th, 
in Albany, was beaten by his sergeant. He then seized the sergeant’s cane 
and ‘beat him with it until the cane broke’.623 It is worth noting, however, 
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that ‘striking and ill-treating a private’ was one of the offences for which an 
NCO could be confined and tried.
624
  
What we can say with reasonable certainty, is that NCOs were far 
less likely than privates to find themselves facing a court martial for charges 
of a violent nature, but those who did faced very similar charges, relating to 
very similar behaviours. 
 
The Dangers of Rank 
If the increased rank of an NCO gave him different temptations and 
opportunities for self-enrichment through fraud and embezzlement, it also 
made him far more likely to suffer violent assault, or threats of violence at 
the hands of other soldiers.  Out of 124 trials for violent offences recorded 
in the GRCM register, in which the victim is identifiable, over half 
concerned NCO victims, and there were twice as many NCO victims as 
there were privates and officers combined. Given the likelihood that a large 
percentage of that violence was a form of resistance to regimental authority, 
we might expect to see NCOs and company-level commissioned officers as 
victims proportionate to their numbers, but, whilst there were generally 
twice as many NCOs as officers in each company, there were four times as 
many recorded as victims in the GRCM register.
625
  
It may be, as explained in Chapter Four, that the increased 
seriousness with which the military viewed assaults on commissioned 
officers led to a greater proportion of such assaults being tried at the highest 
level of court martial, and therefore being far less present in the GRCM 
register. Looking at the two year GCM sample, this does seem to be borne 
out to a degree: there are four trial listings showing charges of violence 
against officers, and seven showing violence against NCOs. This is much 
more proportionate to their numbers in regiments.
626
 At RCM level, there 
were 10 charges of violence against NCOs, across the three regiments, but 
no charges of violence against officers.
627
 Taking all three sample sets 
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together, NCOs are disproportionately present in the records as victims of 
violence or threat.  
Given the particular roles of the various NCO ranks and their 
numbers within any one regiment, we would expect to find a disparity 
between their experiences of violent crime and their presence in the records 
as victims and this certainly seems to be the case here. High ranking NCOs, 
such as sergeant majors and quartermaster sergeants, whose level of day to 
day contact with individual soldiers was much lower than that of company 
sergeants and corporals, and who generally only numbered one per battalion 
or regiment, feature very rarely as victims of violence or threat. For the six 
sampled years of the GRCM register, there is only one example of a high-
ranking NCO victim, a sergeant major, who was subjected to a threat of 
violence rather than an act of violence.  
More surprising, given their roughly equal numbers within most 
regiments, is the difference between senior and junior NCOs. Junior NCOs 
account for a little over a third of the NCO victims in the GRCM sample, 
with senior NCOs accounting for almost two-thirds. Turning to the three 
sets of regimental returns, however, the picture is slightly different.  From 
September 1818 to October 1819, the 33rd
 
court-martialled three soldiers 
for violence against NCOs, with two cases involving corporals and the third 
an unspecified ‘non-commissioned officer’. The 34th tried seven soldiers 
for violence against five corporals, or lance corporals, one sergeant and one 
colour sergeant.  Finally, the 37th recorded a single instance of violence 
against both a sergeant and a lance sergeant, which was tried at GRCM level 
and included within the RCM returns.
628
  Taking the GRCM register and 
regimental returns together, it would seem that all NCOs of sergeant or 
lesser rank shared a high level of risk, but with senior NCOs outnumbering 
junior NCOs as victims of violence and threat.   
Looking in more detail at the individual cases we can see that in 
many instances, we are dealing with threats, rather than acts of violence. In 
the GRCM register sample there are 64 incidents of violence against NCOs, 
with 11 of those involving the threat of violence and five involving 
unsuccessful attempts at violence. Similarly, of the seven incidents recorded 
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by the 34th, two involved threats and one an attempt at violence. Across all 
the sampled records there were 30 examples of physical assault on senior 
NCOs, along with 11 threats or unsuccessful attempts at violent assault,  24 
examples of physical assault on junior NCOs, with seven threats or 
attempts, and no examples of physical assault against higher ranking NCOs, 
but four cases of threatened violence.   
By comparison, very few of the cases involving a victim of the 
private rank could be described as simple threats.  This may well reflect the 
less serious nature of personal disputes between soldiers of the same rank, 
as compared to disputes between soldiers and their superiors; however, it 
may also reflect different relationships of power and authority, with threats 
being used by soldiers as a way to express dissatisfaction and register 
disapproval, as part of a strategy of resistance or negotiation.
629
  
As mentioned in the discussion of soldier violence in Chapter Four, 
some caution needs to be employed when considering the nature of personal 
or professional disagreements between soldiers, whether they were of the 
same or different ranks. Courts martial records can offer some fascinating 
insights into many aspects of a soldier’s life and motivations, but they can 
only give a partial picture at best, and at worst a potentially misleading one. 
With the anonymous former private soldier’s advice in mind, we must 
consider that some of the violence that presents as specific or general 
resistance to regimental authority and boundaries may in fact represent 
personal resistance to the over stepping of their authority by NCOs. This is 
especially true of entries in registers and returns, in which there are usually 
very few details with which to contextualise violent acts or threats. But it is 
also a factor to consider when looking at more detailed records such as trial 
reports. In  ‘Murder in 42nd’, Robert Burnham explores one example of a 
murder which, on the basis of the trial report and Judge Advocate Larpent’s  
journal appears to be a simple, if extreme case of resistance violence 
towards a lieutenant of the regiment by a corporal under his command. 
Larpent’s journal entry, from 27th March 1813, describes the incident:  
[A] young corporal, M'Morran [...] was found fault with mildly 
by his officer, Lieutenant Dickinson, for neglect of duty ; he 
answered rather impertinently : he was then told to consider 
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himself a prisoner, and to follow. Having walked a few yards, 
Lieutenant Dickinson looked round, and the corporal, having 
(no one knows how) loaded his musket, levelled it at him, and 
shot him dead through the heart. [...]The officer was a man of 
mild, humane character. The corporal made no defence : it 
seemed an excess of Scotch pride’.630  
 
Though this seems a simple case of resistance violence, Burnham 
demonstrates that the details of the incident as they appeared to Larpent, 
may not have been entirely accurate. Instead, according to the diary of 
M’Morran’s best friend and comrade in the service, the situation was 
altogether more complex.  Seemingly, M’Morran had met and embarked on 
a romantic relationship with a young woman in the town of Aldea de Serra, 
where the 42nd were temporarily billeted. Dickinson, a young and 
inexperienced officer, left solely in command of their company, which had 
become isolated from the rest of the battalion, also took an interest in the 
young woman, but was rebuffed. His response, if M’Morran’s friend is to be 
believed, was to seek vengeance. After a fairly minor, if ill-advised 
transgression by M’Morran, Dickinson ‘threatened M'Morran in presence of 
the company, to have him sent prisoner to headquarters and broke; for some 
the accusation and judgment are -- broke -- flogged; pleasant enough words 
to all but a soldier; but he added broke and flogged and ordered M'Morran 
in to dress and come out to parade’, and it was this that provoked M’Morran 
to act. 
 On the one hand, then, this is an example of a non-commissioned 
officer reacting with violence against his superior officer, as an act of 
resistance to military discipline. On the other, this is also clearly a personal 
dispute between two men of unequal rank, one of whom may have over-
stepped his authority and used his right to impose regimental discipline as a 
means of exacting personal vengeance against someone he considered to be 
a rival in love. At the same time, it highlights both the similarity of 
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experience between NCO and private, in the face of a commissioned 
officer’s authority, and the tentative and fragile nature of NCO status. 
That the potential complexities of this case are not apparent in the 
official records, or the journal of such a  key figure in the army’s judicial 
system should give us pause when considering the nature of soldier violence 
as it appears in military justice records, even when we have a full trial 
report. With the registers and regimental returns, there is even greater need 
for caution. Some charges seem to offer a clear indication that the violence 
was aimed solely at the rank or role of the victim, particularly in cases 
where the victim was acting in a policing or interventionist role, or in which 
there were multiple victims:  for example, ‘Attempting to abuse a Child, & 
striking the Serjeant’, or ‘Absent from Roll call, opposing the Guard - 
abusing a sentinel, & attempting to strike a Corporal’.631  In other cases, 
though the violence was effectively a form of resistance to authority and 
was certainly treated as such by the military, it is impossible to know what if 
any personal element might have contributed to that violence: for example, 
the GRCM charge against a private of the 92nd for ‘Disobedience of orders 
& throwing a Serjeant down the Barrack Stairs’, or the RCM charge against 
a private of the 33rd for ‘Absenting himself from his Guard getting Drunk 
and striking the Corporal’.632 With the example of M’Morran in mind, 
however, even a seemingly simple case of resistance violence should be 
treated with caution.  
That said, the role of NCOs as conduits and enforcers of regimental 
discipline clearly placed them in a potentially difficult position and not all 
resistance to authority can be explained as a response to over bearing NCOs. 
Given the apparently low numbers of commissioned officers as victims of 
violence and threat, compared to NCOs, and with, in general, the sharp 
division in social class between the commissioned officers and the other 
ranks, it is worth considering that officers benefited, to a degree from a 
shield of deference. Cookson makes the point that many of the men who 
served in British regiments actively disliked officers who had been 
commissioned from the ranks, much preferring officers whose social status 
and upbringing corresponded with their military status and rank. And, just 
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as in civilian society, there were expectations of a reciprocal relationship of 
deference and paternalism.
633
  
The protection afforded by rank alone, without the additional 
element of social deference, was not strong enough to prevent violence 
against NCOs. In his recollections of service in the 32nd, during the 
Peninsula War, Major Harry Ross-Lewin suggests that for some soldiers, 
violence against NCOs was not considered particularly serious offence. 
Though there is a strong element of anti-Irish sentiment to his words, and 
certainly, we should not accept at face value that the Irish soldiers were any 
more ‘wild’ than other soldiers, his contention that ‘[t]hey regarded an 
attempt at desertion as a very venial offence, and the knocking down of a 
staff-sergeant as a mere trifle’, is interesting.634  
We have seen already that in the culture of the barrack room, 
fighting was a way, not just of settling arguments, but also of establishing 
status and group bonds. And the regular appearance in courts martial, and 
indeed, courts of law, of soldiers charged with using their weapons in 
violent acts or threats, highlights the potential for quarrels to turn into 
instances of serious violence. For the NCOs, establishing and maintaining 
authority in such a context must at times have placed them in danger of 
physical assault, to a greater degree than their commissioned superiors. In a 
sense, just as they stood between the officers and men in terms of authority, 
they also stood between them in terms of risk. Theirs was, at times a 
difficult line to walk, invested with a degree of authority, but still subject to 
similar discipline, and without the shield of deference of which their 
superiors were beneficiaries.  
Returning to the advice of the anonymous officer from the ranks, we 
have a description which sums up the difficulties and contradictions of life 
as an NCO: ‘They have, perhaps, more to contend with than any other 
military class whatever, both from superiors and inferiors ; the former are 
often capricious and exacting — the latter, frequently turbulent intractable, 
and jealous of superior merit’.635 
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A final anecdote from Shipp, however, offers a more positive 
experience of NCO rank, and serves to illustrate the point that the cases 
examined here cannot stand as indicative of the NCO life as a whole. 
Though promotion to the NCO ranks brought with it dangers, it also, for 
some, brought affection and humour. It does, nonetheless, further illustrate 
the importance and occasional difficulty some NCOs, particularly those new 
to their roles, had in establishing authority over men with whom they had 
previously served as equals. The anecdote concerns Shipp’s first experience 
of the parade ground as a newly minted corporal: 
I was on the right of the company, being the tallest man on 
parade, when I was desired by the captain to fall out, and give 
the time. I did so, and never did a fugleman cut more capers; but 
here an awkward accident happened. In shouldering arms, I 
elevated my left hand high in the air; extended my leg in an 
oblique direction, with the point of my toe just touching the 
ground; but in throwing the musket up in a fugle-like manner, 
the cock caught the bottom of my jacket, and down came brown 
Bess flat upon my toes, to the great amusement of the tittering 
company.  
I must confess, I felt queer; but I soon recovered my 
piece and my gravity, and all went on smoothly, till I got into 
the barracks, where a quick hedge-firing commenced from all 
quarters; such as, "Shoulder hems!"  —"Shoulder hems" —
"Twig the fugleman!" This file-firing increased to volleys, till I 
was obliged to exert my authority by threatening them with the 
guard-house, for riotous conduct; but this only increased the 
merriment, so I pocketed the affront, as the easiest and most 
good-natured mode of escape; my persecutors ceased, and thus 
ended my first parade as a non-commissioned officer.
636
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Promotion to NCO rank for many, possibly most, of those who 
achieved it was a source of pride and a good deal of hard work. For some 
though, the temptations that came with their extra responsibilities led to 
criminal activity, in particular acts of fraud or embezzlement, sometimes at 
the expense of the men whose welfare and conduct was their responsibility. 
The position of the NCO was clearly a difficult one at times, presenting not 
just additional opportunities and responsibilities, but also additional 
dangers. If at times those additional dangers were the product of the NCO’s 
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own behaviour, they were also the product of his precarious position, and 
the difficulties in establishing and maintaining authority over men with 
whom he shared both culture and class: a factor highlighted by the similarity 
in behaviour between soldiers and NCOs in some of the cases we have 
examined, as well as the very real possibility that rank might be all too 
temporary. 
It is difficult, and in many cases impossible, to know whether an 
individual case of violence by a private soldier against an NCO was 
precipitated by that NCO’s own behaviour towards his subordinate, whether 
that directly related to the assault, or more generally created the context for 
it.  We can tentatively conclude that the cases we have examined represent a 
mixture of personal and service related disputes, with these elements often 
overlapping. What is clear, however, is that NCOs, particularly sergeants, 
were at a much higher risk of violent assault within the army than were any 
other rank, below or above them. And though, given the number of soldiers 
serving, violent assaults in the army were not commonplace, they 
nevertheless represent a part of the soldier experience and in particular a 
part of the NCO experience. An important consideration then, is the way in 
which promotion and indeed demotion impacted on soldiers’ experiences of 
crime and of service in the British army.   
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Chapter Seven: Informal Regimental Economies and the Black Market 
Introduction 
Studies of early modern armies have shown that informal market 
places sprang up in and around military encampments and ‘campaign  
communities’637 And much of the scholarship on eighteenth-century army 
women has emphasised their roles in pillage, the informal economic 
strategies of army families, and the various opportunities available in 
regiments for trade through suttling.
638
 Less well-studied, however, is the 
manner in which informal markets formed around the regimental 
communities of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British 
army and in particular the existence of a black market peculiar to those 
communities, serving and informed by the needs of soldiers and their 
families, and providing opportunities for civilian access to military goods.  
This chapter will consider several key elements of informal regimental 
economies and black-market trading, how they fed into and were fed by rule 
breaking and criminal activity, as well as what they can tell us about the 
relationships that existed within regiments and between regimental and 
civilian worlds. 
 
Defining informal economies 
The term ‘informal economy’ was initially coined in relation to the 
undeveloped, pre-industrial, or ‘third world’ setting. Popularised in the early 
1970s, it has since been applied more widely to societies past and present.  
According to the definition put forward by economic anthropologist, Keith 
Hart, the term can loosely be understood as, ‘a label for economic activities 
which take place outside the framework of corporate public and private 
sector establishments’. 639  The informal or semi-formal nature of much of 
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the economic activity and day to day family survival strategies of working 
people, and particularly the working poor, in eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century Britain, has been well-studied, from the continued 
importance of informal methods of remuneration for workers in formal 
employment and the informal working activities of many people, to the 
licensed and unlicensed activities of second-hand traders and 
pawnbrokers.
640
   
The concept of an ‘economy of makeshifts’, first coined by Olwen 
Hufton in relation to the survival strategies of French peasants, has since 
been widely applied to the eighteenth-century British working poor, and 
underlines the reactive opportunism and ingenuity that characterised the 
survival strategies of many working people during this period: an analysis 
which has also been applied more recently to the survival strategies of 
soldiers and their families.
641
  John Beatty, in his analysis of crime in 
England during the eighteenth century, demonstrates the way in which 
informal economies developed into black markets, fuelling theft, with the 
kinds of items stolen indicative both of the opportunities for theft that were 
available to people depending on where they lived, and the ease with which 
such goods could be traded within the informal market place, in particular 
drawing a distinction between rural and urban settings.
642
 Over the past 
twenty years there has been a growth in interest in second-hand markets, 
both legitimate and illegal; though, as Matt Neale contends, there has been a 
distinctly metropolitan focus to much of the scholarship on urban trading, 
with London’s far more evolved informal economy providing much of the 
evidence for such trading in Britain.
643
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were thriving markets 
for second-hand clothing in most major cities. Though a wide range of 
goods, whether legitimate or stolen, were traded, by far the most well-
developed part of the second-hand marketplace, was the trade in second-
hand clothes, and this is reflected in the prominence of clothes as a common 
item of theft.  Beattie’s analysis shows that the differences between urban 
and rural second-hand trading, and in particular the relationship between the 
second-hand trade and acts of theft, may partly lie in the ‘more restrictive’ 
nature of the rural setting, with criminal activity drawing ‘immediate, 
personal and formidable’ responses from the much more closed and close 
knit rural communities, as opposed to the urban setting with, ‘the relative 
freedom of surveillance in the city’.644 Such an analysis may also apply to 
regimental communities, particularly when on campaign, or stationed in 
barracks or camps rather than billeted in towns and cities.  
Within the regimental communities of the eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century British army, there were opportunities for both formal 
and informal economic engagement. Soldiers served for pay, and some were 
also formally employed in a variety of non-military roles, as servants for 
officers, regimental tailors and cobblers, or day labourers.
645
 There were 
opportunities for formal employment of regimental women, as nurses and 
laundresses, and of civilian suppliers as licensed sutlers.
646
 NCOs had 
access to managerial responsibilities and distribution roles, which brought 
additional pay alongside their basic wages.
647
 Soldiers, their families and 
other members of the regimental communities also supplemented their 
incomes through access to more informal economic activities, from ad-hoc 
trading or bartering of luxury items, or unlicensed sutling, to the hiring out 
of useful skills, such as letter writing, to others within their communities.  
The lines between formal and informal economies were often blurred, 
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particularly in the case of sutling, where both licensed and unlicensed, 
regulated and unregulated, trading was common.
648
  
Soldiers and other members of regimental communities also engaged 
in black-market trading, with illicit or stolen goods bartered, or sold, both 
within regimental communities and out into the wider civilian world. Whilst 
in some cases soldiers stole goods for their own personal use or 
consumption, more often than not theft charges recorded against soldiers 
involved either the direct theft of money, or the theft of items for resale or 
barter.   
By disposing of such items, or purchasing them, soldiers were 
accessing the black market. Both military and civilian justice records show a 
flow of such goods internally, between members of regimental communities 
and externally, between soldiers and civilians. Such a reliance on 
combinations of formal and informal activity was typical of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century economies more generally and as such largely mirrors 
the civilian world; however, the contours of informal regimental economies, 
and the ability of community members to engage in black-market trading 
were shaped and contextualised by the structures, needs and demands of 
regimental life. Though referring to the relationships between informal 
economies and states, Edgar L. Feige’s model is useful in this context: ‘The 
salience of informal activities derives from the fact that their existence is 
intimately connected with the institutional arrangements imposed by the 
state.’649  
The existence of a black market, as opposed to merely an informal 
economy, within British regimental communities is difficult to identify, but 
there is evidence to suggest such a market operated. Surtees, for example, 
hints as much in his memoirs. Referring to the ‘chicanery practised among 
the minor ranks in the army’, he tells us that he  ‘never served in a company 
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in which every individual could not buy, sell, exchange, lend, and borrow, 
on terms peculiar to themselves.’650.  
The boundary lines between legitimate trade, informal activity and 
black-market chicanery were often blurred, with the sale of alcohol, food 
and small luxuries a particularly lucrative area.
651
The selling of goods and 
provisions within barracks, camps and garrisons, through which soldiers 
might resupply themselves with basic necessities and occasional luxuries, 
was considered an important part of regimental life. Indeed, as E. Samuel 
explained, in his treatise on military law, it was the duty of the regiments to 
ensure soldiers had access to such a legitimate supply line:  
‘As a soldier [...] is not at liberty to quit his station, for the 
purpose even of supplying himself with the necessaries and 
conveniences of life, it is peculiarly incumbent on those set over 
him to furnish the means of supply, which he may be precluded 
from providing for himself, sufficient in their quantity, of a fit 
and proper quality, and at a reasonable rate.’652 
 
Alongside the commissaries and contractors, the British army, like 
most armies of the day, relied very much on licensed ‘sutlers’  to ensure 
such access was available to its men. Sutlers, at least in theory, operated 
within strict guidelines, on penalty of losing their licence and being 
‘drummed out of the regiment’; a particularly harsh penalty given that many 
of the licensed sutlers were soldiers’ wives and sweethearts.653 Not all 
sutlers acted entirely within the terms of their licences, however, and the 
regular repetition in regimental orders, of warnings against unlicensed 
sutling suggests that not all those sutling had a right to do so.   
The illicit alcohol trade 
One of the most worrisome areas for army authorities, 
unsurprisingly, was the degree to which men were supplied with alcohol, 
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and in particular the likelihood that they might find night time access to 
large quantities and thereby be unfit for duty the next morning,  or more 
than usually inclined towards ‘nocturnal disturbances’.654  The Articles of 
War therefore prohibited any and all sales of alcohol to soldiers during the 
night, and deemed that:  
the houses and shops of sutlers shall be closed at nine o’clock at 
night, and not opened, for the entertainment of soldiers, before 
the beating of the reveilles in the morning, and within the 
inclusive times, that no sutler shall be permitted to sell any kind 
of liquors or victuals, under the penalty of his being dismissed 
from all future sutling.
655
   
 
The various attempts by regimental commanders to eradicate, or 
significantly reduce soldiers’ access to alcohol outside of permitted hours 
and in large quantities, however inconsistent and contradictory those efforts 
may have been, suggest that the selling of alcohol was a key component of 
informal regimental economies, drawing in participants of private and NCO 
rank, female members of the regimental communities, and opportunistic 
locals from wherever a regiment might be stationed.  An interesting aspect 
of this part of the informal economy is the role of soldiers’ wives and 
sweethearts, which often combined both sutling and money lending.
656
   
The presence of women travelling with, or residing with British 
regiments was being both reduced and formalised throughout the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, but their economic engagement within 
regimental communities remained an important element of regimental 
life.
657
 Some of that engagement took the form of offering necessary 
services such as laundering clothes, or licensed sutling, but much took an 
informal, ad-hoc, opportunistic form, which at times breached the orders 
governing their communities.  Brumwell’s study of the British soldier in the 
Americas, during the Seven Years War, demonstrates the common role of 
soldiers’ wives as suppliers of alcohol, much to the annoyance of the 
authorities.  The ‘women of the Highlanders, & the Royals’, for example, 
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had a particularly strong reputation as ‘outrageous sutlers’.658 Amanda 
Venning’s Following the Drum, similarly demonstrates the perennial 
frustration of army commanders faced with women selling alcohol to the 
men, and indeed, drinking to excess themselves.
659
 
Neither soldiers, nor officers had the right to engage in sutling, with 
such activity thought to encroach unfairly on the business of legitimate 
sutlers. Again, according to the Samuel’s reading of the Articles of War: 
‘Liberty is granted [...to all military personnel...] to bring any quantity or 
species of provisions, eatable or drinkable’, providing that there were no 
existing contracts between regiment and contractor to supply those items. 
All food and drink, except alcohol, not covered by existing contract, could 
be ‘freely brought [...] within the walls of any fort or garrison’. But this only 
applied to goods intended ‘for the private use or consumption of themselves 
or their families respectively’ and they were not to be ‘transferred under 
colourable pretences to indifferent persons’.660   
Yet, within regimental communities throughout the British army, 
informal trading of this nature continued to be an important and expected 
part of soldier life. Admonitions against such informal trading are to be 
found in several surviving order books, signalling their position as a concern 
for regimental commanders. One example in particular is instructive, as it 
demonstrates both the immediacy of the concern and a peculiarity of the 
informal regimental marketplace: that much of this illicit trade was the 
particular province of the NCO. A notebook thought to have belonged to an 
officer of the 65th, in the late 1770s, records the standing orders for the 
regiment and at number 28 the orders state that: ‘If any Non-Com(issione)d 
Off(ice)r is known to Suttle or sell Bread, Cheese, Liquor &c without leave 
or be any ways concerned with those that do, he may depend on being 
brought to a Court Martial & have no favour shown’.661  Interestingly, the 
tone of this order, with the threat not just of a court martial, but also that no 
                                                     
658
 Brumwell,  Redcoats, p. 125; also, Kopperman, p. 445; Lynn, pp. 137-43; 
Berkovich, pp. 126-28 
659
 Venning, Following the Drum, pp. 132-33. 
660
 Samuel, Historical Account of the British Army, p.440.  
661‘Standing Orders  for the 65th Regiment (of Foot)’, Trans by Walt Norris (1989), 
at Genuki: UK and Ireland Geneology, < 
http://www.genuki.org.uk/big/eng/YKS/Misc/Military/65thFootStandingOrders.ht
ml>, [Accessed 17 July 2013]. 
225 
 
 
 
favour will be shown, is very similar to some of the Gibraltar orders against 
drunkenness, noted in Berkovich’s case study: in that case the orders 
seemed to wax and wane as to the level and nature of the threat, often 
contradicting previous and still current orders. It seems highly unlikely that 
the 65th was any more successful in regulating alcohol use and provision 
than the Gibraltar garrison.
662
  
NCOs, especially sergeants and indeed sergeants’ wives, were 
particularly active in the alcohol trade within regiments.
 663
 A GCM, held in 
Canada in 1751 at the request of Bombardier Joseph Burch of the Royal 
Regiment of Artillery, in order to appeal the guilty verdict of a RCM for 
‘suttling contrary to orders’ and the subsequent sentence of reduction in 
rank for a period of three months, offers some intriguing insights into this 
particular part of the informal regimental marketplace. What makes this trial 
so interesting is that it demonstrates features of both licensed and unlicensed 
suttling, involving both an NCO and a woman who was a licensed sutler, 
who may or may not have been his wife, and the potential impact of illicit 
alcohol trading on the smooth running of the regiment.  
The first witness, Captain Charles Brome, set out that impact very 
clearly in his deposition, telling the court that another captain of the 
regiment had complained  to him, one evening, that Burch, ‘and all the men 
of the guard were gone from their guard, and that he imagined they were at 
the prisoner’s house a drinking’. In response, Brome ensured that the men’s 
attention was drawn to recently received orders from the Board of Ordnance 
which forbade ‘any non-commissioned officers and others belonging to the 
board to suttle on any pretence’. Ten days later, Brome saw one of his men, 
‘with a pint of rum in a bottle, concealed under his coat’ and who, when 
questioned said he had bought it ‘at the prisoner’s house’: a claim the 
soldier then repeated to the court. Two more soldiers deposed that they had 
often drunk at Burch’s house, and that they had paid for the drink.  
Burch claimed in his defence that the licensed sutler, Mrs 
Hawthorne, was neither his wife, not his business partner, calling on the 
owner of the house, to confirm he had no part in the renting of it, and the 
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alcohol supplier to confirm that he was not involved in buying any of the 
alcohol, and that the supplier would not consider him to be ‘indebted [...] for 
the liquor bought by Mrs Hawthorne’. However, both Captains and all three 
soldiers refer consistently to the premises as ‘Burch’s house’ and all three of 
the soldiers when questioned claimed to have seen Burch both ‘draw’ the 
rum and serve it to the drinkers. Even more tellingly, one of them claimed 
that he had ‘pay’d money both to the prisoner and Mrs Hawthorne for 
liquor, and he imagined it to be equal, which he paid’. 664 Whatever the truth 
of Burch’s relationship with Mrs Hawthorne, his attempts to distance 
himself from the business, either as partner or spouse, failed and the original 
verdict and sentence were both upheld. 
The role of an NCO in caring for his men naturally opened up 
opportunities for personal gain, some of which have been covered in greater 
detail in Chapter Six. NCOs were the conduit for much of the officially 
sanctioned, formal supply of troops, from the distribution of new clothes to 
the men, to overseeing the supply of meat to the company canteen and 
serving out the allowed quantities of alcohol each day, and opportunities for 
a small profit were a natural and often tacitly accepted ‘perk’ of NCO rank, 
with the most lucrative position arguably that of pay sergeant. The line 
between acceptable perks and profiteering off the backs of the men could, 
however, be a thin one, and the repetition of admonitions against NCO 
profiteering within individual regiments may be a signal that line was being 
crossed with unusual regularity.  
If alcohol was the ‘parent’ of many other military crimes, it was also 
a key spur for property crime and one of the foundation blocks of the 
informal regimental economy. To return to the words of Bell, in his 
observation of soldiers stationed in Ireland: ‘The crimes most commonly 
committed by the men, were, pledging their necessaries for whiskey, and 
stealing those of their comrades for the same purpose.’665  We have seen 
already that even the alcohol provided for soldiers as part of their daily 
rations would at times be traded for other, usually stronger, drink.  Goods, 
both owned and stolen, were sold by soldiers in order to procure alcohol and 
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sometimes, bypassing currency altogether, were swapped or bartered 
directly for a quantity of alcohol.  
Though slightly outside our period, Former Staff Sergeant 
MacMullen’s description of alcohol trading amongst the soldiers and 
regimental community of the 13th Light Brigade, during the early 1840s 
offers a fascinating glimpse of this part of the regimental marketplace. 
MacMullen attributed some of the vigour of the market in illicit alcohol to 
the regiment’s location in India, claiming that ‘the extent to which it is 
practised in regiments any length of time in India is truly surprising’.666  The 
regiment attempted various means to control the levels of drinking amongst 
the men. Each soldier was issued with a ticket by their pay sergeant, which 
would entitle them to buy from the regimental canteen, at a reduced rate of 
around three pence, two drams of arrack, with one dram served in the 
morning and the second in the evening. Alongside this allowance, the 
canteen also offered wine and brandy, but at ‘four pence half penny a dram 
without tickets [...] the high price of these liquors prevented the men from 
drinking them, unless when plentifully supplied with money.’667 This 
attempt to effectively price soldiers out of drinking, rather than reducing 
their consumption, instead served to open up the informal market to lower 
priced, often locally produced alcohol. And it would appear many soldiers 
were active participants as both buyers and sellers.  MacMullen’s 
description also underscores the role of regimental women in alcohol 
trading : ‘But canteens are not the only places in which soldiers obtain 
liquor; it is sold by most married women, and often by single men’.668  
That it was sold by ‘most married women’ and in the absence of 
wives, ‘often by single men’, suggests that this was a valuable and 
important part of many individual soldiers’ personal and family economies 
and as such it seems that many men and women risked the possibility of 
courts martial, and for the latter, expulsion. Alcohol trading was risky, but it 
was very lucrative. As MacMullen put it, ‘the great profit induce[d] both 
parties to take the risk’.669   
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MacMullen gives a detailed description of the illicit alcohol trade in 
the regiment, with ‘Dharoo’, a drink distilled from berries and similar to 
whiskey in taste and appearance, the main product sold. This was ‘generally 
purchased for six annas a bottle from the natives, and retailed at four annas a 
dram to the soldier’, which resulted in ‘a clear profit of three hundred per 
cent’. At times when ‘money was plentiful’ for soldiers, such as after the 
regiment had returned from combat in Afghanistan, the price per dram rose 
to as much as ‘eight annas’ and ‘so great was the demand for it, even at that 
price, that married men who did not join until 1842 had amassed sums of 
money, in some cases amounting to two hundred pounds sterling’, by the 
time MacMullen arrived with the regiment in 1844.
670
  
A willingness to ‘suttle contrary to orders’ may also have flourished 
because, whilst the potential punishments for those who were caught were 
severe, most of those who engaged in this trade were not caught, or at least 
not prosecuted. MacMullen ascribed this to how ‘cunningly [...]they 
manage[d]’, but if his assessment of the ubiquity of the offence within the 
regiment is accurate, and given Kopperman’s and Berkovich’s findings, 
then a combination of pragmatism and ambivalence on the part of 
regimental commanders may also have played a part, with only the more 
egregious or blatant offenders being prosecuted as examples to the rest.
671
  
 
 
Soldiers and civilians  
As discussed in Chapter Five, the soldier experience of theft, as both 
perpetrator and victim, illuminates the importance of relationships and 
interactions between soldiers and civilians in creating the context for some 
kinds of property crime; a context which relied on both the proximity 
between these two apparently different worlds, and the distinctions between 
them.  In particular it seems that the close proximity and intertwined lives of 
civilians and soldiers, along with the opportunities peculiar to military 
service were key to the development of particular strands of black-market 
trading.  
                                                     
670
MacMullen, Camp and Barrack Room, p. 139. 
671
MacMullen,. p. 140. 
229 
 
 
 
Unsurprisingly given the nature of their service, in legitimate 
trading, soldiers most often took the part of the buyer. Though there were 
exceptions to this. Whilst on active campaign, for example, victories at 
times brought booty which would be legitimately sold and the proceeds 
distributed as prize money.  After a successful siege, when the violence and 
the drinking and the looting were over, camps would often take on the 
appearance of an ad-hoc marketplace.
672
 In his memoirs of serving with the 
Connaught Rangers, William Grattan described the scene in camp on 9 
April 1812, two days after the taking of Badajos: ‘the neighbouring villages 
poured in their quota of persons seeking to be the purchasers of the booty 
captured by our men, ...and our camp presented the appearance of a vast 
market.’ 673 
Some soldiers too were able to maintain a secondary line of 
employment through the regiment. Tailors and shoemakers in particular 
brought valuable skills and such work offered opportunities for legitimate 
trade alongside military service.
674
 More often, though, it is in illegal or 
illicit trading that we see soldiers acting as sellers and civilians as 
purchasers; a practice made possible and given context by the proximity of 
soldiers and civilians in almost every type of military setting.  Hurl-
Eamon’s study of the economic survival strategies employed by soldier’s 
and sailor’s wives in eighteenth-century London, shows very clearly that in 
many instances, ‘stolen’ goods, however they might have been rationalised 
or defined by those accused of taking them,  commonly passed along chains 
of possession beginning with the initial taker or ‘finder’ of the goods and 
ending, often, with the pawnbroker, or ‘Uncle’.675  Importantly these chains 
of possession seemed to pass between service families with such 
consistency of approach as to suggest a cultural norm in how they operated.   
While Hurl-Eamon’s study focuses primarily on the actions of 
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soldiers’ and sailors’ wives within the metropolis, drawing on civilian 
justice records and locating the crime primarily within the domestic sphere, 
courts martial trial records allow us to trace some of those activities and 
chains of possession within the military world itself.  Like the Old Bailey 
cases, courts martial were defence cases and as such what is most interesting 
and relevant is often less the facts of the case, than what the defendants 
considered might be convincing to the court.
676
   An examination of 
surviving GCM transcripts reveals similar patterns of behaviour and similar 
chains of possession.  If we consider, for example, the case of Thomas 
Connor, Randall McAllistor and John Breeze, tried at Rhode Island, in 
1779, on charges of ‘embezzling and selling powder and paper cartridges 
belonging to His Majesty’s stores’, we see some interesting similarities to 
the Old Bailey cases covered in Hurl-Eamon’s study.  
 In one of the Old Bailey cases, the female defendant, whilst taking 
her shipwright husband some breakfast to where he was working at 
Chatham Docks, helped herself to a quantity of ‘old lead’ which she carried 
out in the empty food basket.  This crime clearly falls into the category 
noted by Hurl-Eamon of goods being taken through a sense of plebeian 
entitlement, very similar in tone to the sense of entitlement shared by wives 
of non-military, working men.
677
  That the defendant attempted to hide her 
takings, may have reflected a recognition of the illegal status of her act, but 
she may still have considered it morally acceptable as part of a working 
culture of perquisites. It is clear, however, that whereas in some cases the 
perpetrator acted within that traditional moral understanding, in other cases 
that older moral understanding was being stretched far beyond its intended 
limits or knowingly used as cover for acts of theft.  
The court martial in Rhode Island is a much clearer case of theft. 
This was organised, intentional theft for the purpose of resale, and not the 
chips and scrapings taken by workers for their own use under the traditional 
understanding of perquisites.  If the first witness in the trial is to be 
believed, the defendants ensured they had a buyer prior to taking the 
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powder. Across several days and four separate visits, the three defendants 
sold approximately 100 pounds of rough canon-grade powder, and ten 
pounds of fine powder to the witness. Everybody involved in the 
transactions appears to have been aware of the legal implications: when 
questioned as to the ‘danger attending the purchasing of it’, one defendant 
had assured the witness that ‘there was no danger if the cartridges were 
destroyed’. McAllister, though, who appears to have been the one to procure 
the powder in the first place, attempted to characterise the theft in similar 
terms to those of Hurl-Eamon’s study. Twice whilst questioning witnesses, 
McAllister asked: ‘Did I not ask the consent of the working party to take a 
little powder to give to a friend?’678  That this is offered as a defence, 
suggests that small-scale taking would not have been unusual, and may have 
been more kindly regarded than outright theft.   
This trial is interesting for a number of reasons. Alongside the 
apparent cultural continuity between soldiers and civilians, it also shows a 
flow of goods moving between the military and civilian worlds, with such 
interactions seemingly easy to arrange and lucrative for both parties.  It was 
‘some days after’ establishing with the witness that he would be willing and 
able to buy the powder from them that two of the defendants arrived at his 
house with the first two cartridges, each weighing ten pounds, and which he 
bought from them for eight dollars. With the kind of rare insights offered in 
such trials, we can see very clearly a chain of possession running from the 
initial act of theft, through the negotiation between soldiers and civilian of 
several sales, and further along again as the civilian purchaser then sold the 
powder onto a third party.   
A second case from 1779, this time from Gibraltar, again shows 
soldiers stealing powder and then passing that powder onto a civilian. 
William Booth and Thomas Else, both of the Soldier Articifer Company, 
were tried by GCM for ‘stealing powder the property of the King’; 
somewhat ironically, given the Articifer company was established to work 
on the improvements to Gibraltar’s fortifications, precisely because of the 
unreliability of civilian labour. In this case the powder was clearly of a kind 
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used in construction, rather than the cannon grade or fine grade powder 
stolen by Connor, McAllister and Breeze. Again, though, access to the 
powder was an essential part of the soldiers’ service.  It had been stored, 
along with other construction materials, in a ‘tent’ near the ‘new road 
leading up to the Moorish castle’ on which some of the men were working. 
Booth and Else were employed at this time in ‘blowing stones’ and had been 
for six weeks.  
On the day of the theft, both men were seen entering the tent, and 
then leaving, with one carrying a ‘sand bag’ under his arm. They then took 
the bag to ‘a Jew’s house’ nearby, and a few moments later, were seen 
leaving the house without the bag. Two witnesses, also of the artificers, one 
of whom had left the powder in the tent for later use in their work on the 
road, had followed Booth and Else, and one of them went to the house and 
searched for the bag. In his initial search he found nothing, but returning 
later and ‘asked the Jew’s wife’ for the bag which had been left there. This 
time the bag was produced and was found to contain, ‘about two fulls of the 
crown of a hat of powder’.679    
No mention was made in the trial of the civilians purchasing the 
powder, and it is possible that Booth and Else had merely asked them to 
hold onto it for them until they were able to collect it; however, many of the 
studies of second-hand trading among civilians in Britain and some parts of 
Europe, particularly note the role of Jewish immigrants, at least into the 
middle of the nineteenth century.
680
 To what extent this reflects a real 
propensity for second-hand trading, or simply the nineteenth-century ‘image 
of pawnbrokers ‘ as ‘typically Jewish’, is difficult to say. 681 Lynn notes that, 
in the context of early modern European armies, the sutlers and vivandieres, 
who traded in various items, including second-hand and stolen goods, often 
passed them to more established traders and that these larger traders would 
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often be ‘identified as a Jew, a word wielded with an anti-semitic bite’.682  
Many of the courts martial transcripts from this period use the same 
terminology, and as such it seems likely that this was at the very least 
considered by the court to indicate some form of illicit and possibly 
organised trading was involved. 
The chains of possession in these trials seem clear and travel from 
soldiers to civilian and, in the Rhode Island case, on into the wider 
community. Importantly, the goods being stolen and sold are materials 
common to the military and we can begin to see elements of the black 
market in military goods in operation.  They offer few clues as to whether or 
not this could be considered an expression of a wider and more accepted 
black market within the regiments, however, or within military circles. In 
both cases, the soldiers concerned were from the same regiment, with the 
thefts made possible because they had been assigned to a work party at the 
yard, or in construction on the new road. Other cases, however, suggest such 
trading operated at a wider military level.  In 1775, eight soldiers from four 
separate regiments were tried at Gibraltar, with seven facing charges of 
‘stealing a quantity of lead from the King’s stores; or being accepting 
thereto,’ and one being charged with ‘buying a part of the said lead, 
knowing it to be stolen.’  As with the previous case, this was not a single act 
of theft, but rather a series of thefts, with ‘aprons of lead’ removed from the 
stores and secreted in various places around the yard ready to be picked up 
at a later time. Interestingly, it seems that one of the defendants, Samuel 
Parsons, sent his young son to sneak into the yard after hours and pick up 
the hidden aprons, throwing them over the wall to his waiting father.
683
   
As with the previous case, a buyer appears to have been lined up in 
advance of the defendants collecting the aprons from the yard, though it is 
impossible to tell whether or not that buyer was already in place prior to the 
aprons being taken from the stores themselves.  Certainly, it seems that one 
of the defendants, George Brown, considered that he would be able to sell 
the items and encouraged the other defendants to acquire the lead on that 
basis. Again we see a chain of possession leading from soldiers into the 
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civilian market, with the lead aprons eventually ending up in the possession 
of ‘a Jew’ in the local town.  We can also see signs of adherence to some 
sort of code of conduct in the behaviour of the defendants, which would 
seem to tie in with Coss’s analysis. Having sold each quantity of lead, the 
proceeds were then shared equally amongst them, despite some clearly 
having taken greater risks than others.  But this is not a ‘primary’ or even 
‘secondary’ group dynamic.  The soldiers in this trial shared neither 
company, nor regiment. Instead it seems a ‘tertiary’ group dynamic was in 
play, with soldiers relating to each other as members of a garrison 
community at a wider level than their own company loyalties.  The 
involvement of Parson’s son meanwhile, brings to mind some of the cases 
explored by Hurl-Eamon, with their apparent cultural specificity.   
It is also of interest that these trials share so many common features 
in terms of soldier behaviour and opportunities for theft and resale, given 
that they occurred in two very different locations. There were, arguably, 
similarities between Gibraltar and Newport, Rhode Island: in both cases the 
soldiers were garrisoned, in heavily militarised settings, and close to a 
civilian population. Even so, the similarity in behaviour, echoed in other 
trials from different locations, suggests a common experience.  
What is absolutely clear from these cases is the fluidity with which 
goods passed between regimental and civilian worlds, showing just how 
porous the nominal borders between those two worlds could be. 
Importantly, at least one of the cases hints at a shared understanding 
between soldiers of different regiments and companies.  Such a shared 
understanding may have contributed to an active black market within the 
civilian world, but may also have contributed to the development of an 
internal black market within the military itself.  
The level of detail available in a court martial trial transcript allows 
us a unique insight into the specific mechanisms of black-market trading, far 
more so than the much less detailed information in courts martial registers. 
In the cases above we are able to see sequences of events and contextual 
details, different participants and their relationships to each other, and how 
all these factors fit together.  But even in the courts martial registers and 
regimental returns, with their much less detailed charge listings a picture 
emerges both of soldiers conniving at the taking and disposing of goods, and 
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of the apparent movement of stolen goods between soldiers. For example, 
on 17th May 1814, in Canada, three privates from the same company and 
regiment were all tried at the same session for the theft and resale of several 
birds. The first was charged with having ‘[u]nlawfully possessed himself of 
Seven Fowls’, the second with ‘[a]ccepting and disposing of four of the 
Fowls, knowing them to be stolen’, and the third with ‘[t]aking charge and 
having sold Two of the Fowls, knowing them to be stolen’.684   
Cases like these give clear indications of soldiers co-operating in the 
theft and sale of goods, and they show very clearly the traffic in goods at the 
meeting point of civilian and military communities, but where goods can be 
shown to pass between soldiers and other members of the military 
community, it is often unclear as to whether this represents a black-market 
trade, or an expression of the ‘sharing’ ethos Coss identified within soldier 
groups.  We know from the GRCM register, for example, that Gunner Jason 
Thornton, of the Royal Artillery, was convicted in October 1813 of 
‘Stealing a barrack Sheet & a Great Coat’. In the same trial session, Gunner 
John Haggery, of the same battalion and regiment, was convicted of ‘Selling 
a Great Coat knowing it had been stolen’.685 We have no way to know what 
passed between the two Gunners, whether they had acted together but only 
one could be proved a thief, or whether Thornton had given or sold the coat 
to Haggery. Even when only a single soldier was involved, it is sometimes 
clear that stolen goods were being sold or passed along to others. For 
example, a private from the 37th was tried in March 1819, by RCM, for 
‘Unsoldierlike conduct in offering for Sale Articles the Property of Capt. 
Taylor’.686   We do not know from the charge to whom Captain Taylor’s 
property was offered for sale, however, and it is possible that this is another 
example of goods being sold out of the regiment.  
Examples can be found, however, that would seem to indicate a 
functioning black market within regimental communities.  One GCM trial in 
particular, from March 1779, is of interest here, as it offers evidence for 
both a sharing ethos within the group, and black-market trading within the 
regimental community, and fits very much with Lynn’s assessment of 
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sutlers’ roles in early modern campaign communities, as traders in second-
hand goods and plunder.
687
  Six soldiers of the 71st Grenadiers, were tried at 
Southampton, New York, for ‘being absent from their Quarters without 
leave, and for Robbery’.  According to the witnesses, including one 
involved soldier who appeared as King’s Evidence against his former 
comrades, the men approached the house of Isaac van Schaie, a local 
inhabitant, dressed in uniforms and with their faces ‘blackened’ and 
attempted to gain entrance to the house under pretence of needing water. 
Having been refused entry, one of the soldiers forced the door open, and all 
but one of the defendants went into the house and proceeded to violently 
assault van Schaie, demanding that he give up any money he had in the 
house.  During the robbery the soldiers ransacked the van Schaie household, 
breaking open and emptying two chests of money and stealing large 
quantities of male and female clothing, dressmaking cloth, shoe leather, 
ornate lace, and various other items.   
What makes this case so interesting, though, is what the soldiers then 
did with their stolen goods.  According to the testimony of Roderick Frazer, 
the soldier who turned King’s Evidence against his comrades, when they 
left the van Shaie house, they first hid their loot in some woods near to their 
quarters in Sagg Harbour. Frazer testified ‘that next day they brought them 
to their barracks where they divided them’ and that three of the soldiers had 
‘offered the black lace mentioned in the evidence to a Sutler for sale’.688 
The Sutler in question, one William Demain, was also called as a witness, 
and deposed that he had indeed been offered black lace by soldiers of the 
71
st
 Grenadiers, though no mention is made as to whether or not he accepted 
that offer. 
 
The Black Market Trade in Soldiers’ Necessaries  
Much of this activity, and in particular the theft and trading of food 
and livestock, fits Lynn’s analysis of early modern armies on campaign, 
with their ‘pillage’ economies. But there are also hints of a developing 
black-market trade in military goods. The borders between military and 
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civilian experience were far from sharp. With civilians who were nominally 
part of regimental communities through occupation or family ties, serving 
soldiers living in rooms belonging to civilian hosts, former servicemen with 
a foot in each world, however much the military sought to separate and 
remove soldiers from their immediate social milieu, a key characteristic of 
military life throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was 
proximity to and inter-dependence on civil society. Though by no means the 
only expression of it, the black-market trade in regimental clothing 
epitomised this relationship.  Perhaps most illustrative of this is the military 
offence of  ‘selling’, ‘losing’, ‘taking’ or ‘making away’ with regimental 
necessaries or accoutrements. 
According to James’s New and Enlarged Military Dictionary, 
soldiers’ necessaries were defined as ‘such articles as are ordered to be 
given to every soldier in the British service, at regulated prices’.689 Some 
items were provided as part of the soldier’s initial enlistment, and though he 
paid towards the cost of these out of his bounty, later replacements were 
made at the cost of the public purse. Other items were to be paid for 
annually by the soldier, through the stoppages system. James gives a 
detailed description of ‘[t]he necessaries to be provided by stoppage from 
the pay of the soldiers of regiments of foot, militia and fencible infantry’, 
which ran to 25 items, including two pairs of shoes, a second pair of 
breeches, a foraging cap, two pairs of black gaiters, combs, powder and 
puff, a knapsack, a clothes brush, shoe brushes, a pair of stockings, and 
various other items considered necessary to the soldier, along with the cost 
of repairing and laundering. Some items were provided annually, and others 
at varying intervals: the knapsack for example was expected to last six 
years. Altogether, the annual cost to the soldier for this extensive list of 
goods was three pounds, sixteen shillings and a penny. 
The interchangeability of the ‘making away with’ charges make it 
very difficult to know the extent to which this particular offence fed into the 
black market operating between and within civilian and regimental worlds.  
If, for example, we look at the GRCM register for the years 1813-1814, we 
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can see that out of the 55 soldiers prosecuted for such offences, only two 
were specifically charged with having sold their necessaries. By far the 
largest group within this category were charged with ‘taking’ or ‘making 
away with’.  A similar pattern can be seen across the years 1819-1820, 
during which only a single soldier was charged with having sold his 
necessaries, whilst a further 87 faced charges of ‘taking’ or ‘making away’ 
with theirs. During the years 1825 and 1826, only eight of the 283 charges 
of this type were specific charges of selling regimental necessaries.   
How many of the soldiers’ necessaries found their way into civilian 
hands is therefore unknown, but there is evidence to suggest that it may 
have been fairly widespread, despite the harsh penalties that could be 
imposed on civilians found to be in possession of regimental clothing. The 
annual Mutiny Act specifically tackled the problem of civilians purchasing 
from soldiers, including it within the provision against persons aiding or 
abetting deserters, with the offender forfeiting ‘for every such Offence, the 
sum of Five pounds’, and with additional provision for imprisonment or 
whipping if the offender was unable to meet the fine.
690
 And civilians could 
also be tried under criminal law for this offence.  Anne Hennem, of 
Newport, for example, was prosecuted at the Quarter Sessions in 1806 for 
‘receiving and detaining a shirt from Richard Hand, a private in the 56th 
Regiment of Foot’, for which offence she was fined five pounds.691   
For those who both received regimental goods and removed the 
marks which identified them as such, the penalties were even harsher. 
Removing identifying marks from the ‘King’s property’ was a felony, and 
as such carried a very severe punishment.  A report from Justice John Heath, 
into the trial and conviction at the Kent Assizes in March 1804, of a 
shoemaker named Amos Leeds, demonstrates just how devastating the 
consequences could be for those caught removing the king’s mark from 
regimental goods. According to the key witness, a soldier named George 
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Stockdale, he had visited Leeds’s shop in Kent, looking for a pair of shoes. 
Leeds showed him several pairs, which Stockdale found too expensive, 
before then bringing out, ‘a pair of regimental shoes, marked G.R.’.  When 
Stockdale questioned Leeds as to his possession of marked shoes, Leeds 
insisted he had bought them, but refused to say from whom. Stockdale took 
one of the shoes and made clear that he intended to seek out a justice of the 
peace and show it to them, then left the shop.  
When he returned half an hour later, accompanied by a constable, 
the remaining shoe was ‘lying on the counter’, with ‘part of the mark’ 
removed and also lying on the counter.  The jury found Leeds guilty of 
‘feloniously taking out from a shoe, a mark denoting the property of the 
King, for the purpose of concealing the King’s property’ and he was 
sentenced to transportation for fourteen years and the forfeiture of all his 
goods and chattels.  Heath’s report makes clear that as the presiding judge 
he had little choice but to impose such a sentence, as the statutory nature of 
the offence left him with no discretion, but he recommended Leeds for 
clemency on the grounds of his former good character and ‘a deficiency in 
sense’ and suggested a reduced sentence of six months imprisonment, ‘as he 
was a Receiver, knowing the shoes to be the King’s stores, and deserves to 
be punished as such’.692 
From time, to time civilians were court-martialled for buying 
soldier’s necessaries, and these cases can offer tantalising glimpses into the 
mechanisms and expectations of this part of the black market.  At a General 
Court Martial held in New York, on 12
th
 August 1779, Robert Reid, an 
inhabitant of Phillipsburg, was accused of ‘selling Rum to the Soldiers, 
purchasing their Necessaries and enticing them to desert.’ Reid denied the 
charge of enticement to desert, and no evidence being produced to prove 
that charge it was dismissed. For the other two charges, however, Reid, 
‘pleaded Guilty of buying a Shirt and Shoes of a Soldier and selling Rum to 
them.’ This case offers a clear example of the two-way traffic of goods 
between military and civilian worlds.  Reid both sold and bought contraband 
goods across the civilian-military divide.  More importantly though, Reid’s 
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defence offers evidence for a much wider trade in regimental goods, as he 
claims that: ‘His buying a Shirt and the Shoes of a Soldier and selling Rum 
to them proceeded entirely from ignorance as he did not know that it was 
contrary to the Articles of War, and as his neighbours practised the same 
thing [author’s italics]’693   
Though this claim should be treated cautiously, it can be assumed 
that the defendant at least expected that this would be readily believable to 
the court and the implication that this was a relatively normal part of 
civilian-military interactions is clear. The very fact that the Mutiny Act 
allowed for civilians to be prosecuted for buying a soldier’s necessaries 
would seem to add weight to this impression. That such sales continued 
despite the potential for civilians to become embroiled in the military justice 
system may be testament to both the ease of the trade and the overall 
unwillingness of the military to focus on the civilian side of that transaction, 
preferring in most cases to prosecute the seller and not the purchaser.  
Isolated instances such as the Reid case, however, show the risks inherent in 
such activities: Reid suffered the ignominy of being tried as a civilian in a 
military court, and was sentenced to fifty lashes and a five pound fine. 
A particularly illuminating example of the cut and thrust of soldier 
and civilian black-market trading comes from the trial of James Buckett, of 
the Royal Fusiliers, court-martialled at Gibraltar, in 1757, ‘For being 
concerned with others in several Robberies.’ Buckett and a comrade, now 
turned King’s Evidence, had been involved in a number of robberies, taking 
stockings and black ribbon from shopkeepers. So far, a fairly ordinary tale 
of robbery, but the culprits had also engaged in another activity, this time 
with ‘some other Soldiers of the Gang’. In this second scheme, two of the 
soldiers: ‘went Several times to Spaniards in the Streets, offering a Shirt to 
sell.’ Having bought the clothing, the Spaniard would then be approached 
by another member of the gang, ‘pretending to be a Corporal’, who would 
tell him that the shirt he was carrying had been stolen from the regiment and 
‘threatend [sic] to take the Spaniard to the main Guard if he did not deliver 
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up the Shirt.’ This, the court heard, they ‘always’ did, leaving the soldiers to 
go off ‘with the Shirt & the money.’694 
This case is interesting on several levels. It speaks to an 
understanding on the parts of both soldiers and ‘Spaniards’ as to the nature 
of the black-market trade. That the soldiers had been able to effect this 
scheme ‘several times’ suggests a general readiness on the part of the 
civilians to purchase from soldiers, and the readiness of those same unwary 
customers to hand the goods over when challenged by a soldier claiming to 
represent the regiment, speaks just as clearly to a recognition of the dangers 
of such illicit trade.  It also illuminates something of the continuity of the 
experience of crime in the British army.  Coss describes a very similar kind 
of confidence trick, called ‘the calms’, played on the local peasantry in the 
Peninsular, half a century after Buckett and his gang were playing theirs on 
the inhabitants of Gibraltar:   
The scam entailed exchanging blankets or some military issue 
item for local currency. At some point during the deal, a 
comrade wearing fake sergeant’s stripes on his arm, would 
interrupt the proceedings, declaring them illegal and demanding 
that the soldier return the money. In the confusion, the soldier 
would give back flattened uniform buttons, passing them off as 
shillings. The peasant, feeling lucky to avoided legal 
entanglements, would go on his way unaware he had been 
taken.
695
  
 
Separated by half a century, the soldiers in mid eighteenth-century Gibraltar 
and those in early nineteenth-century Spain and Portugal were both able to 
use the same set of civilian expectations of trading with soldiers, and its 
dangers,  to their advantage in very similar ways. 
The black-market trade in necessaries operated both at the meeting 
point of civilian and regimental worlds and also within regimental and 
garrison communities. A series of orders, recorded in an officer’s ‘orders 
and letter book’, from Gibraltar, covering the period 1787 to 1791, suggests 
that soldiers wives were particularly active in this part of the black 
market.
696
 An order dated 29 June 1790, stated that ‘A Mrs Martha 
                                                     
694
WO 71/65. Trial of James Buckett, 19 December 1757. 
695
Coss, p. 109. 
696
 Interestingly, in his  examination of second-hand trading in the cities of central 
Europe, Georg Stöger suggests that soldiers wives were often active in trading 
second-hand clothes, and sometimes military uniforms: Georg Stöger, ‘Urban 
242 
 
 
 
Wilkinson’ had incurred a fine of a little over twenty-five dollars, ‘for 
buying two shirts from Hugh Lavit, of Captain William’s company’. A few 
months later, an order dated 15 September 1790 stated that, ‘Some of the 
Commanding Officers of corps, having represented to the General that 
soldiers’ necessaries are frequently bought by women belonging to the 
troops in the garrison, he directs that whenever any women belonging to the 
troops is convicted of buying any part of a soldier’s necessaries she should 
be sent out of the garrison by the first opportunity.’ 697 
Soldiers did not just sell their own regimental necessaries and 
accoutrements, and it is likely that at least some of the soldiers listed in the 
GRCM register as having lost or otherwise misplaced their necessaries may 
themselves have been victims of theft by a fellow soldier. At a Court 
Martial, held in Halifax, Nova Scotia , 16th July 1750, John Willson, soldier 
in Colonel Warburton’s Regiment, was tried for ‘Absenting himself five 
Days and Nights from his Fort, Making away with  his Watchcoat, and 
Robbing his Comrade’s Haversack of two Shirts, one pair of white Geaters 
[sic] and one pair of Stockings’. Two local inhabitants each offered 
evidence for Wilson having sold them items from the haversack. John Deal, 
told the court that ‘the Prisoner sold him a Shirt for half a Dollar and a 
Mugg of flisse [sic]’. Deal had questioned the prisoner as to whether the 
shirt was his to sell, clearly showing an awareness of the possible 
ramifications of buying stolen items, and was told that ‘it was, and that he 
had right of them.’ A second inhabitant, William Gales, deposed that ‘the 
Prisoner came to his House with Two Sailors, and sold him a Shirt for half a 
Dollar’. 698    
Alongside the legitimate second-hand clothes trade, a black-market 
component to civilian trading in clothes existed, independent of any military 
presence. The Old Bailey proceedings and local quarter assize records are 
full of cases in which stolen clothing was sold by the thieves to clothes 
sellers. Beverley Lemire in her analysis of clothes theft and popular 
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consumerism, describes the demand for second-hand clothes within civilian 
communities in early modern England, which ‘functioned through a 
network of legal and illegal distribution’.699 Georg Stöger has traced very 
similar networks in eighteenth-century central Europe, where ‘the exchange 
of used textiles was [...] omnipresent in pre-modern urban economies’.700 
Interestingly, Stöger also points out that a common concern for some civil 
authorities was the apparent prevalence of second-hand military uniforms: 
he gives the example of an investigation by the Viennese magistracies, in 
1781, of the city’s main market place, as a result of which, ‘used uniforms 
and other military items were confiscated from 34 traders’. Though most of 
these items had been legitimately purchased by the traders from an army 
auction, some had been bought from ‘active or former soldiers’.701    
The particular trade in regimental clothing and accoutrements 
naturally fed into this existing framework, but it has specific features which 
mark it as a distinct part of the black market, with a different set of risks and 
motivations.  
Allowing for occasions of quality fraud or mismanagement, the 
quality and design of regimental clothing was micromanaged to a high 
degree from the centre. Design patterns and materials were examined in 
detail before tenders were awarded, and even during the early part of this 
period, suggestions that quality was lacking warranted a board of enquiry 
and regimental inspection reports.
702
 On the 23rd of June 1756, for example, 
at a Meeting of the General Officers of the Army, at the Judge Advocate 
General’s Office in Privy Gardens, the ‘Articles of Agreement for 
furnishing cloathing[sic]’ for several regiments were examined along with 
certificates signed by the relevant authorities to confirm the acceptability of 
patterns and delivery schedules in each case.  The same meeting also 
considered inspection reports from seven regiments, five of which reported 
‘a compleat[sic] delivery’, none reported any deficiencies, and two 
specifically reported that the quality and fit were both ‘good’. One regiment 
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not due to make an inspection report at that time was individually contacted 
by the War Office on the Judge Advocate’s request and reported that no 
defects had been found in the clothing.
703
 
Inasmuch as anything could be said to be a guarantee of quality the 
regimental mark was just that. Though soldiers were not provided with 
luxurious clothing, micro-managed patterns and designs, and the need for 
durability and functionality, meant that regimental clothing was of a known 
and almost guaranteed quality, certainly when compared to the ready-made 
‘slop’ clothing that made up much of the market for new clothing;704 though 
they were likely to be of a lower quality and price compared to the 
‘perquisite’ cast-offs sold by servants.705  At the same time, they were 
unusually easy to identify as illicit goods, with the same regimental mark 
that guaranteed durability also increasing the risks involved in the trade. 
Soldiers’ uniforms were designed to be hard wearing, because they 
were intended to be hard worn. Legitimate sales of old items, once 
replacements had been issued were possible, but by the time most of the 
items were replaced, the originals had usually been worn out and would 
fetch a very low price. As McCormack points out, while militia regiments 
were provided with new clothing every three years, when embodied for war 
‘they had to be replaced more frequently because they wore out’, and the regulars 
were refitted annually, ‘giving an indication of how long a garment would last’.706  
This added impetus to the sale of new items, and it is noticeable that 
in several of the RCM trials recorded by the 34th, of soldiers who made 
away with their great coats, the charges specified that the coats were ‘for 
1819’ when they were new and still considered valuable.707 Soldiers were 
generally allowed to sell their old clothes, once new ones had been issued, 
however, and this added a layer of defence for the civilians who bought 
from soldiers. As we have seen in some of the cases, buyers often queried 
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the soldiers’ right to sell the items, taking on faith that the coats or shirts 
were theirs to sell and not considered part of their current set of necessaries.  
For a final example of criminal activity and black-market trading 
fostered by the intertwining of military and civilian lives we return to the 
trial of John Antrobus, ‘for feloniously stealing, on the 10th of October, one 
regimental jacket, value 8 s. and one pair of overalls, value 6 s. the property 
of our Lord the King.’ This trial casts a light onto several different aspects 
of the black-market trade in regimental clothing, bringing together several 
of the characteristics we have discussed so far. In this case, the soldiers 
concerned were all accommodated in barracks, at the Tower of London, but 
the close relationship between soldiers and civilians is still apparent.  John 
Sullivan, soldier in the third regiment of guards in his evidence told the 
court:  
‘I left my overalls in my room about one o'clock; the jacket did 
not belong to me, it was taken from the barrack room where I 
sleep in the Tower. My overalls were taken out my box under 
my own bed. I put them in my box on the 10th, about one 
o'clock in the afternoon; on the following morning I went to put 
them on to go on parade, they were gone. In the morning when I 
complained I had lost my overalls, a man complained he had 
lost his jacket.’708  
 
Antrobus had, it seemed, engaged in something of a crime spree, stealing 
several items of clothing and regimental equipment from the barracks. 
Though there is no confirmation within the trial documents, Antrobus had 
claimed to Sullivan prior to the thefts that he was a newly discharged 
marine, thereby justifying his presence in the Tower.  The regimental items 
Antrobus stole found their way to several civilians engaged in the second-
hand clothing trade. More interestingly, one of those items then found its 
way back to the Tower, purchased by William Street, another soldier in the 
same regiment.  
In a rare insight, the evidence presents not just the personal loss 
inherent in the crime of theft, along with the chain of sale and possession 
across the boundaries of civilian and military life, but also the impact of 
such theft on the soldier victim’s professional life and the way in which 
being victim to it might paradoxically have further fuelled the need for this 
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part of the black market.  Sullivan, having been the victim of theft was then 
himself punished for the loss of regimental clothing: he told the court ‘I was 
stopped thirteen shillings and sixpence out of my pay for them.’ The 
consequences for a soldier of not having the correct clothing and 
accoutrements could be severe. A quick glance at any level of military 
justice records shows soldiers being incarcerated, flogged, demoted and put 
under stoppages for this offence in great numbers. Yet for two shillings and 
sixpence, William Street was able to avoid punishment and equip himself 
with a regulation regimental jacket, formerly in the possession of John 
Sullivan.  
At the centre of this coming and going of regimental clothing 
between civilian and military hands, were two locations in close proximity: 
the barracks of the Tower of London on the one hand, and on the other a 
clothes shop, owned by Elizabeth North, who bought the stolen clothes from 
Antrobus,  sold the jacket to William Street and sold the overalls  to ‘an old 
clothes man’, who then presumably traded them on to somebody else. 
Almost every component of this part of the black market is represented in 
this trial, up to and including the return of regimental issue, previously 
stolen and sold into the civilian community, back across the border into 
regimental use. It also demonstrates how the close proximity and 
intertwined lives of civilians and soldiers fuelled and was expressed through 
a very specific set of black-market trading relationships.  
Most importantly, when taken alongside the case from Boston, in 
1775, of a soldier tried for ‘lending a shirt to pass the Review’, this case 
hints at the possibility that regimental clothes and equipment were often in 
motion, changing hands through theft, loan, or sale both out into the civilian 
world and amongst members of the regimental community.
709
 The 
importance for soldiers of having a complete set of necessaries, particularly 
during inspections and reviews, was potentially as much of a spur to the 
black-market trade in necessaries as their need to acquire funds by selling 
the same.  
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Conclusion 
In many respects the soldier’s experience of informal economic 
strategies, including black-market trading, was very similar to that of his 
civilian counterpart, but there were also some important distinctions 
between them. The soldier’s relationship with his uniform, for example, was 
arguably very different from the civilian’s relationship with their clothing. 
The civilian experience which comes closest to the soldier’s in this respect 
was probably the liveried servant: McCormack, in his examination of the 
material culture of militia soldiers, makes the point that there are analogies 
to be drawn between the two. In terms of style and design, servants’ liveries 
and some of the regimental uniforms were very similar. More importantly, 
the proprietorial relationship of regimental commanders, particularly in the 
militia, but also in the regular army, gave them a ‘paternalistic control over 
their men’s material lives [...which was...] amplified by [...] material and 
stylistic choices’. McCormack suggests that the model of ‘involuntary 
consumption’ applied by John Styles to liveried servants could be equally 
applied to soldiers, with design and purchasing decisions made, not by the 
soldier who would wear the clothing, but by his commanding officers. And 
like servants, soldiers had expectations of some right, as a customary 
perquisite, to the use or disposal of that clothing beyond their service, or its 
intended use. 
710
 
The soldier’s uniform, though, went beyond identification of a 
paternalistic employment relationship. It was an important part of the 
‘package’ of soldier identity. The visual impact of servant livery and soldier 
uniform though similar, invoked very different understandings of the people 
who wore them. Across the militia and the regular army, individual 
regimental uniforms differed, but they shared a unified purpose in 
presenting a ‘soldierlike’ appearance.711 The terminology used by 
contemporaries to identify soldiers, as separate and distinct from civilians, 
was often focused on their uniforms: ‘redcoats’ and ‘bloodybacks’, for 
example.
712
  And individual regiments or parts of the service were similarly 
identified by their colours, or features of their uniforms: the Royal Horse 
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Guards, for example, were known to all as ‘the Blues’ because of the colour 
of their uniforms at the time the regiment was first formed, while according 
to Costello, ‘the Rifles, from the dark colour of their uniforms, and the total 
absence of all ornament, had gained the nick name of "Sweeps"’.713 
Many of the memoirs of former soldiers from this period, describe 
their enlistment experiences, and the change from ‘coloured clothes’, or 
‘civvies’ in modern parlance, is commonly presented as an important part of 
their entrance into military service and of their becoming soldiers. Possibly 
one of the most poignant examples of this is Shipp’s description of 
enlistment, as a ten year old boy, having his head shaved, being ‘deprived’ 
of his clothes and kitted out instead in ‘red jacket, red waistcoat, red 
pantaloons, and red foraging-cap’, after which, he recalled, ‘[t]he change, or 
metamorphosis, was so complete, that I could hardly imagine it to be the 
same dapper little fellow’.714 
The evidence considered for this chapter cannot speak to the 
psychological impact of soldiers selling their identifying uniforms, but it is 
worth considering that the act of selling regimentals, though in many ways 
similar to any other sale of clothing, may have had an extra resonance for 
soldiers.  On a purely practical level, the implications for soldiers who 
engaged in this trade were very different from those attending civilian 
second-hand clothes trading, both for the soldier who sold his necessaries 
and the soldier who was driven by need to buy replacement items, in order 
to pass a review and avoid punishment.  
As a final point, the mechanisms and expectations of the black 
market in military goods to a large extent shaped the soldier’s experience of 
property crime, but it also underlines the need for caution in identifying a 
clear soldier identity. It is in the informal economies within regiments, and 
the black market which operated from and around regiments, that some of 
the closest connections can be drawn between soldiers and civilians, in 
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terms of behaviour, economic need, and adherence to a sense of ‘moral 
economy’.  
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Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this thesis has been to identify and characterise the 
soldier’s experience of crime in the British army during the period 1740 to 
1830, and to delineate the ways in which that experience was soldier-
specific. By examining the role that crime played in soldiers’ lives and 
service, this study has illuminated some important aspects of the soldiering 
experience during this period, soldiers’ self-identification as soldiers, and 
their relationships with each other, the command structure in which they 
lived and worked, and the civilian world from which they came, with which 
they were at times intimately connected and yet from which they were also 
at times distanced.  
The secondary aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the value 
of the courts martial registers and regimental returns when used together as 
a basis for analysis of soldier crime and soldier service. Quantitative studies 
of justice records must always be treated with caution, with the so-called 
‘dark figure’ of crime an unknowable factor in any conclusions drawn.715 
This is even more the case for the justice records of the eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century British army, with the proportion of offending 
tackled by military authorities below the level at which a requirement for 
detailed reporting came into effect, significantly higher than the proportion 
tackled at or above that level. Gilbert suggests that we will never know the 
true extent, not just of offending, but of offending that was recognised as 
such and met with summary discipline.
716
 Similarly, though the registers 
and returns consulted purport to collate listings of all trials held at the 
various levels across the service, we cannot be wholly sure that they are 
complete and accurate reflections of the numbers of trials held. However, as 
this study has demonstrated, using a similar methodological approach to 
those employed by scholars of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British 
                                                     
715‘The dark figure of crime’, was originally coined by Adolphe Quetelet, in 1832, 
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Claire Berlinski, 'The Dark Figure of Corruption’, Policy Review, (  June/July 2009 
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2014]; also, see Beattie, ‘The Pattern of Crime in England’, p. 53. 
716Gilbert, ‘Military and Civilian Justice’, p. 42; also Steppler, ‘The Conduct of 
Courts Martial’, p. 863.  
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crime and justice, it is possible to identify some broad patterns and key 
features of the soldier experience of crime in the British army, from the 
mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century.  
First, a general observation: crime and criminality are, as observed 
in the introduction complex aspects of human behaviour, and highly 
contextual. As such, there were clearly elements of crime which were 
context-specific and where experiences of crime differed according to 
particular service conditions, regimental cultures, type or location of 
service. The particular propensity for suicide, noted by Rumsby, for soldiers 
serving in the line cavalry in India, for example, and Divall’s contentions 
regarding different levels of offending between the two battalions of the 
30th, both speak to the importance of distinct regimental and service 
contexts. Baule and Hagist, likewise, suggest that the Boston punishment 
book may reflect an atypical situation given that the book concerns a 
‘composite battalion’ made up of three different companies from the Royal 
Irish Regiment and two battalion companies from the 65th.
717
   
Though the examination of the three case study regiments 
demonstrates a degree of specificity, it also shows continuity of experience 
across the three regiments. The 34th recorded a higher number of courts 
martial overall, though proportionate to the number of men serving in the 
regiment it was very much in line with the 33rd and 37th, and the 
percentage of soldiers serving in that regiment who were convicted by court 
martial was only marginally higher at a little over 8% than for the 33rd or 
37th, both of which convicted a little under 8% of the men. With the ‘dark 
figure’ of crime in mind, this seems a statistically insignificant difference. 
Where we do see some differences is in terms of the balance of offence 
types. Military crimes, such as desertion and regulatory offences account for 
88% of charges for the 33rd, 84% of charges for the 34th, and 70% of 
charges for the 37th.  Given the tendency noted in Chapter Two, for 
regiments at home to have much higher desertion rates, the level is 
unsurprising for the 33rd, but the high level for the 34th suggests issues 
beyond the expected. Similarly indicative of possible issues in the regiment 
is that violence and threat charges feature far more heavily in the 34th, at 
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15% of all charges, compared to 9% for the 33rd, and 6% for the 37th.  
Though less stark a difference, the 34th also preferred a higher proportion of 
property crime charges, with 37%, compared to 32% for the 33rd and 22% 
for the 37th.
718
  
The confidential inspection reports attached to the regimental returns 
for the 33rd and 37th reported no problems in either regiment, with both 
apparently functioning well and in accordance with the rules and regulations 
laid out for them, despite these two regiments recording different rates of 
some offence types. The report for the 34th, however, suggests there may 
have been issues at a command level. According to the report, the 
commanding officer of the 34th, Lieutenant-Colonel Dickens, had ‘not been 
present since the date of the last confidential report in October 1818’. 
Across the year, the regiment had two different acting commanding officers. 
The report then criticised Dickens for having repeatedly displayed 
‘contempt, disrespect and neglect [...]’ to all official correspondence and in 
this respect reported him ‘unfit for the duties thereof.’719 The report also 
stated that the officers of the regiment had paid attention to the discipline of 
the men and reported ‘progress’ in that, suggesting that there had previously 
been an issue with a lack of discipline. It is worth considering then that the 
disrupted nature of command in the 34th may have disrupted the regimental 
culture; though the impact in terms of offences tried by courts martial was 
slight.  
From the quantitative study of the GRCM and GCM registers, it is 
also clear that certain periods and places saw different rates of some kinds 
of offending: for example, the flurry of food thefts in Spain and Portugal 
recorded in the GRCM register for 1813, and the burglaries in France 
recorded in the GCM register for 1819. The extent to which this reflected 
distinct behaviours as opposed to variations in reporting is difficult to know; 
however, it does suggest that soldiers were responding to the particular 
context of active campaigning for the former and military occupation for the 
latter. Berkowich’s study of the various attempts to curb drunkenness in 
Gibraltar, throughout the eighteenth century, demonstrates that increases in 
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official action against an offence can indicate both a specific problem of in-
time behaviour, and the failure of those responses to answer a well 
established culture of offending.
720
 
Though specific geographical and service contexts impacted on 
soldiers’ experiences of crime, looking at the registers and returns, along 
with earlier extant courts martial transcripts and the recollections of serving 
soldiers, what is most noticeable is the high degree of commonality in the 
kinds of behaviours soldiers engaged in and the overall balance of offence 
types. For example, charges of making away with necessaries occur 
throughout the records, often involving very similar transactional 
relationships between soldiers and civilians, regardless of where or when the 
soldiers served. The confidence trick, played on civilians by soldiers in 
Gibraltar, in which they first sold  shirts and then played on civilian fears of 
prosecution to retrieve the shirts and keep the money, was very similar to 
the confidence trick, known as ‘the calms’, noted by Coss, despite the 
soldiers concerned being separated from each other by half a century. 
Similarly, we have seen soldiers selling their necessaries in late eighteenth-
century Britain, in Screen’s ‘The Army at Home’, and in the courts martial 
cases from New York in the 1770s, and throughout the GRCM and GCM 
samples from the early nineteenth century.  
Likewise, the analysis of the registers and returns seems to confirm 
the tendency, already noted by Coss and Haythornthwaite, for soldiers to act 
together in crime, particularly where the victims were civilians, and as in the 
case of burglary from New York in 1779, in which one of the culprits 
prevented their comrades from raping a young girl, and Haythornthwaite’s 
guilt-ridden NCOs paying the widow of a peasant killed by one of their 
own, this tendency also acted in some ways to protect civilians. That this 
tendency can be seen to have operated in cases from the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, again suggests that the core behaviours and 
attitudes of soldiers towards violent crime remained broadly similar 
throughout the period. 
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Though in many respects, soldiers and civilians of an equivalent 
economic and social class experienced crime in very similar ways, there 
were clearly some aspects of the experience of crime which were soldier-
specific, shaped by their service and by the cultures of which they were a 
part and which they themselves acted to form.  For the regulars, and in 
particular those for whom army service was their primary occupation for 
life, the structures of command and authority in which they lived and served 
created the context for and shaped the mechanisms of criminal activity.  
Desertion, suicide and self-harm, all speak to the particular stresses of 
soldier service, coupled with the limited avenues available to soldiers to 
effect change in their material and emotional circumstances. High levels of 
alcohol-related offences, meanwhile, show the primacy of alcohol in the 
lives of many soldiers, and indeed in the culture of the army overall. Service 
in the army can be seen to have provided specific opportunities for some 
kinds of property crime, in particular the theft and resale of military goods, 
and the use of soldiers’ own weapons, whether in suicide or violent actions 
against others, demonstrates how criminal acts, once engaged in, took 
particular forms shaped by army service.  
Much of the scholarship on the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
soldier has framed his experience and identity in terms of being either 
primarily a soldier, culturally distinct from the civilian, or primarily a 
member of an occupational group, distinguished by the specifics of the 
soldiering profession, but with cultural continuity as the key component. 
The soldier experience of crime explored in this thesis, suggests that such a 
binary division is not appropriate. Instead, the soldier identity incorporated 
and negotiated elements of both cultures. The soldier’s experience of crime 
was differentiated from that of his civilian counterpart by the structures and 
terms of his service, and by the distinct identity he formed as a soldier; 
however, it was also intimately linked to a civilian experience.  
In ‘Making New Soldiers: Legitimacy, Identity and Attitudes, c. 
1740–1815’, Linch explores some of the complexities of soldier identity, 
and in particular how that identity was formed and inculcated in the context 
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of ‘novel’ forms of service, such as the volunteers and fencibles.721 Separate 
from the regular army, though much more numerous, the men who served in 
these different auxillary forces wrestled with an identity which was both 
‘citizen’ and ‘soldier’. They utilised many of the same techniques for 
building soldierly attitudes and contexts, used by the regulars, but the 
absence, for many, of actual combat complicated their claim on a soldier 
identity. In legitimating that soldier identity, they incorporated the 
separation of soldiers’ ‘communal action’ in parades and training, while 
maintaining close links with their civilian communities.
722
  For the soldiers 
of the auxillary forces, soldiering was part of their identity but not the whole 
of it, yet for soldiers in the regular forces the identity of soldier was 
expected to supersede and effectively replace their prior civilian identity.  
Despite this expectation, however, we can see a similarly negotiated 
identity in the soldiers who served in the regular forces. The soldier 
experience of crime in particular, both as victim and perpetrator, 
complicates our understanding of soldier and civilian relations. Sometimes 
the experience of crime evinced a sense of clear separation between soldiers 
and civilians, most clearly demonstrated in the tendency to act in groups 
against civilians, but also in the protections afforded to them by those 
soldier groups. At other times soldier crime demonstrated a sense of cultural 
continuity between soldiers and civilians, seen most clearly in soldier 
responses to perceived injustice, or the ‘contractual failures’ of their 
regimental employers. Some cases show soldiers stealing from civilians, and 
others show soldiers as victims of civilian acts of theft.  
Perhaps most indicative of the complex relations between soldiers 
and civilians are the cases which show soldiers and civilians acting in 
concert in property offences, both in terms of them acting together in thefts, 
and also as participants in illicit trading.  In such cases, particularly those 
involving the theft and resale of military goods, we can see soldiers and 
civilians effectively combining efforts against regimental authority.  
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Further complicating the soldier experience of crime, as well as what 
that can tell us about soldier identity and culture, is the question of rank. 
From the moment a new recruit enlisted in the army, he began a 
transformational journey, first from civilian to soldier, and then for some a 
transformation from soldier to holder of positions of authority or military 
rank.
723
 This latter transformation altered many aspects of the soldier’s 
service, including his experience of crime. We have seen in this study that 
the soldier experience of crime was not just differentiated from that of the 
civilian, but also according to rank and operational role. Additional 
responsibility or promotion to NCO rank offered particular opportunities for 
certain kinds of crime, in particular fraud and embezzlement; however, they 
also appear to have increased the soldier’s risk of falling victim to violent 
assault.  
The soldier’s experience of crime therefore was not static. Neither, 
though, did it progress in a single direction.  Some of the cases we have 
examined illuminate the complexity of the NCO position. On the one hand, 
cases of NCOs convicted for over-stepping the bounds of their authority 
demonstrate a sense of separation from and superiority over the men under 
their command. But we have also seen NCOs, not just committing similar 
offences to the ones committed by privates, but actively conspiring with the 
men under them, in criminal activity. And, just as the NCO role brought 
with it particular opportunities for criminal activity and illicit profiteering, it 
also made some behaviours less acceptable and NCOs seem to have fared 
much worse in the military justice system when charged with drunken 
behaviour. The tendency for NCOs to lose their status, and return to the 
ordinary ranks, also meant a return to a private’s experience of crime.  
Not only, then, was the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
British soldier’s identity a negotiation between civilian and soldier, it was 
also, for a significant minority, a negotiation between subordinate and 
superior. That this negotiation was ongoing and multi-directional is made 
evident by their experiences of crime.  
Another key part of this study has been to demonstrate the existence 
and outline the features and mechanisms of the black market in soldiers’ 
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necessaries and military goods, which operated both within regiments, 
between soldiers, and outside the regiments,  between soldiers and civilians.  
The idea of armies as market places is by no means a new one. Lynn’s study 
of women’s roles within early modern armies, for example, explores the 
semi-formal activities of seamstresses and sutlers, the ‘economy of 
makeshifts’ that had soldiers’ wives and partners engaged in wide ranges of 
ad-hoc money making, and the ‘fencing’ of pillaged goods amounting to 
what he terms a ‘pillage economy’.724  Less formally organised than later 
armies, the armies of early-modern Europe were ‘mobile cities’, with all that 
implies for trading opportunities. Sieges, meanwhile, with their almost 
settled encampments, became conduits for trade and supply between 
soldiers and civilians.
725
 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the British 
army had significantly reduced both the size and importance of the ‘mobile 
city’, applying much greater controls to the supply and support systems 
needed to maintain its forces and reducing the presence of women and other 
non-military personnel.
726
  
The informal marketplaces of regiments on campaign remained, 
however, and trading still characterised much of the relationship between 
soldiers and civilians. The ad-hoc trading of the ‘pillage economy’ remained 
an important part of soldiers’ domestic economies, but along with greater 
levels of central control and a more systemized approach to supply and 
support, came a specific trade in military goods.  By the first half of the 
twentieth century, this trade had developed into a sophisticated and 
ubiquitous feature of British army life. Clive Emsley contends that by the 
time of the second world war, ‘[e]verywhere servicemen developed their 
opportunities for working with the local black market or for selling, on their 
own account, petrol, tyres, spare parts for vehicles, vehicles themselves to 
anyone who could pay’, and that ‘on occasions, it assumed the major 
proportions of what is now labelled organized crime’.727 Sitting somewhere 
between the ‘pillage economy’ of early modern armies on campaign and the 
‘organised crime’ of Emsley’s twentieth-century British soldiers, the 
regimental economies of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
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British army had already developed some of the features of a distinct black 
market in military goods and in particular military uniforms.  
As a final caveat, it should be noted that for many, and very likely 
most, of the soldiers who served in the British army, during this period, the 
kinds of offending discussed in this study would not have formed a large 
part of their experience of service. Only a minority of soldiers found 
themselves in front of a court martial at any level. But even those who did 
not commit crimes, or who were not prosecuted for crimes, would have 
encountered criminal behaviour in others, may themselves have been 
victims of crime, and would almost certainly have been aware of, if not 
active participants in, the regimental black market. As such, a study of crime 
can tell us much about wider experiences of service and army life. 
The ways in which the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
soldier experienced crime, whether on the campaign trail, or in the informal 
marketplace of garrison or camp, offers insights into the complexities of his 
sense of identity, his relationships with his comrades, superiors and 
subordinates, and with civilians, both as victims and accomplices. His 
experience of crime carried with it elements of his civilian past, but also 
demonstrated elements of a civilian present. It was given context, shaped 
both in terms of the crimes he committed and the ways in which he 
committed them and sometimes even made necessary, by his service. Most 
of all, what comes through the military justice records is a complex and very 
human experience, on the one hand highly contextual and individual, and on 
other, strikingly institutional in nature.  
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